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INTRODUCTION

Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins1 made clear that state courts
may definitively interpret state constitutions to grant greater individual
rights than the United States Constitution provides and to prevent
interference with rights that ordinarily would not give rise to any claim
under federal

PruneYard

-

law.2

Nonetheless,

the

specific issue

that

underlay

whether state constitutions may be interpreted to protect

rights from infringement by private actors who are not subject to restraint
under current federal constitutional law - remains controversial.3
1. 447 U.S. 74 (1980), affg Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899,
5 92 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). See infra notes 50- 53 and accompanying text.
2. Admittedly, even to speak of constitutional "rights" or "guarantees" against
private action inevitably prejudges the point i n issue: whether general constitutional
"rights" against private parties exist. However, in the absence of a more acceptable
locution, those terms are used in this article as abbreviations for those interests and values
generally acknowledged to be constitutionally protected from unreasonable government
interference, and that perhaps should be constitutionally protected from certain private
interferences.
3. For many years academic discussion has focused on the issues of integrating private
non-governmental power into the legal scheme and protecting individual rights from
infringement by those who wield such power. See, e.g., Berle, Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity - Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942-53 (1952); Miller, The Constitutional Law of the
"Security State," 10 STAN. L. REV. 620 (1958); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and
the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1253 &
n.29 (1967). At the outset of the current upsurge of interest in state constitutions,
com ��ntators su�gested that state declarations of rights can resolve these issues by
prov1dmg a set of liberty enhancing norms applicable to non-governmental actors as well as
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The "state action " limitation on the scope of federal constitutional
rights posits an "essential dichotomy ... between deprivations by the
State, subject to scrutiny under [the Constitution], and private conduct,
'however discriminatory and wrongful' against which the federal Constitu
tion generally offers no shield."" Rooted in both a general view of the role of
constitutions and the particular language of the federal Constitution, the
state action doctrine is a generalized limitation on virtually all federal
governmental infringers. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 4 5 WASH. L.
REV. 454, 47 3-74 (197 0). As the state action debate continues in the wake of Prune Yard,

some academic attention is still focused on the possibilities afforded by such state
declarations in general. See, e.g., Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action"
Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221 (1985);
see also Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963) [hereinafter Developments].
Notwithstanding the importance of the basic issues at stake, however, most recent
commentaries touched upon these questions only in the context of a single factual setting or
a particular state constitutional provision. Furthermore, except for articles discussing free
speech issues, the treatment of state action under state constitutions has been brief. See,
e.g., R. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATE RIALS 127-42 (1988);
Berdon, Protecting Liberty and Property Under the Connecticut and Federal Constitu
tions: The Due Process Clauses, 15 CONN. L. REV. 4 1, 5 3-54 (1982) (Connecticut due
process clause applies only to state action); Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and
"State Action:" The View of the Framers, 2 2 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 445 (1986) (speech on
private property); Heins, "The Marketplace and the World of Ideas:" A Substitute for
State Action as a Limiting Principle Under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment,
18 SUF.FOLK L. REV. 347 (1984) (state equal rights amendment); Ragosta, Free Speech
Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (19 86) (public free speech rights in shopping centers); Note, The
Constitutionality of New York's Garageman's Lien: A "Flexible" State Action Concept
Under the State Due Process Clause, 43 ALB. L. REV. 121 (1978) [hereinafter Note,
"Flexible" State Action] (due process); Note, Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum-State
Actio n, Strict Scrutiny, and the "New Judicial Federalism," 41 Mo. L. REV. 1219, 122127, 1240-46 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Burning Tree] (equal rights amendment); Nate, Sex
Disc rimination and State Constitutions: State Pathways Through Federal Roadblocks,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115, 122-26 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Pathways]
(gender discrimination); Comment, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must ProP_erty
Rights Give Way to Free E xpression?, 64 WASH. L. RE V . 13 3 (1989) (speech on pnvate
property).
As this article goes to press, however, two articles have appeared that treat these issues
depth and reach conclusions similar to those advocated here. Cole, Federal and State
"State Action:" The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized D octrine, 24 GA. L. REV.
327 (199 0); Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights
.

m

Apply Ag ainst Private Actors?, 17 HASTING S CONST. L.Q. 111 (1990).
4. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (197 ) (qu�t�ng Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) . Although these cases involved claims ansmg under �he
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court applied the same approach to state action
questions regardless of the underly ing substantive right at is�ue : ee, e:g., Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (198 2) (enga ging in a single "state action inquiry for first, fifth and
fourteenth amendment claims).

�

�

.
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constitutional rights.11 While scholars debate whether the federal concept
of state action is "unitary" or whether its precise contours depend on the
specific rights involved,6 it is clear that private parties are ordinarily
subject to federal constitutional restraint only if they are directly influ
enced by, act in concert with, or stand in place of some government act or
official. To be sure, federal and state statutes and common law limit priva te
actions to some extent.7 But, because of state action restrictions on the
federal Constitution, most non-governmental entities - even those which
may own property invested with a public interest, provide services on which
the public depends or otherwise wield significant

de facto

power over

individuals - are permitted much greater leeway to impinge upon the
federal constitutional rights of others than would be permitted for
government agencies engaged in similar activities.8
However, as

PruneYard

indicated, analysis need not end with the

federal Constitution. During the last dozen years, many state courts have
considered whether state constitutional rights guarantees should be
construed to limit infringements b y private actors. The decisions are
5. The thirteenth amendment is an exception to this rule since the amendment and its
enabling statutes apply to purely private as well as government actions. Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-39 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
6. Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1688-98 (2d ed. 1988) and
Glennon & Nowack, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221 (federal state action decisions are not unitary; they
mask a balancing of competing rights) with Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courls
and Congressional Power, 60 N.C.L. REv. 747, 751-52 (1982) (state action is a unitary and
necessary limit on judicial and congressional power).
7. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988), which
prohibits, inter alia, private discrimination in housing, education and employment. Some
states also have passed civil rights statutes that do not require any showing of state action.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ l lH-111(West 1986). Other statutes protect
rights from private infringement in specific circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CooE §
1152 (West 1989) (guaranteeing labor organizers access to private labor camps); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 211 B.20 (West Supp. 1990) (guaranteeing political candidates access to
multiple dwellings).
Some common law doctrines, such as the traditional procedural restrictions on the
ability of lienors t o seize property or the obligation of common carriers to serve all
customers, also may be seen as promoting basic norms of equality and due process. Such
common law has also been a source of protection for speech rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 287, 277 A.2d
369 (1971). Nevertheless, these statutes and doctrines do not cover all circumstances in
which private actors may infringe basic rights. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v.
Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1978).
8. I n recent years this disp� ity has become more obvious and problemat
ic as
�
.
.
corporation� and o �her pnvate entities have grown in size and power.
Moreover, govern
ments have mcreasu gly provided goods and services similar to
those provided by private
�
en�repreneurs ' and su ultaneou ly have "privatized" such activities
�
as mail delivery and
�
.
.
pnson operations, which trad1t1onally have been governm
ent responsibilities.
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mixed: some state courts have applied their state charters to private entities
that clear ly would not satisfy any federal definition of state action;& others
ha v e co nstr ued similar provisions to apply only to state actors;10 while yet
others followed a split approach, providing protection against quasi

pri v ate infringeme nt of some rights but not others, 11 or have vacillated,
alternately rejecting and embracing traditional state action limitations in

cases raising similar legal a nd factual issues.12

While some part of this divergence among states can b e readily

explained by obvious, well-documented and non-controversial differences
in their respective constitutional texts, history or traditions, 13 in most cases
these factors provide no clear answers. Absent clear textual or historical
guidance, courts must decide whether other r easons or presumptions exist
to counsel them in determining the applicability of ambiguous state
constitutional provisions to arguably private infringers. The divergent
state court decisions r eflect sharp divisions among those jurisdictions as to
the interpretation and le gitimate role of state constitutional rights
gu arantees.
During the years surrounding

Prune Yard, several state courts issued

decisions either abandoning the state action requirement or interpreting

the requirement broadly so as to apply their respective bills of r ights to a
range of private defendants, including shopping centers,14 universities,111

insurance companies, 16 banks, 1 7 utilities,18 private clubs19 and possessory

9. California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are the most prominent of states applying
guarantees to private action. See infra notes 50-60, 127-29, 135-48, 170-72 & 190-92 and
accompanying text.
10. Connecticut and Michigan are among the most resistant. See infra notes 70-71,
118, 166, and accompanying text.
11. New York and Texas appear to follow a split approach. Compare infra text
accompanying notes 64 & 83-85 (Texas takes a relatively expansive approach to speech
guarantees) with infra text accompanying notes 119 & 123-25 (Texas continues to require
some level of state action for equality guarantees). Compare infra text accompanying note
72 (New York requires an ostensibly traditional degree of state action for speech claims)
with infra text accompanying notes 178-89 (New York creates an expansive definition of
state action for due process claims).
12. Massachusetts and Washington illustrate this phenomenon. See infra text
accompanying notes 61-62 & 76, respectively .
13. See infra text accompanying notes 37-48, 98-110, 155-62, 203-05 & 218.
14. E.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983);
AlderwoodAssocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
15. E.g., State v. Schmid , 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455
U.S.100(1982); Peperv. Princeton Univ. Bd. ofTrustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978);
Commonwealth v Tate 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981).
505 Pa. 571, 482
16. E.g., Ha;tford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, A.2d
409 (1985).
494
169,
Super.
Pa.
A.2d 542 (1984); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343
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l ienors.20 In the last several years, however, this trend has reversed. A
majority of recent decisions have held, 21 and many commentators have
argued,22 that state guarantees of individual rights do not apply to any
significant number of potential infringers not already included within the
federal definitions of state actors. Where courts have continued to reach
expansive results, they have done s o o n narrow grounds, either adopting

1 7. E.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N. J . 1 6 1 , 330 A.2d 1 (1 974).
1 8. E.g., Gay Law Students Ass ' n v. Paci fi c Tel. and Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 4 ( 1 979).
19. E.g., Burn i ng Tree Club, Inc. v. Bai num, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 8 1 7 (1 985). See
also Jonathan Club v. Cal i forn ia Coastal Comm'n, 1 97 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal. Rptr.
1 68 (1988).
20. E.g., Sharrock v. Dell Bu ick-Cadi llac, Inc., 4 5 N.Y.2d 1 52, 379 N. E.2d 1 169, 408
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1 978).
21. E.g., Fi esta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 1 59 Ari z. 3 7 1 , 767 P.2d 719
i
(Ar z. Ct. App. 1988); Schrei nerv. McKenzi e Tank L i nes, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983);
Woodland v. Mi chi gan Ci ti zens Lobby, 423 M ich. 1 88, 378 N.W.2d 337 ( 1 985); Under 21
v. Ci ty of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d I, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 { 1 985); Western Pa.
Social ist Workers 1 982 Campa ign v. Connect icut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 5 1 2 Pa. 23, 5 1 5 A.2d
1 3 3 1 (1 986); Southcenter Joi nt Venture v. National Democratic Pol ' y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash.
2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1 282 ( 1 989); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 W is. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1 987).
22. See, e.g., Dolli ver, supra note 3; Ragosta, supra note 3. See also Simon,

Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expres

33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 ( 1 985) (cri tici zi ng expansive decis ions i n the speech context
as ad hoc and as threateni ng balkanization of libert ies); Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to
Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Malling" of Constitu tional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
93 (1 983) [herei nafter Note, "Malling" of Constitutional Righ ts] (advocating reta i ni ng
the state action li m i t in modified form); Comment, supra note 3, at 1 45-52 (criticizi ng
expansive decisions as sl ighti ng property rights). B u t see Cole, supra note 3 (argui ng that
state courts should break free of federal analyses); Friesen, supra note 3 (argui ng that
California rights guarantees may apply to private i nfringers); Margulies, A Terrible
Beauty: Functional State Action Analysis and State Constitutions, 9 WHITTIER L. REV.
723 (1 988) (noti ng that state courts have not yet advanced convi nci ng rationales or
pri nci pled li mits for expandi ng the applicati on of state constituti onal rights, but argui ng
that judicial i ntervention on behalf of ind ivi dual rights i s proper i n some cases); Skover,
supra note 3 (Wash i ngton state const i tut ion i mposes an affirmat ive duty on the state to
preserve basic values from private infringement).
Recent reaffirmations of the need for a state action limi tation on the scope of state bills
of rights may be seen as part of a broader revis ioni st trend of scholars concerned over the
�ossibl� adverse consequences of i ncreasi ng reliance on and expansion of state consti tu·
ti onal nghts. See, e.g., Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Casefor
Judicial Restraint, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 85 (1 985); Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan
and the Theory ofState Constitutional Law, 1 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 ( 1 988); Maltz,
The Dark Side of State Court Ac;tivism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Maltz,
sion,

Dark Side].
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definitions of state action only slightly broader than the federal definition2s
or avoiding the issue.u
The reasons for this recent trend are not hard to discern. The
underlying concern appears to be that if courts abandon threshold
requirements of state action there will be no principled means to prevent
the "constitutionalization" of an unacceptably broad range of private law
and private relationships. More specifically, courts and commentators
have argued that state action limits are required by the plain meaning of
the particular state constitutional guarantees at issue, the framers' specific
intent, general principles of constitutional interpretation, the need to
preserve the competing rights of the allegedly infringing private parties,
and in order to preserve an appropriate allocation of powers between courts
and legislatures. Until these objections are resolved, few courts will follow
the expansive lead of Prune Yard and its progeny.211
This article argues that there are no inherent or a priori reasons for
generally imposing federal state action requirements onto state constitu
tional guarantees. To the contrary, where the text and history of a
particular constitutional provision fail to show that it was intended to bind
only the state government, alternative limits for appropriately delineating
the circumstances in which state rights should apply can be established.26
Part I of this article surveys the relevant state constitutional provisions and
decisions, focusing on the three broad substantive areas of free speech,
23.

See, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169,

408 N.Y.S.2d 39 ( l 978), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 178-89; Jones v.
Memorial Hosp. Sys. 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 83-88.
24. See, e.g. , Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1157 (1988),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 89-92.
25. This point was made explicit recently by the Washington Supreme Court, which
refused to be swayed by "the recent writings of some legal commentators which present an
array of theoretical arguments as to why they think that constitutional guarantees of
individual liberties should not be limited to protecting against actions of the state," on the
ground that constitutional interpretation "must spring not from pure intuition, but from a
process that is at once articulable, reasonable and reasoned." Southcenter Joint Venture v.
National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 427, 780 P.2d 1282, 1290 (1989)
(citation omitted). Advocates of expansive interpretations of state bills o f rights are
presently at task to show that the rationale for such expansion is not a mere intuition, but is
instead well grounded in history and reason.
26. Despite what may be its ultimate rele�ance, �his article �oes not discuss whether or
how "originalist" or "non-originalist" theories of mterpretat1on should apply to state
constitutions. It is assumed for purposes of argument that courts are bound to s oin:e exte�t to
respect unambiguous constitutional texts and their draft�r�' clearly expres�ed mtenttons.
See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Or1gmal Understa�d�ng, 60 B.�.L.
REV. 204 (1980); Devlin, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987
Louisiana Constitu
-

tional Law, 48 LA. L. REY. 335, 348-49 (1987); Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22.

8 26
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equal protection and due process. Part II c ritiques th� ar� umen s in favor

�

of imposing a state action limitation on state const1 ut1onal nghts and
concludes that, while some limits on the scope of such nghts are necessary,
i n most cases no compelling reasons for a t hreshold requirement of "state
action" exist. Part III suggests a n alternative set of limits on the
application o f state constitutional g uara n tees based on the nature of the
parties and the competing rights i nvolved.
II.

STATE CONS TITUTIONS AND STATE ACTION: DIVERGENT TEXTS
AND CONFLICTING CASE LAW
A few basic principles govern i nterpretation of state constitutional

rights. First, constitutional guarantees can be written to provide rights that
even purely private parties may not i n fringe.21 Second, state courts of last
resort are the fi n a l authorities for the interpretation of their respective state
constitutions and are free to interpret those state charters in ways that
d iverge from i n terpretations of the Constitution, even if the language is
exactly the same.28 Third, federal supremacy dictates that all state
constitutional rights are subordinate to and may not be applied to conflict
with federal statutory or constitutional rights.29 Thus, state law may add to
federal rights only i f the additional rights granted to one litigant do not
detract from the federally protected rights o f another - a possibility that
must always be considered when the conflict is between p rivate parties.30
27. For example, the thirteenth amendment forbids imposition of slavery or peonage
by any person, regardless of the existence of state action. See supra note 5 . Similar
provisions clearly a pplicable to private action also exist in many state constitutions. See,
e.g., Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, 419 ( Mo. 1 9 5 7) (interpreting Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 29); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 3 6 N.J. 189, 196, 175 A.2d 639, 643 (196 1 )
( discussing N.J. CONST. art. I , para. 19); Mount Sinai Hospital v . Davis, 18 Misc. 2d 311 ,
3 12, 190 N.Y.S.2d 8 70, 8 73 (N.Y. Sup. C t . 1959) ( discussing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17).
28. See, e.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 1 5 9 , 167 (Alaska 1972); People v. Brisendine,
13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 5 3 1 P.2d 1099, 1 111-14, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327-31 (1975); Bulova
Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d
1 41, 146 (1974) . If the state court expresses that it is not relying on federal law, the United
St�te� Supreme Court will not interfere unless the interpretation violates a federal right.
M ichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). But cf Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287,
301, 450 A.2d 925, 9 3 2 (1982) (emphasizing the persuasiveness of federal precedent and
"the general advisability in a federal system of uniform interpreta
tion of identical
constitutional provisions").
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
30. F�r ex � le, while state constitutions may require
some private property owners
� �
t � open their facilities to others, ny attempt to require
those property owners to sponsor or
� .
aid �peakers presumably would mfnnge the owners
' negative first amendment rights. See
Pa�1ficGas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm
'n, 475 U . S . 1 (1986). See a/soNote ,Access to

Private Fora and State Consti tutions: A Proposed Speec
h and

Property Analysis, 46 ALB.
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Since state constitu tional rights operate only i nterstiti ally, 31 whethe r
they may be me� ningfully a pplied to private infringers will depend upon
the degree to which federal law has preempt ed the resolutio n of conflicts in
a particular area. Despite the breadth of federal law, the "strategic space"

available for state constituti onal regulation is far from trivial i n scope and
importance. Since state law is the traditional and primary source for
defining the private "property" and "liberty" i nterests protected by the

federal due process clause, decisions i m posing reasonable restraints on
those interests in order to vindicate other state constitutiona l rights are
legitimate exercises of the state's traditional regulatory authority and not
impermissible interferences with federal law.32

Although decisions regarding the applicatio n of state rights guaran
tees to private actors have arisen in many different factual and legal
contexts, most cases have concerned three substa ntive issues:

1)

whether

private property owners can prohibit exercise of rights to speech, press,
petition and assembly on their premises;

2)

whether private entities may

discriminate agai nst members of disfavored groups; and

3)

whether

private creditors m ust afford their debtors some minimal due process
before taking action against them. For purposes of clarity, this article
reviews the constitutional texts and leadi n g decisions in each of these areas
seriatim.33
L. REV.

15 01, 1518-21 ( 1982)

(discussing the conflict between speech and property rights
in the shopping center context); Comment, supra note 3 (same).

31. Reference to the "interstitial" nature of state constitutional rights is not intended
as a statement on whether state courts should adopt a "primacy" or "interstitial" approach
to resolving cases where conduct arguably violates both federal and state constitutional
norms. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT.
L. REV. 379 (1980); Simon, supra note 22, at 315-18.

32. In Prune Yard, the shopping center argued that requiring it to provide access to
would-be speakers violated its property rights under the Constitution. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that no federal property rights were violated. Since the
Constitution protects only property rights already created by state l aw and these rights are
subject to reasonable state regulation, any burdens on the shopping center's property rights
violate the Constitution only if they become so severe as to amount to an uncompensated
"taking . " PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980). See also
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (private commercial and fraternal
organization enjoys first amendment associational rights, but those rights do not preclude
application of a state anti-discrimination statute).
It has been argued that federal decisions since Prune Yar have undercut its holding

�

that the infringement of the shopping center owner's property nghts was not so g �eat a� to
constitute an uncompensated "taking." Comment, supra note 3, at 147-51 (d1scussmg
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) and Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 ( 1987)).

�

33. State action issues have arisen in other contexts a s wel . For e x�mple, state
,
.
guarantees of privacy have been particularly important. See, e.g., Chico Feminist
Women s
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Speech, Petition and Private Property

The first amendment facially prohibits only quintessentially govern
mental activity: passing any law to limit the freedoms it declares.a.
A lthough the United States Suprem e Court once showed considerable
willingness to expand the federal state action concept in order to vindicate
freedoms of speech, assembly or petition,36 those rights are not federally
protected in the absence of state action, as currently defined. ae
I.

State Con s titutional Texts

Like their federal counterpart, virtu ally all state bills of rights
guarantee freedom of speech and the press, 37 and the rights to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress o f grievances.38 Although these provi
sions vary in form and wording, they can be grouped into three classes
based on how clearly they indicate whether the rights granted are protected

Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp. 1 1 90, i 202 ( E.D. Cal. 1983 );
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilli ng, Inc., 768 P.2d 1 1 23 (Alaska 1989); People v. Zelinski,
24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1 000, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 575 ( 1 979); Porten v. Un iversi ty of San
Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 1 34 Cal. Rptr. 8 39, 842 ( 1 976 ); State v. Nelson, 354
So. 2d 540 (La. 1 978 ) .
34. "Congress shall make no law . . . a bridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5 0 1 , 504-09 (1946 ), and Amalgamated Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 3 1 6-20 (1 968), the Court held that
si nce the privately owned company town and shoppi ng center, respect ively, had function·
ally replaced the tradit ional business district as a forum for expression, the properti es were
in fused with a "public funct ion" and the private owners were requi red to respect
i ndi viduals' ri ghts to engage i n first amendment activi t i es. The Court also has i ndicated that
private civi l suits charging vi olation of state tort Jaw could impl icate state action, at least if
the state laws involved were applied to ch ill first amendment rights. See, e.g. NAACP v.
Cla iborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 9 1 6 n.5 1 ( 1 982); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265 ( 1 964) .
36. The Court has held that the acti ons of private schools and private sector labor
unions do not involve suffici ent government action to requi re that they respect the free
speech interests of thei r employees or members despi te the signi ficant degree of governmen
tal regulation and de fa cto private coercive power present in both cases. See, e.g., Rendell 
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 ( 1 982) ; Uni ted Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski , 457 U.S.
102, 121 n. 1 6 ( 1 9 82). In a sequence of cases that influenced the recent resurgence of interest
_ _
_
_
m state const1tutional rights, the Court reversed precedent and held that the Consti tution
does not require pri vate owners of public shoppi ng centers to permi t the public to exercise
first amendment freedoms on thei r premi ses. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 ( 1 976);
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 ( 1972).
37. Only the Delaware Consti tution contai ns no explicit guarantee of freedom of
speech. However, �t g�ants a right to freedom of the press. DEL. CONST. art. I, § S .
_
and New Mexi co do not explici tly guarantee the
38. The constitutions of Minnesota
f
freedoms o peti tion or assembly.
.
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from only government interference. For example, some states guarantee
freedom of speech89 and freedom of assembly and petition"0 with language
that tracks the first amendment by providing only that "no law" shall be
passed curtailing speech, or otherwise indicating that they apply only to
govern mental entities. Not surprisingly, state courts have consistently
construed such provisions to require state action. 0
In contrast t o these few provisions, the language used by most states to
guarantee speech, press, assembly and petition do not clearly indicate
whether they apply to non-governmental infringers. For example, the
freedoms of speech and press are guaranteed in many states through the
simple statement that citizens have a right to "freely speak, write and
publish on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of that liberty."
Nineteen constitutions rely on this or similar language. The statement may
appear alone,41 or combined with other language relating only to the press
or libel." Lik ewise, a majority of assembly and petition guarantees do not
explicitly limit their application to government interference. Rather, these
provisions usually state that citizens "have a right" to peaceably assemble
39. HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 4; IND. CONST. art. I,§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 8; R .I. CONST.
art. I,§ 2l ;S C. CONST. art. I,§ 2; UTA H CONST. art. I,§ 15; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 12; w. VA.
.

CONST. art. III, § 7.
40. HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 31; LA . CONST. art. I.§ 9; N.Y.
CONST. art. I,§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 26; R.I. CONST. art. I,§ 21; S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 2;
VA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
41. See, e.g., Reiter v. American Legion, 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1947); State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 611P.2d 1147 (1980). But see Lloyd Corp. v.
Whiffen, 89 Or. A pp. 629, 634-35, 750P.2d 1157, 1160 (1988) (court's action of issuing an
injunction against persons seeking to exercise speech and petition rights within a large
private shopping center constitutes sufficient "state action" to implicate the state constitu
tional guarantee of free speech); see infra notes 63-67. See Note, Private Abridgment of
Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 182 (1980) (even speech provisions
phrased like the first amendment should not be interpreted to require state action).
42. ALAS KA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 6; IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 9;
WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 5. See generally Utter, The Right to Speak, Write and Publish
Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private A bridgement, 8 PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 157, 171-80 (1985) (discussing the text and origins of the Washington speech
guarantee).

Five other states use language in their constitutions differing from the standard
provision quoted, yet they also appear to confer a right beyond prohibiting governmental
restraints. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 16 (as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. LXXVII
Vr.
1948); Miss. CONST. art. III,§ 13; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22; N.C. CONST. art. I,§ 14;
CONST. ch. I, art. 13th.
,§ 11;
43. ARK. CONST. art. II,§ 6; ILL. CONST. art. I,§ 4; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights
INN.
M
40;
KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § § 1, 8; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art.
5;
VI,§
art.
.
CONST
S.D.
CONST. art. I,§ 3; N E B. CONST . art. I,§ 5; N.D. CONST . art. I,§ 4;
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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and petition for redress of grievances,•• or that such rights .. shall never be
abridged. "46 The class of potential i n fringers to whom that command is
a ddressed is not explicitly limited. Thus the plain texts o f these constitu
tional provisions provide no mandate for limiting their application by a
t hreshold requirement of state action.
In the final group of states, the textual l a nguage is arguably somewhat
a mbiguous because the constitutions contain more than one relevant
provision. In these states, guarantees of speech and press l ike those quoted
above appear with other language that parallels the Constitution or clearly
refers to governmen t action. One state constitution separates the two
p rovisions,48 while in others they are combined as separate cla uses or
sentences within a single provision .47 For "dual" state constitutional
g uarantees of this type, purely textual a rg u ments about their application to
non-governmental actors depend on whether the two statements are read
separately or together. If read together, as a reiteration of the same
guarantee in different forms, the explicit restrictions in one statement
could be considered i mplicit in the other. B u t if a statement regarding the
.
right "to speak and publish freely" is read as an independent grant and not
as mere surplusage, there is cause for construing that portion of the state's
44. ALA. CONST. art. I,§ 25; CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 24; CONN.
CONST. art. I,§ 1 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; GA. CONST. art. I, § I,
para. 9; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. I , § 5; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 20; KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § l ; ME. CONST. art. I, § 1 5; Mo.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 13 (no express provision regarding right to assemble);
MASS. CONST. pt. 1 , art. XIX; M ICH . CONST. art. I, § 3 ; Mo. CONST. art. I § 9; MONT.
CONST. art. II,§ 6; NEV. CONST. art. I,§ 1 0; N . H . CONST. pt. I, art. XXXII; N.J. CONST. of
1 947 art. I, para. 1 8; N.C. CONST. art. I,§ 1 2; N .D . CONST. art. I, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. I, §
3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; PA. CONST. art. I , § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I,§ 2 1 ; TENN. CONST.
art. I , § 23 (no express provision regarding the right to petition); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 27;
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 20th.
45. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 4;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 1 1 ; NEB. CONST. art. I , § 1 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4; WASH.
CONST. art. I,§ 4; w. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 6; Wis. CONST. art. I , § 4; WYO. CONST. art. I,
§ 21.
46. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5 .
47. Most of these state provisions combine the a ffirmative statement with a direct
prohibition on laws restraining speech. ALA. CONST. art. I , § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10;
FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 4; GA. CONST. art. I, para. 5; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; ME. CONST. art. I , § 4; M ICH. CONST. art. I , § 5; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8 ; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 7; NEV. CONST. art. I , § 9; N.J. CONST. of 1 947 art. I, para. 6; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 1 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ; Omo CONST. art. I, § 1 1 ; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; PA.
CONST. art. I,§ 7; TENN. CONS1:. art. I,§ 1 9 EX. CONST. art. I , § 8 ; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12;
_
the dual guarantee" is combined with additional
Wis. CONST. art. I, § 3. In Cahforma,
matters. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
,

}
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guarantee as a right enforceable agai ns t a n y infringer rather than just a
privilege against governmen tal interfere nce."8
2.

C aselaw: Is State Action Required ?

Several courts i n the late 1 9 70's a n d early l 980's capitalize d on the
expansive possibilitie s offered by the absence of explicit language requiring

state action, applying their state's speech , petition and assembly guaran
tees to limit the power of certain priva t e property owners to prohibit

expressive or political activities on their premises.'9
The first and most celebrated of these cases was Robins

v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center/'0 w hich held that the guarantees of freedom of speech

and petition in the California Constitution precluded the owner of a large
private shopping center from closing that facility to otherwise orderly

persons soliciting signatures for a petition addressed to the President and
Congress. The U n ited States Supreme Court previously held that such
shopping centers did not involve state action and thus were not required by
the Constitution to permit first amendment activity on their premises.51
Despite this, the court in

PruneYard concluded that state guarantees of

speech and petition could apply t o private actors of this type. The
California court declined to follow federal precedent essentially because of
the divergent wording of the state's constitutional provisions and the
special importance of "liberty of speech" i n that state.52 However, the
48. But see Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 4 9 2, 505-07, 407 N.W.2d 8 32, 836-37
(1987) (the "plain meaning" of such a "dual" constitutional guarantee of speech is that it
applies only to government infringement). See infra note 203.
49. For discussion of these cases see Ragosta, supra note 3, at 4-20; Developments,
supra note 3, at 1 40 1 -0 3 ; Comment, State Constitutional Rights ofFree Speech on Private
Property: The Liberal Loophole, 1 8 GoNz. L. REV. 8 1 ( 1 982- 8 3 ) .
50. 2 3 Cal. 3 d 8 9 9 , 5 9 2 P . 2 d 34 1 , 1 5 3 Cal. Rptr. 8 5 4 ( 1 979), affd, 4 4 7 U . S . 74
( 1 980).
5 1 . Hudgens v . NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 ( 1 97 6 ) . Under federal law today private actors
who perform "public functions" are bound by federal constitutional rights only ifthe public
function is both "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State" and "traditionally
associated with sovereignty." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 1 9 U . S . 345, 352-53
( 1 974). The California Supreme Court also had previously adopted a similarly restrictive
interpretation of the state constitution. Diamond v . Bland, 1 1 Cal. 3d 3 3 1 , 5 2 1 P.2d 460,
1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 4 1 9 U.S. 8 8 5 ( 1 9 7 4) (followi�g federal preced�nt and
.
concluding that state constitutional rights of speech and petition do not outweigh the
property interests of a shopping center owner).
.
.
52. 23 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 592 P.2d at 346-47 , 1 5 3 Cal. Rptr. at 8 59-60. The Cahforma
Constitution guarantee s freedom of speech through a single two-part provis on: "Ev�ry
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her se.ntiment� on �11 subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of spe�ch or
press." CAL. CONST. art. I , § 2. Although the court i n Prune Yard did not express!� discuss
the point, it evidently interpreted these two sentenc es as independent sources of nght: one

�
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court was less explicit about its reasons for a pplying the state constitution.
A l though the court discussed the practical i mportance of shopping centers
as one of the few places where peop l e congregate and may effective ly
exercise expressive or petitioning rights, it did not clarify whether it
rejected a state action requirement o r simply broadened the federal
definition of "state action" to embrace the peculiar facts of the case. 118
Subsequent California cases have not yet clarified the meaning of
PruneYard. Most lower California courts have interpreted the case as
abolishing the state action requirement in this context11" and many also
have shown a w i l lingness to extend Prune Yard to cases involving private
infringers other than shopping center owners.1111 Others have indicated
parallel to the Constitution and the other intentionally going beyond that model. The court
also relied on the state constitution's separate provision guaranteeing the right to petition:
"The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for the
redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 3.
53. 23 Cal. 3d at 9 1 0 n.5, 592 P.2d at 346-47 n.5, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 n.5.
Although the court emphasized that it was not considering "the property or privacy rights of
an individual homeowner or proprietor of a modest retail establishment," it is not clear
whether the court meant that in such cases the state constitutional rights found in
Prune Yard would not apply, or that the type of time, place and manner restrictions imposed
depend on the nature of the private property involved.
54. See, e.g., Horton Plaza Assocs. v. Playing for Real Theatre, 1 84 Cal. App. 3d 10,
228 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 7 ( 1 986), appeal dismissed, 736 P.2d 3 1 9, 236 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1 987)
(state constitution confers "affirmative expressive rights upon California citizens which
they may exercise upon private property where they have a right to be," subject only to time,
place and manner restrictions); Leach v. Drummond Medical Group, Inc., 1 44 Cal. App. 3d
362, 375, 192 Cal. Rptr. 650, 658 ( 1 983) (same). But see Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden
Rain Found., 1 3 1 Cal. App. 3d 8 1 6, 8 38, 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 3 , 825-26 ( 1 982), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1 1 92 ( 1 983) (noting the ambiguity in Prune Yard but interpreting that
case as simply broadening the definition of state action rather than abandoning the
requirement entirely).
Most courts and commentators have interpreted Prune Yard as abandoning any state
action requirement . See, e. g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash.
2d 230, 241-43, 635 P.2d 1 08 , 1 1 4- 1 5 ( 1 98 1 ) ; Ragosta, supra note 3, at 4-7 . But see Note,

Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping Centers Under the
California Constitution, 68 CALIF. L . REV. 64 1 , 6 5 7-58 ( 1 980) [hereinafter Note, Robins]

(noting California' s retention of modified state action requirements in the due process
context and reading Prune Yard similarly); Note, Free Speech, Initiative and Property in
Conflict - Four Alternatives to the State Action Requirement in Washington, 58 WASH.
L. REv. 587, 592-93 ( 1 983) [hereinafter Note, Four Alternatives] (interpreting
Prune Yard as adopting a definition for state action similar to pre-Hudgens federal law).
55. See Leach v. Drum1!1ond Medical Group, Inc., 1 44 Cal. App. 3d 3 62, 375-76, 192
C�l . Rptr. 6�0, 659 ( 1 983) (mcorporated private medical group with a de facto monopoly
_ a particular area); Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 1 3 1 Cal. App. 3d
w1thm
8 1 � , 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 8 1 3 ( 1 982), appeal dismissed, 4 5 9 U.S. 1 1 92 ( 1 98 3 ) (private walled
residential community). See also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 3 1 1 , 667 P.2d 704,
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hostility to such an e xtension.ae Nevertheless, California law is clear: at
least some large private entities must respect speech and petition rights as
if those entities were state actors; these entities may impose time, place and
manner restrictions on the exercise of such rights only to the same degree

and for the same purposes as permitted to government entities;67 and the
right of access, which was originally recognized to protect petitioning and
other forms of politi c a l activity, has been extended to protect other forms of
speech as well."
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of

PruneYard, the highest courts of New Jersey,69 Pennsylvania60 and
Washington•• rendered decisions abandoning a threshold requirement of

193 Cal. Rptr. 900 ( 1 9 83) (impliedly approving extension of Prune Yard to a small shopping
center).
56. Stt, t.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 1 72 Cal. App. 3 d 322, 3 42 n.8,
218 Cal. Rptr. 228, 240 n.8 ( 1 985) (in dictum, declining to independently apply the state
constitution to a private university).
57. Stt, t.g., H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 1 93 C al. App. 3d
1 193, 1208, 238 Cal. Rptr. 84 1 , 850 ( l 987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 ( 1 988) (holding that

P1'1'MYard "did not establish a new standard of reasonableness to be applied to private
property" and subjecting the shopping center to the same rigorous review of its proposed
time, place and manner restrictions as would be applied to government regulation of
speech); Horton Plaza Assocs. v . Playing for Real Theatre, 1 84 Cal. App. 3d 1 0, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 8 1 7 (1 986), appeal dismissed, 736 P.2d 3 1 9, 236 C al. Rptr. 905 ( 1 987) (same).
58. Stt. t.g., Northern Cal. Newspaper Organizing Comm. v. Sol a no Assocs., 193
Cal. App. 3d 1644, 239 Cal. Rptr. 227 ( 1 987) (labor union's distribution within shopping
center of litcrature concerning labor dispute protected by California Constitution); Laguna
Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 1 3 1 C al. App. 3d 8 16, 837-38, 1 82 Cal. Rptr. 813,
825-26 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1 1 92 ( 1 98 3 ) (rights extend to commercial
speech).
59. State v. Schmid, 84 N .J . 535, 569, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 633 (1 980), appeal dismissed
.sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 1 00 ( 1 982). See generally Note, supra note
30, at 1512- 1 8 . See also Zelenka v. Benevolent a nd Protective Order of Elks, 1 29 N.J.
Super. 379, 324 A.2d 35 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 3 1 7, 3 3 1 A.2d 1 7" ( 1 974)
(violates public policy to permit a purely private club to expel a member solely because of
free speech rights).
60. Commonwealth v. T ate, 495 Pa. 1 58, 1 75, 4 3 2 A.2d 1 382, 1 39 1 ( 1 98 1 ) (holding
that the state guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly preclu?ed enforceme� t of
trespass laws against persons peacefully handing out leaflets at a pubhc event on a private
college campus).
This decision was significantly limited in Wes tern Pa. Socialist Workers 1 982
·

�

�

Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 51 2 Pa. 23, 5 1 5 A.2d 1 3 3 1 1 986), where t e
court held that the state constitution did not require a large priv ate shopping mall to permit
access for a political candidate seeking signatures on a nominating petition.
61. Alderwood Assocs. v. W ashington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243-44, 635
P.2d 108, 1 15- 16 ( 1 9 8 1 ). The court held, in a plurality opinion gar� e� i!1 g four vo� e�, that
.
state action is not required for claims brought under the SJX'. ech and 1m�1attve provlSlons of
the state constitution. Accordingly, the owners of a large pnv� t� �h?ppmg �c: nter could not
exclude a nondisruptive group soliciting signatures on an m1tt ative petition.
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state action for claims arising under their state guarantees of speech,
a ssembly and petition. Massachusetts abandoned the requirem�nt with
.
respect to petitioning activities protected by a related state const1tut1onal
guarantee of free and fair elections.62 Appellate courts i n Oregon63 and
Texas,6" also have recently rendered similarly expansive decisions that
apply state constitutional speech and petition rights to lim i t infringe� ent
_
by private actors.66 In each case however, the stat� court f� 1 led to provide a

complete rationale for departing from a state action reqmrement. Instead

the opinions restated only uncontroversial points: that the rights at stake
were traditionally regarded as particularly important; that state courts
may interpret their constitutions i n dependently of federal law; that the
state constitutional provisions in issue included no express la nguage
requiring state action; and that state cou rts, unburdened by federalism
concerns or the need for nationally uniform rules, can exercise greater
interpretive freedom than federal cou rts . 66 B ut these factors only establish
From its inception, the analysis and results in Alderwood have been hotly debated. See,
e.g., Dolliver, supra note 3; Skover, supra note 3, at 241 -47; Utter, supra note 42, at I 8 1-89;
Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 54, at 5 94-608 . See also Lobsenz & Swanson, The
Residential Tenant 's Right to Freedom ofExpression, 1 0 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. I , 2027 ( 1 986) (advocating expansion of the A lderwood analysis to tenants) .
The Washington Supreme Court has recently modified Alderwood in Southcenter

Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1282
( 1 989). See infra note 76.
62. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N .E.2d 590, 593 ( 1 983).
This decision was limited in Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 58 1 , 452 N. E.2d 188
( 1 983), indicating that state action is required for claims arising under the state
constitutional guarantee of free speech.
63. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1 1 5 7 ( 1 98 7 ) , ajfd. 307 Or.
674, 773 P.2d 1 294 ( 1 989) (finding sufficient "state action" to trigger the state speech
guarantee merely because the private shopping center owner could seek a court injunction
to enforce his decision to exclude political speakers from the premises) . See infra text
accompanying notes 89-90.
64. Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564, 567
(Tex. Ct. App. 1 98 7 ) , cert. denied, 1 09 S. Ct. 7 1 ( 1 9 8 8 ) (based on PruneYard, Schmid,
Tate and Alderwood, " [a ] lthough private property is involved in this case, it is not
determinative of' a claim of violation of the Texas constitutional guarantee of free speech).
65. The Supreme Court of Alaska also has hinted at such a result. Johnson v. Tait, 774
P.2d 1 8 5, 1 9� (Alaska 1 989) (state constitutional guarantee of free speech did not apply to
preclude a p�1vate bar owner from prohibiting patrons from wearing motorcycle club colors
on th � pr�m1ses because the s i:iian proJ?rietor's right of autonomy outweighed the patron's
.
const1tutlonal nght �f expression, leavmg open the question of how these competing rights
would be balanced m the context of shopping centers or other similar fora).
66. See, e.g., Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 8 7-93, 445 N.E.2d at 592-95; State v. Schmid,
84 � .J. 535, 5 � 3-60, 423 A . 2d 6 1 5, 624-28 ( 1 980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton
Umv. v. Schmid, 4 5 5 U.S. 1 00 ( 1 982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 1 58 , 1 68-73, 432
A.2d 1 382, 1 387-90 ( 1 98 l ) ; Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council ' 96 Wash. 2d
230, 234-44, 635 P.2d 1 08 , 1 1 1 - 1 6 ( 1 98 1 ) .
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that state courts m a y interpret state action d i fferently than t h e S u preme
Court; they do not indicate whether state action should be required and if

h

so, how it should be defined . As to these points, t h e courts decided only t at
each case presented a confl ict of private rights that the court should resolve
on the merits.''
In contra st, other states that considered t h e issue, including N orth
Carolina," Oklahoma,99 Connecticut,7 0 M ichigan,7 1 New York,72 Wis
consin,n Arizona" and, a pparently, M i ssouri,7� concluded that their
constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly, petition and related rights
do not extend beyond prohibiting government infringement, and do not
grant any right of access t o private property .76 Courts that have taken such
restrictive approaches have articulated a number of reasons for their
refusal to interpret their constitutions more broadly than the B i l l of Rights.
Prominent among those rationales are the courts' contentions that ex
tending state constitutiona l rights beyond protection against the govern
ment violates a general principle of American consti tutional law,77 that
67. In Alderwood, the court explicitly noted that the absence of constraints applicable
under federal law allowed the state court to "evaluate in each case the actual harm to the
speech and property interests" at stake in the case. 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 1 1 5. In
other decisions, a similar view of the court's role is implied by the extensive balancing of the
competing interests and the concern for fashioning time, place and manner restrictions to
maximize both parties' interests.
68. State v. Felmet, 302 N .C. 1 7 3, 273 S.E.2d 708, 7 1 1 ( 1 98 1 ) . See Simon, supra note
22, at 327·28 (the North Carolina provision "reads more affirmatively than most").
69. Oklahomans For Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Okla., Inc., 634 P.2d 704, 708 n. 1 5
(Okla. 1981 ).
70. Cologne v. Wcstfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 201 ( 1 984) .
71. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 378 N.W.2d 3 3 7 ( 1 985).
72. Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N. E.2d 1 2 1 1 , 498
N .Y.S.2d 99 ( 1 98 5 ) .
73. Jacobs v . Major, 1 3 9 Wis. 2 d 492, 4 0 7 N.W.2d 8 3 2 ( 1 987).
74. Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 1 59 Ariz. 37 1 , 767 P.2d 7 1 9
(1988).
75. Kugler v. Ryan, 6 8 2 S.W.2d 47, 5 1 ( Mo. Ct. App. 1 984).
76. In addition, Washington, one of the states that had initially upheld a right of
access to private property subsequently held that the state's speech and assembly
guarantees do require state action. South center Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y
Comm. , 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1 28 2 ( 1 98 9 ) . Southcenter did not disavow the result in
Alderwood, but it did explicitly overrule the plurality's reasoning. In �outhcenter th� co�rt
_
followed Justice Dolliver's concurring opinion i n Alderwood by drawmg a sharp d1stmction
the state
of
between guarantees in the state declaration of rights and other provisions
ter that
Southcen
in
insistence
s
constitution. However, in light of the court's vociferou
applying guarantees against private action would be "to a�t con�rary to the fundamental
nature" of state constitutions this distinction between nghts is tenuous.
77. See, e.g .. Woodland � . Michigan Citizen s Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88, 204-05, 378
N.W.2d 337, 344 ( 1 9 8 5); Shad Alliance v . Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 502-03 , 488
N.E.2d 1 2 1 l , 1 2 1 5, 498 N .Y .S .2d 99, 103 ( 1 98 5 ) ; Southcenter, 1 1 3 Wash. 2d at 422-23,
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such an extension would ignore the pa rticular historical origins of the

provisions, and the framers' intentions, 7 8 that such a n ex � ension would

result in arbitrary d istinctions between l a rge and sma ll busmesses,7• that

the rights of private property owners w ould be disproporti ?nat� ly im
.
paired,80 and that the legislature s hould balance such confl1ctmg rights. 81

3.

Caselaw: How Should State Action Be Defined?

Courts that interpret state constitutional guarantees of speech and
petition to require state action d i ffe r in defining the requiremen t. While
some courts adhere closely to federal precedent, 82 other courts expand their
definition to include entities not considered state ac tors under the federal
constitution.
For example, in Jones v. Memorial Hospital System11 the Texas
Court of Appe a l s considered a nurse's claim that she was discharged from a
l a rge private hospital in reta liation for writing a newspaper article, thereby
violating her right of free speech under the Texas Constitution. The court
did not decide whether the state constitution applied to wholly private
entities, but did hold that the affirmative provisions o f the Texas Constitu-

780 P.2d at 1 286-87; Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash i ngton Envtl. Counc i l, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
347-53, 635 P.2d 1 08, 1 1 8- 1 9 ( l 98 1) (Dolli ver, J., concurring); Jacobs, l 39 W is. 2d at 5061 3, 407 N.W.2d at 837-4 1 .
78. Cologne v. West fa rms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 60-62, 469 A.2d 1 20 1 , 1207-08
( 1 984); Woodland, 96 M ich. 2d at 204-09 & n.25, 3 78 N.W.2d at 345-46 & n.25; Shad
A lliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 500, 504 n.6, 488 N.E .2d at 1 2 1 3-14, 1 2 1 6 n.6, 498 N.Y.S.2 d at
1 0 1 -02; 104 n.6. However, the justices do not always interpret the hi storical record
si mi larly. See, e.g. , Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 5 1 0- 1 1 , 488 N.E.2d at 1 220-2 1, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 1 08-09 ( Wachtler, J., dissenti ng).
79. See, e.g. , Cologne, 1 92 Conn. at 64, 469 A.2d at l 209; Jacobs, 1 39 Wis. 2d at 518,
407 N.W.2d at 843.
80. See, e.g., Woodland, 423 Mich. at 2 1 0-1 1 , 3 78 N.W.2d at 347 ( ci ti ng L. TRIBE,
A MERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 149 ( 1st ed. 1 918) ) ; Southcenter, l l 3 Wash. 2d at 430,
780 P.2d at 1 290-9 1 .
8 1 . See, e.g., Cologne, 1 92 Conn. at 65, 469 A.2d at 1 2 1 0; Woodland, 423 Mich. at
2 1 1 - 1 2, 378 N.W.2d at 347-48; Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 504-05, 488 N.E.2d at 12161 7, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 1 05; Southcenter, l J 3 Wash. 2d at 425-26, 780 P.2d at 1 288-89;
A lderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 250, 635 P.2d at 1 1 9 ( Dolliver, J., concurring).
�2. No state court is bound. to adopt federal standards in interpreti ng thei r own state
_
coll:stttutions.
Even courts that rely heavi ly on federal precedent in defini ng government
acti on acknowledge that it is only persuasive authori ty. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines
Inc., 432 So. 2d 567, 569 ( Fla. .1 983). Some courts have been persuaded by the extensively
developed, though often con fusing, federal "state acti on" jurisprudence. See, e.g. , Cologne,
1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 20 1 ; State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 ( 1 98 1).
83. 7 46 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 988) ( reversing the trial court's grant of
_
_
summary JUd�ment
m favor of the defendant hospital on the ground that i t was not a state
ac�or). Cf Gibbons v. State, 775 S.W.2d 790 ( Tex. Ct. App. 1 989) (treating a private
dnveway as a non-public forum for speech purposes).
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tion permitted it to .. adopt a test that requires a lower threshold of public
activity ."" Applying this lower threshold , the court stated if the hospital
was "substantial l y involved with state a n d federal activity" it should be
treated as a public entity for state constitutional purposes .&& Plaintiff's
allegations, which if proved would satisfy the state action requirement,
amounted to commonplace factors such as state l i censing and regulation of
the hospital, state and federal grants to the hospital, and a number of
contractual and other relationships w ith the government. The decision to
terminate the nurse's employment was m a d e i n dependently b y the manag
ers of the hospi tal w i thout involvement by state officials.86
The result in

Jones w ould

have been d i fferent if the court had applied

federal standards. Where state action is a l leged on the basis of "entangle
ment" between the government and private actor, a plaintiff w ho w ishes to
state a federal constitutional claim must show that the state is "responsi
ble" for the "specific conduct" of the private en tity because of its exercise
of coercive power or signi ficant encouragement. Mere acquiescence by the
state in decisions independently reached by private parties is insufficient to
imbue them with "state action." 87 Under this d efinition, the U nited States
Supreme Court has held that entities s i m i la r to the defendant hospital in
Jones will not be rega rded as .. state actors" for federal constitutional
purposes absent the k i n d of official involvement that apparently was not
alleged in

Jones.88

The Oregon Court of Appeals recently reached a result similar to
Jones by effectivel y expanding the definition of state action. Lloyd Corp.

v.

Whi.ffen89 held that the state constitution's free speech guarantee pre
cluded a state j udge from enjoining a political speech a n d signature
gathering in a l a rge s hopping center .90 T h e court avoided a direct
confrontation w i t h the state action question. However, since all private
rights are ultimately defined and enforced by courts, a finding of state
action based on nothing more than one private citizen seeking j udicial
84. Id. at 895. The relevant provision in the Texas Bill of Rights is a ''.d ual" pro�isio�.
The first clause states that " [ e ]very person shall be at liberty to sp��k, wr�,te or pubhsh his
opinions on any subject, being responsible for the a bus� ?f that P.nvtlege, and the second
clause provides that "no law shall ever be passed curta1hng the hberty of speech or of the
press." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 .
85. 746 S.W.2d at 8 9 5 .
86. Id. at 895-96.
107 v.
87. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 9 9 1 , 1 004 ( 1 982); Moose Lodge No.
lrvis, 407 U.S. 1 6 3 , 1 76-77 ( 1 972).
991 .
88. Rendell-Baker v . Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 ( 1 982); Blum, 451 U.S.
1 294 ( 1 989).
P.2d
773
89. 89 Or. App. 629, 7 5 0 P.2d 1 1 57 ( 1 98 8 ) , affd, 307 Or. 674,
90. Id. at 632, 7 5 0 P.2d at 1 1 59 .
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assistance to protect his rights against violation by another private citizen
would considerably expand the concept o f state action. While the U nited
States Supreme Court once appeared t o embrace such a the�ry for c ertain
.
federal constitutional purposes,91 today such facts would be msuffic1ent to
find state action under the first amendment. 92
B.

Private Discrimination and the Equality Ideal

The issue of w h ether state constitutional guarantees of equal protec
tion create rights enforceable against non-governmental entities has
aroused far less judicial activity and scholarly scrutiny than have speech
and private property · rights.93 In light of federal and state statutes
specifically requiring private and government actors to treat some disfa
vored classes equally, it is unlikely that state constitutional l a w will play a
dominant role in this fiel d . However, the statutes do not protect all persons,
and there are indications that some state courts are expanding the class of
arguably private entities constitutional l y required to treat others equally.94
The fourteenth amendment unequivocally states that it applies only to
government activity;911 accordingly, the Supreme Court has never w avered

9 1 . Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 ( 1953) Uudi c i al award of damages for breach of
a racially restrictive covenant consti tuted state act ion) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l
( 1 948) Uudicial enforcement of a raci ally restrictive covenant consti tuted state act ion
under the fourteenth amendment).
92. Although the above cases were not overruled, courts have not followed them. They
are best understood as a response to the unique problems of raci al discri mination and the
balance of substantive r i ghts at issue in those cases. See. e.g., Glennon & Nowack, supra
note 6, at 238-43; Henki n, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 1 1 0 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 474-79 ( 1 962); Leedes, supra note 6, at 763-70.
93. Issues regardi ng the origin and substantive interpretation of state consti tutional
equality guarantees have received substantial scholarly attention. See, e.g., Schuman, The
Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities: " A State's Version of "Equal Protection," l 3
VT. L. REV. 221 ( 1 988); Wi lli ams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REv. 1 1 95 ( 1 985). However, few commentators have di rectly addressed the issue of
whether such guarantees are l imited by any state acti on requirement. See. e.g., Heins,
supra note 3, at 349-65; Note, Burning Tree, s upra note 3, at 1 240-46; Note, Pathways,
supra note 3, at 1 25-26.
94. The lack of statutory protect ion of women and of gay and lesbian i ndividuals, for
example, has forced. these groups to explore the possibility that state consti tutions might
_ f from private actors. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Paci fic Tel. and Tel.
afford relie
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4 ( 1 979) ; Peper v. Pri nceton Univ. Bd. of
Trustees . 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 ( 1978) (gender d i scriminati on).
95. ..No State shall . . . deny to any person w i thi n i ts jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 .
The C:onstitution cont�i ns no language expressly prohibiting the federal government
f�om d�ny1�g equal pro�ect1on of the laws to c i t i zens. However, a prohi b it ion on federal
.
d1scnmmat1on, paralleling the prohibition of state d i scri mination under the fourteenth
amendment, has been read i nto the "due process" clause of the fifth amendment.
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in its holding that private discrimination i s beyond its scope. While the
Supreme Court once demonstrated a will ingness to expand the boundaries
of the state action concept to reach cases of r a cial discrimination

ee the
'
Burger Court's restrictive approach to the state action concept in other

contexts today extends to federal equality rights as well .97
1.

S tate Constitutional Texts

State constitutional provisions gua r anteein g equality are so variable
in their wording as to defy definite categorization.98 Nevertheless, as with
state constitutional guarantees of speech and petition, state equality
provisions can be grouped according to the extent to which t h ey facially
indicate whether they apply to private conduct .99 Some either expressly
state100 or clearly i mply1 0 1 an intent to restrict only discrimination by some
Weinbcrger v. Wiesenfcld, 420 U.S. 636, 6 3 8 n . 2 ( 1 97 5 ) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U . S . 497,
499 ( 1 954) . The fifth amendment, like the fourteenth amendment, was intended to restrict
only government action.
96. In cases such as Reitman v. Mulkey, 3 8 7 U .S . 3 69 ( 1 967) , Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 ( 1 966), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 3 6 5 U.S. 7 1 5, 724-25 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 4 6 1 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , and Shelley v . Kraemer, 334 U .S . l ( 1 94 8 ) , the Court
articulated several new and expansive theories by which otherwise private entities were held
to be sufficiently related to the state to be required to observe fourteenth amendment norms
of racial neutrality. Although the Court has never stated that the threshold for state action
would vary depending on the nature of the constitutional rights allegedly infringed, it has
been noted that the Court at one time appeared more willing to find state action in racial
discrimination cases. See Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 473 n.9, 5 0 1 P.2d at 60102 n.9, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 2 3 - 24 n.9.
97. See, e. g., San Francisco Arts and Athletics v. U n ited States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 ( 1 987); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 1 63 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Evans v. Abney, 396 U .S. 435
(1970).
98. However, courts have tended to interpret these facially divergent provisions in
ways that render them similar in substance. See generally Williams, supra note 93.
99. Some commentators have argued that such differences in phrasing are significant
in determining whether a particular practice violates the provision. See, e.g., W illiams,
supra note 93, at 1 2 1 0- 1 2 ( arguing that provisions prohibiting "discrimination" in the
exercise of civil rights implies broader substantive protection than is given under the federal
equal protection doctrine); Note, Pathways, supra note 3 , at 1 25-26. As discussed below, it
does not appear that such variances in wording are often determinative of w ether a
provision can apply to private actors. See infra notes 1 1 1 -36 and accompanymg text.
Nevertheless, the cases indicate that the phrasing of the state guarantee m�y hav� some
impact on the arguments raised, and state provisions will be grouped in this fashion for
clarity.
100. N . H . CONST. art. 2d; PA. CONST. art. I , § 26; VA. CONST. art. I , § 1 1 . Virginia also
relies on a separate constitu tional provision prohibit ing special legislation. VA. CONST. art.
_
IV , § 14. Virginia's constitution, however, grants no greater protection than the federal
Constitution. See, e .g. , Boyd v . Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 7 8 1 , 786 (W.D. Va. 1 986) . Cf Carson
v. Maurer, 1 20 N . H . 925, 9 3 0-3 1 , 424 A.2d 8 2 5 , 8 3 0 ( 1 980) (locatin g the state equal

?
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level of government upon a showing of state action. Other provisions
i mpose explicit obligations on private as well as government actors. 102
Unlike state guarantees of speech and petition, however, the majority
o f state equality provisions do not facially i n dicate whether state action is
required. Such provisions can be classified i n to two groups: those following
the federal Constitution by phrasing the right as a right to "equal
protection of the l aw ; " 1 03 and those that phrase the right as one of "equality
under the law," "equality before the law," or the equivalent . 1 04 In addition,
many state constitutions lack express constitutional guarantees of equal
ity, instead reading such rights into more general constitutional language
including guarantees of "natural" or "inalienable" rights,1 05 or due
process ;106 requi rements that laws shall have "uniform operation;"107

protection guarantee in the combination of articles 2d and 1 2th of the New Hampshire
Constitution).
101. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.
The Louisiana Bill of Rights also contains a separate provision prohibiting discrimination in
access to public accommodations, LA. CONST. art. I, § 1 2, which was intended by its drafters
to apply to private infringements. See generally Hargrave, The Declaration ofRights ofthe
Louisiana Constitution of 1 974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1 , 6-10, 37-40 ( 1974).
1 02. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ l & 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N. Y. CONST. art. I, §
1 1 . Surprisingly, some of these provisions also have been interpreted to require state action,
despite their texts. See infra notes 1 1 1 - 1 2 and accompanying text.
103. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; GA. CONST. art. I, § l , para. 2;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST. art.
I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3. See Margulies, A Lawyer's View of the Connecticut
Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 107, 1 08-09 ( 1 982) ( identifying three additional sections
of the Connecticut Constitution that also protect rights of equality to some degree).
1 04. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; MASS. CONST. Declaration of
Rights, art. I; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
Several states also have adopted separate constitutional provisions explicitly prohibiting
discrimination based on gender, the majority of which guarantee equality of rights "under
the law," regardless of sex. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § l . For background
and discussion of the various provisions, see generally Comment, Equal Rights Provisions:
The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086 ( 1 977).
105. See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm' n v. Case, 1 5 1 Colo. 235, 380
P.2d 34 ( 1962) (construing Cow. CONST. art. II, § 3); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City,
237 Kan. 572, 583, 701 P.2d 13 14, 1 326 ( 1 985) ( KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1 ); State v.
Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 384, 377 N.W.2d 5 10, 5 1 4 ( 1 985) (NEB. CONST. art. I, § I ) ; Peper
v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 79, 389 A.2d 465, 477 ( 1 978) (N.J. CONST.
of 1 947 art. I, para. l ) ; Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Wisconsin Dep' t of Health and
Social Serv., 1 30 Wis. 2d 79, 83, 387 N.W.2d 254, 256 ( 1 986) ( Wis. CONST. art. I, § I).
106. See, e.g., State v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 299 Md. 3 1 0, 326-27 n.7, 473 A.2d
892, 900 n.7 (Ct. App. 1 984) (Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 23); Thompson v.
Estate of Petroff, 3 1 9 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1 982) (MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2); T.l.M. Co. v.
Okla �oma Land Title Ass' n, 698 P.2d 9 1 5, 920-21 (Okla. 1 984) (OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
7); N1chols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S . W.2d 1 3, 1 8 (Tenn. 1 982) (TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 8); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 1 60 W. Va. 1 72, 1 79 233 S.E.2d 3 1 8, 324
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denials of ..ar�itrary �wer;" 1 08 �opulist inspired provisions initially
_
drafted to forbid granting of special pnvileges or emoluments;10& or a
combination of several of t hese or other state constitutional rights .110 Not
surprisingly, these provisions provide little unambiguous textual guidance
as to whether state action should be required.
2.

Caselaw: Is State Action Required ?

A great majority of state courts have held that state constitutional
equality provisions require state action. They have done so regardless of
(1 977) (W. VA. CONST. art. I I I , § 10). In Mississippi, the situation is unclear. See, e.g.,
Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penny Co., 3 1 3 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1 975) (rejecting a challenge to
Sunday closing laws as violative of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment and MISS. CONST. art. 3 , § 1 4, without clearly construing the reach of the state
provision).
107. See, e.g., Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 66 1 , 669-70 (Utah 1984) (UTAH CONST. art.
I, § 24).
108. See, e.g., Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 605
S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky. App. 1 980) . (KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 2).
109. Such provisions generally state that "no law shall be passed" granting any citizen
or class of citizens "privileges, o r immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens." See, e.g., Valley Nat'! Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 55455, 159 P.2d 292, 299 ( 1 945) (ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 1 3 ) ; Cunningham v. Aluminum Co. of
Am. 417 N.E.2d 1 1 86, 1 1 9 1 (Ind. 1981 ) (I ND . CONST. art. I , § 23); Waterloo v. Selden, 251
N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1 977) (IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d
128, 133, 243 N. E.2d 66, 70 ( 1 968) , appeal dismissed and cert . denied, 395 U.S. 1 63
(1969) (0HIO CONST. art. I, § 2); State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 370-72, 667 P.2d 509, 5 1 2
(1981) (OR. CONST. art. I, § 20); Roden v . Solem. 4 1 1 N.W.2d 421 , 422 (S.D. 1987) (S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 1 8) ; Darrin v . Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 8 59, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 887-88 ( 1 975)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 2) .
Similar provisions exist i n the constitutions o f several other states, including some that
guarantee equality or freedom from discrimination in more familiar language. See, e.g.,
CONN.CONST. art. I, § § 1 & 20; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 . 0n the
origin and development of such provisions, see generally Schumann, supra note 93, at 22226; Williams, supra note 93, at 1206-08.
1 10. See, e.g., Hueytown v. Jiffy Chek Co., 342 So. 2d 7 6 1 , 7 6 2 (Ala. 1977)
(construing a general right of equality from the combination of ALA . CoNST .. art. I, § § 1, 6 &
_
22, which respectively concern inalienable rights, due process and cnmmal procedural
rights, and forbidding "special privileges"); State v . Russell, 1 03 Idaho 6�9, 7.00, 652 P.2d
203, 204 (1982) (construing a general equality guarante e from the combmation of IDAHO
CONST. art. I, §§ l , 1 3, & 1 8, which respectively speak of inalienable rights, due process and
access to courts for the redress of injuries); State v . Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 1 0 1 Nev. 6? 8,
708 P.2d 1022 ( 1 98 5 ) (construing NEV. CONST. art. I , § 1 & art. IV, § 2 1 , which
respectively address inalienable rights and uniform application of laws); Nygaard v.
Robinson, 341 N.W.2d 349, 3 5 7 & n. l (N.D. 1 9 8 3 ) (construing N.D. CONST. art . .1 . §§ �l
& 22, which respectively forbid special privileges and require general laws to be �mfor� m
operation). Cf Du Pont v. Famil y Court, 1 53 A.2d 1 89, 1 92 (Del. 1 9 59) (co? strumg a right
to non-discriminatory access to courts from DEL. CoNST. art. I, §§ 7 & 9, which concern due
process and access to courts, respectively).
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how the provision in issue is framed. I n one extreme example involving a
gender discrimination claim against a l a rg e civic organization, the Alaska
Supreme Court held, despite a state equality guarantee expressly placing
its "obligations" on "all persons," t h a t a showing of government action
was, nevertheless, a prerequisite for a n y claim brought thereunder. 1 1 1 In so

holding, the court did not define ·th e "all persons" language, nor did it
present any evidence o f the intentions o f the state constitution's dra fters or
ratifiers. Rather, the decision invoked a general axiom of "American
constitutional theory" that constitut ions restrain govern ments only.112
Although arguably ambiguous o n thei r faces, us equality guara ntees
framed like the federal Constitution i n terms of "equal p rotection of the
laws," have been universally construed to apply only to state actors. In Gay
Law Students Association

v.

Pacific Telep hone and Telegraph Co. , 114 the

1 1 1 . United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1 008, 1 0 1 3 (Alaska 1983)
(challenging the association's policy of excluding women from membership, as, inter a/ia,
violative of ALASKA CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. I, §§ I & 3).
1 1 2. Richardet, 666 P.2d at 1 0 1 3 . The court cited no authority for this axiom other
than its own dictum in a prior case. See also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y.
5 1 2, 87 N.E.2d 541 ( 1 949). In this early case involving a race discrimination claim against a
large privately owned but state aided urban redevelopment project, the New York Court of
Appeals construed a rather complex constitutional equality provision, N . Y. CONST. art. I, §
1 1 . The court held that to the extent the guarantee is phrased in terms of a right to "equal
protection of the laws," it applied only to governmental actors. Despite the existence of
other language indicating an intent to protect civil rights from private as well as government
discrimination, the New York court relied on what it took to be "the plain meaning of plain
words." In addition, it relied on the identity of language between the state and federal
provisions and on some historical evidence that the framers of the New York provision
intended to track the substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment to reach that result.
Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 530- 3 1 , 87 N.E.2d at 548.
1 1 3. Most of these provisions consist of only a statement of the right without further
elaboration or restriction. In five states, the equality guarantee is combined in a single
section with a guarantee of due process. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 ; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5;
I LL. CONST. art. I , § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; N . M . CONST. art. I I , § 1 8 . In another seven
constitutions, the equality provision appears either alone or in combination with other
matte�s. AR�. CONST. art. II, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2
(combined with a guarantee of inalienable rights and other matters); M ASS . CONST.
Declaration of Rights, art. I (combined with a guarantee of inalienable rights); MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CoNsT . art. I, § 3 (due process and inalienable rights); TEX. CONST.
.
.
art. 1.,§ 3� · In either c�se, nothing on the face of the provisions, other than that they refer to
.
equality of the laws, seems to suggest that only state actors must observe their precepts.
'?ther state gua ra�tees are �ritten to obl igate the government to enforce the right to
.
.
equality, but do not md1cate agamst whom this
enforcement is to be directed. GA. CONST.
art. I, § l , para. 2; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 . While these provisions expressl
y refer to
�ov�rnments rather tha n to private a�tors, it is not clear that they bar only government
.
.
mfrmgements. Indeed , if these prov1s1ons are construed to impose
an affirma tive govern
mental duty to prevent discriminatory action by non-governme
ntal actors they could have
the same effect as an equality guarantee direct ly enforc
eable agains t p;ivate infringers.
1 14. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr.
1 4 ( 1 979).
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California Supreme Court recognized that the state's equal protection
guarantee, though ph rased in terms of "equal protection of the laws "

d

differed from its federal counterpart i n that it contained n o expli it
requirement of government action . 1 1 11 T h e court, nevertheless , h eld that a
limitation should be read into the state constitution because t h e drafting
history of the equality provision failed to d emonstrate a specific intention
on the part of the d r a fters to reach private conduct.116 Courts i n Illinois,
Michigan and Connecticut, which also have constitutional guarantees
phrased in terms of "equal protection of the laws," reached similar
conclusions on less a nalysis. The Illinois Appellate Court relied on no more
than the assertion, without citation, that " [i ] t is fundamental " that state
constitutional guarantees "apply only to governments and not to individu
als."117 The Michigan District Court and t h e Connecticut Supreme Court
relied on a reaffir mation, without discussion, that the state and federal
equal protection provisions "have the same meaning and the same
limitations."118 T h e unexpressed pres u m ption appears to be that a state
constitutional provision framed in the s a m e w ords as a federal provision
was intended to a pply exactly like its federal model.
State equality provisions phrased in terms of "equality u nder the law"
1 1 5. Id. at 468, 5 9 5 P.2d at 598, 1 5 6 C a l . Rptr. at 20.
1 1 6. Id. (relying o n Kruger v. Wells Fargo B a nk, 1 1 Cal. 3d 352, 3 66-67, 5 2 1 P.2d
441, 449-50, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 ( 1 974) (similar conclusion in the context of a claim
of violation of the due process protections of the state constitution)) . The argument that the
record's silence speaks against applying the constitutional guarantee to non-governmental
actors is somewhat persuasive in the context of a claim brought under the California
constitution's guarantee o f due process before the 1 97 4 amendments. The relevant
language existed as part o f what was then article I, section 13, a provision that explicitly
referred to criminal procedural rights and other matters that only a state could infringe.
The implication that the due process guarantee w a s originally implicitly limited to state
action, and that any attempt to broaden its applicability by amendment should have been
indicated in the amendment's history, seems persuasive in that context. However, such an
argument is less persuasive with respect to that state constitution's guarantee of equal
protectio n, which was essentially a new provision.
1 1 7. Aldridge v . Boys, 9 8 Ill. App. 3 d 803, 808, 424 N.E.2d 886, 889 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
1 1 8. Caldor's, Inc. v . Bedding Barn Inc., 1 77 Conn. 304, 3 1 4, 4 1 7 A . 2d 3 4 3 , 349
(19 79); Lockwood v. Killian, 1 7 2 Conn. 496, 500, 3 7 5 A.2d 998, 1 00 1 ( 1 977) (quoting
Karp v. Zoning Bd. o f Stamford, 1 56 Conn. 287, 2 9 5 , 240 A.2d 845, 849 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) . See also
ich. 1 97 7 ) , modi e in
Schroederv. Dayton- Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 9 1 0 , 9 1 5 (E.D.
part, 456 F. Supp. 6 5 0 ( E . D . Mich. 1 979) equal protection clause m the state const1tut1on
was intended to provide same rights as its federal counterpart).
The courts' reliance in Caldor's and Schroeder on this principle of substa ?tive dentity
between state and federal provisions seems Jess than a cm�plete answe� to the issue m those
cases. Although two provisio ns forbid the same substantive conduc� , m the absence of t e
explicit "state action" l anguag e limiting its federal counterpart 1t oe� not necess�nly
ers. See infra
l
follow that they must apply to exactly the same classes of potentia mfnng
notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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also have been i nterpreted as applying only t o governmental actors. Courts
i n Texas, 1 19 Florida 120 and Maryland 1 2 1 held that state equa lity guarantees
framed in this fashion implicitly apply only to state actors. Several other
states have implied as much. 122 Although both the Texas and Florida
courts argued that restrictive readings were required in order to comply
with their framers' intent, neither provided persuasive documentation that
the drafters did in fact intend to impose such a government action
l imitation. 123 The conclusion that government action o f some kind is
required seems to have resulted more from the courts' various perceptions
that the phrase "under the law" i mplicitly refers to some kind of
government action, 124 that it would be a radical departure from prior law to

1 1 9. See, e.g., L incoln v. Mid-C i ti es Pee Wee Football Ass' n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Junior Football Ass 'n of Orange v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70, 7 1 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1 976). See also Zentgraf v. Texas A. & M. Univ., 492 F. Supp. 265, 272 (S.D.
Tex. 1980).
1 20. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 ,
7 1 5-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982), affd, 432 So. 2 d 567 ( Fla. 1983). The Florida
Constitution contains two separate statements regardi ng equal i ty withi n a single section.
The first states that "[a ] ll natural persons are equal before the law," and the second that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of race, rel igion or phys ical handicap."
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. The appellate opinion focused on the interpretation of the latter
clause. 408 So. 2d at 7 1 6- 1 7. The Florida Supreme Court's affirmance focused on the
former. 432 So. 2d at 569-70. See infra notes 1 33-34 and accompany i ng text.
1 2 1 . Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 63-64, 501 A.2d 8 1 7, 822-23
( 1 985).
122. See, e.g., Uni ted States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm. Agai nst Discri mina
t ion, 391 Mass. 594, 609 n.9, 463 N.E.2d 1 1 5 1 , 1 1 60 n.9 ( I 984); Garcia v. Albuquerque
Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 39 1 , 393, 622 P.2d 699, 701 { l980); Maclean v. First
Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 683, 688 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
123. Lincoln, 576 S.W.2d at 925; Junior Football Ass'n, 546 S.W.2d at 7 1 . The
Flori da court referred only to comments from the floor debate of the Consti tutional
Revision Committee to the effect that "the sect ion was i ntended to function i n a manner
si milar to" the fourteenth amendment. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 7 1 6.
1 24. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 7 1 5- 1 6; Lincoln, 576 S.W.2d at 925; Junior Football
Ass n, 546 S . W.2d at 7 1 . The court i n Schreiner was the most expl icit i n relying on such a
cons�ruction of the language: "The first sentence [of the Florida equal protection clause]
specifically states that all persons 'are equal before the law.' Th is clause i ndicates that this
section deals with the relati onshi p between the people and the state." Schreiner, 408 So. 2d
at 7 15.
�he court in Lincoln seems to have reached essent ially the same conclusion by the
negative argument tha� th� framers of the Texas consti tution had not clearly indi cated to
the contrary that apphcat10n to non-governmental entities was i ntended. Lincoln, 576
S .W.2d at 925. The opin ion i n Junior Football Ass 'n, later quoted and followed i n Lincoln
and Zentgrajf, was even more laconic, confi ning itself to a conclusory statement that "under
the law" meant that the �iscriminati�n be by state act ion or private conduct "encouraged
_ w i th state action." Junior Football Ass'n,
by. enabled by, or closeIy interrelated in function
�46 � ..W.2d at � l . . It appear� th�t these courts reasoned that any reference to "law" is
_ those who make, interpret or enforce the law.
1mphc1tly a restnct1on
to applicati ons against
'
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interpret the state constitution to apply to non-governmenta l infringers,
and that it would risk infringing on individua l s ' cultural a n d religious
views, particula rly i n cases alleging gender discrimination . 126 The Mary

land court was even more laconic, stating only that its state equal rights

amendment does not, "of course," apply u n less the requirements of the
government action doctrine are met. 12 6
While clearly dominant, this trend is not u n animous. The Pennsylva
nia Supreme Court held that state action in its federal sense is i r relevant to
a claim brought under a state equal rights a mendment phrased i n terms of
" equality under the law ." 127 The court determined that the a mendment
must be interpreted on its own terms, in light of its own language. The court
did not give any general definition of the phrase "under the law" or d iscuss
whether the phrase should be interpreted to impose a requirement of
government action. Instead , it held only that the state provision appl i ed in a
case in which the private insurer made the operative rate-setting decision
on its own and the state's involvement was limited to the Insurance
Commissioner's a pproval of those discri minatory rates. 1 28 Despite the
court's reticence, however, if it is willing to find the constitutional
guarantee applicable under such circumstances, it has effectively read the
phrase "under the law" out of the provision a s a meaningful threshold
restriction. In any event, su bsequent lower cou rt decisions in Pennsylvania

125. Lincoln, 576 S.W .2d at 925. While the validity of such arguments will be
discussed below, see infra notes 254-68 and accompanying text, it is worth noting that the
defendants in all of these cases were not private individuals but large institutions or
associations with significant state contacts.
1 26. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 5 3 , 63, 50 1 A.2d 8 1 7, 822 ( 1 985).
Although the opinion of the court spoke for only a three judge majority, it appears that the
court was unanimous that some sort of state action doctrine must apply. See Note, Burning
Tree, supra note 3.
1 27. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 57 1 , 586, 482
A.2d 542, 549 ( 1 984). The court held that plaintiff's challenge to a private insurer's
automobile insurance rates, which discriminated on the basis of gender, stated a claim
under the Pennsylvan ia Equal Rights Amendme nt. That provision, in words virtually
identical to its Texas and Florida counterparts, provides that " [e] quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged . . . because of the sex of the indi�i�ual: " PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28 Hartford effectively overruled the prior appellate decision m Murphy v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2 8 2 Pa. Super. 244, 257, 422 A.2d 1 097, 1 1 04 ( 1 980), ��rt.
denied, 454 U.S. 896 ( 1 98 1 ) , which has been cited in academic literature for the proposition
that the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment applies only to state action. Id. See also
fter
Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 3 4 3 Pa. Super. 1 69, 1 74, 494 A. �d 409, 4 1 2 � 1 9 8 5 ) (a.
s of
analysi
its
to
t
Hartford, "Murphy must now be viewed as no longer followed with respec
.

the E.R.A. ").
1 28. Hartford Accident, 505 Pa. at 586, 482 A . 2d at 549.
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concluded that claims under the state con stitution need not always allege
any degree o f government or offic i a l involvement at a ll . 1 29
Where a state constitutional g u a rantee of equality is not express, but
construed from other provisions, textual arguments shed l ittle light on the
question whether the guarantee applies to private infringers. However, it
does appear that equality protections d erived from due process clauses or
other provisions prohibiting the passage o f any "law" inconsistent with
their terms, i m plicitly require some form o f government action to invoke
their protections. In contrast, equal ity rights inferred out o f guarantees of
inalienable rights may stand on a different footing. A number of state cases
during the pre-incorporation period a pplied such generalized guarantees
o f fundament a l rights against private as well as governmental infring
ers.130 Nothing in the l anguage or t h e concept of "inherent," "natural" or
"inalienable" rights requires restriction o f only governmental infringers.
Regardless of such arguments from text, however, most state guaran
tees of this type also have been interpreted to apply only to government
actors. The S upreme Court of Arizona, for example, held that the
guarantee of equality that has been read into that state's due process
provision must be interpreted like the fou rteenth amendment to apply only
to state action .131 In

Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines and Risk
Management Services, Inc. ,132 the S u preme Court of Florida similarly
rejected arguments that the "inalienable rights" and "deprivation"
clauses, which guarantee basic rights under the state's constitution, might
apply to private as well as government i n fringements.1 33 While recognizing
that nothing i n the l anguage of those clauses mandated any state action
requirement, the court in

Schreiner held

that the historical record did not

make it clear that the constitution's d r a fters intended or communicated to
the public an i ntention to engage in what t h e court deemed a "major policy
change. "13•
1 29. Welsch, 343 Pa. Super. at 1 74, 494 A . 2d at 4 1 2; Bartholomew v. Foster, 1 1 5 Pa.

�ommw. 430, 43.7 , 5 4 1 A.2d 393, 396 ( 1 98 8 ) . Since both of these cases, like Hartford,

mvolved the heavil y regulated insurance industry, it is possible that the .. equality under the
law" lan�uage may app�y only to private institutions that are heavily regulated by the state,
perform 1m�rtant pubhc functions or are otherwise connected with the state. However, the
Pennsylvama courts have not yet announced any such restriction.
1 30. S�e infra notes 232-44 and accompan ying text.
1 3 1 . N 1edner v. The Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 1 2 1 Ariz.
3 3 1 , 332, 590 P.2d 447, 448 ( 1 979) . The court gave no reasons for this conclusio but
n
merely stated that the state constitution is to be interpreted like the fourteen amendm nt.
th
e
1 32. 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1 983).
1 33. Id. at 569-7 0 (construing FLA. CONST. art. 1 , § 2, which also provide
s that " [a]ll
persons are equal before the law").
1 34. Id. As the court itself noted, however, at least some evidenc
e from the historica l
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At least one exception to this trend m a y exist for provisions of this type
also. The

�upre ��

guarantee mto an

C�urt of

� ew � ersey,

which has read an equality
.
ma henable rights provision, h eld in Peper v. Princeton

i s&
that a female employee could maintain an
University Board of Trustees,
action for sex discrimination against a private university directly under

that provision . U n fortunatel y , the court, like the Pennsylvania court in
Hartford, did not explain in detail why government action was not

required. The cou rt noted only that it was necessary to permit Peper's

claim in order to prevent the rights guaranteed by the inalienable rights
provision from being rendered "hollow . " 1 36

3.

Caselaw: How Should State Action Be Defined?

As with state s peech and petition rights, courts that have i nterpreted
state equality guarantees to apply against only state actors differ as to
defining that requ iremen t . Most state courts followed federal prece
dents.m Some courts, however, hav� accepted the argument that a
showing of state a ction is required, but have defined that requirement
expansively to reach certai n powerful private actors.
For example , in the Gay Law Students decision mentioned above, the
California Supreme Court considered whether a public utility's refusal to
hire homosexuals violated their state constitutional right to .. equality
under the law."1 38 Although the utility was p rivately owned, the court
record indicated that an expansive interpretation was intended. Id. at 570. Cf State ex rel.
Nyitray v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 2 Ohio St. 3d 1 73, 1 75, 443 N .E.2d 962, 964 ( 1 983)
(holding, in a case not raising state action issues, that the "limitations placed upon
governmental action by the Equal Protection Clauses [of the state and federal govern
ments] are essentially the same"); Darrin v. Gould, 8 5 Wash. 2d 859, 870-7 1 , 540 P.2d 882,
889 (1975) (implying in dictum that government action is required for a claim either under
WASH. CONST. art. I , § 1 2, which prohibits laws granting "special privileges and
immunities," or under the state equal rights amendment).
135. 77 N.J. 55, 389 A . 2d 465 ( 1 978). For a further discussion of Peper see Note,
Pathways, supra note 3, at 1 24-25.
1 36. Peper, 77 N .J. at 79-80, 389 A.2d at 4 7 7- 78. See also Gray v. Serruto Builders,
Inc., l lO N .J. Super. 297, 305-06, 265 A.2d 404, 409 (Ch. Div. 1 970) (fi�di�g as an
alternative holding that the non-discrimination clause of the New Jersey constltut1on, N .J.
CONST. of 1 947 art. I, § § 1 & 9, is applicable to a claim of racial discrimination against a
private landlord).
137. See, e.g Lockwood v. Killian, 1 7 2 Conn. 496, 500-07, 375 A.2d 998, 1 001-04
(19 77); Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 S.W.2d 52 (Ky.
App. 1 980); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 8 1 7 ( 1 98 5 ) ; Under
21 v. City of New York, 6 5 N .Y .2d 344, 3 59-64, 482 N .E.2d l , 7- 1 0, 492 N.Y.S. 2d 522,
528-3 1 (1985).
1 38. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 466-75, 595
P.2d 592, 597-602, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4, 1 9-24 ( 1 97 9 ) . See supra notes 1 1 4- 1 6 and
accompanying text.
..
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found sufficient "state action" to t rigger state constitutional protection
from the facts that the utility held a stat e franchise that gave it a near
monopoly on t elephone services, that i t was subject to a high degree of state
regulation, and that it enjoyed certain quasi-governmental powers such as
the power of eminent domain. 139 The court also relied on the importance of
the right to work, the degree of i nj ury done to the plaintiffs, and the
insulation that defendant's monopoly status provided against attempts by
the plaintiffs o r the public to use ordinary ma rket mechanisms to register
d isapproval of or effectively change the utility's policies. 140 The utility's
decision not to e m ploy homosexuals a pparently was reached independently
by the utility company since there was no a llegation that any state official,
law, or policy contributed to the d ecision .
It is clear, according to current law, that the facts in

Students would not demonstrate su fficient

Gay

Law

state action to trigger applica

t ion of the fourteenth amendment. A s the United States Supreme Court
1 1
held in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 state granted monopolies
- even those which are subject to extensive public regul ation and receive
s ignificant benefits from the state - d o not, without more, constitute state
actors.142 The addi tional element required to trigger constitutional rights,
p recisely what was absent in

Gay Law Students,

is some exercise of the

state's "coercive power" over the utility or some other "significant
encouragement, either overt or covert," o f the particular decision of the
private entity. 143 Mere state acquiescence in decisions independently
r eached even by regulated monopolies is not sufficient.
In departing from federal precedent, the court in

Gay Law Students

did not explicit l y reject the reasoning or the results of the federal cases. The
court also did not explain why or under what circumstances the concept of
state action should be defined d i fferently for state than for federal
constitutional purposes. On the contrary, t h e court stated that federal cases
on this question constituted persua sive precedent. 144 M oreover, it took
pains to distinguish Jackson on its particular facts145 and to find older
139. Id. at 469-70, 595 P.2d at 597-99, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 2 1 -22.
1 40. Id. at 470-72, 595 P.2d at 599-600, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 2 1 -22.
1 4 1 . 4 1 9 U.S. 345 ( 1 974).
142. Id. at 3 5 8 ; See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 1 63 ( 1 972).
143 . San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 546.
144. Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d at 472, 5 9 5 P.2d at 600, 1 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 22.
1 45. Id._ at 4 7 3 ? .9, 595 P.2d at 601 n.9, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.9. The
court noted that
Jackson �as mapposite because t�e ri h � all gedly infringed in that case
was less important
�
�
than the issues of emp�oyme t discnmmatton present in the
instant case. Regardless of
!1
whether one agrees with this assessment of relative import
ance, it is clear that such
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federal precedent that could arguably support its conclusion.1'6 Neverthe
less, Gay Law St udents clearly expanded the federal definition of state
action in result, if not in theory. While subsequent California decisions
have refrained from aggressively extending the results in Gay Law
Students to other situations or other rights, 147 a few lower California courts
have expanded, at least covertly, the category of state actors required to
observe state constitutional norms of non-discrimination.148
California does not stand alone. Courts in other states, while refusing
to find state action in the cases before them, also have implied that they
could interpret their tests for state action more broadly than allowable
under current federal law .149
C.

Due Process and the Private Creditor
The final area of inquiry concerns whether state constitutional

guarantees against the taking of property without "due process" create
procedural rights enforceable against pr ivate or quasi-private entities.
This question, like the issue of the applicability of state equality guaranarguments go to the merits of the underlying dispute and have nothing to do with the
threshold question of whether the defendant is a "private" or a "public" actor.
146. Id. at 472-73, 595 P.2d at 600-01, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23 (discussing Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 ( I 944 ) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977) ).
147. The decision i n Gay Law Students continues to be good law in California. Some
subsequent decisions, however, construe the Gay Law Students state action holding as
applying only to the specific facts of the case. See, e . g., King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1229
n.12, 743 P.2d 889, 896 n.12, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 n.12 (1 987 ). California courts also
have refused to extend the rationale in Gay Law S tudents beyond the equal protection
context to other substantive state constitutional rights. See, e.g., Pasillas v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 312, 349, 202 Cal. Rptr. 739, 760 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1 145 (1985) (refusing to extend Gay Law Students to
case claiming violation of the state constitutional rights to freedom o f speech and
association).
148. See, e.g., Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 197 Cal. App. 3d 884,
243 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988). The court
in Jonathan Club held t h a t where a private club leased beachfront property from the state
for the exclusive use o f the club's members, the club w a s sufficiently "entangled" with the
state to become a state actor for purposes of both the federal and the state equality
guarantees , although nothing in the facts showed that any government official or policy had
anything to do with "coercing" or "encouraging" the club's decision to discriminate.
149. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n 576 S.W.2� 922 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (taking a "middle ground" approach by defimng stat � action as any
.
.
.
"private conduct [that) is encouraged by, enabled b y or closely 1 terrel�ted m. fu �cti on �Ith
_
state action")· United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm n Agamst D1scnmmation,
391 Mass. 5 4, 609 n.9, 463 N.E.2d 1 1 5 1, 1 1 60 n.9 (1984) (for state constitutional
purposes court might "take a broader view of w h a t constitutes State action than has the
United States Supreme Court"). See generally Heins, supra note 3.
•
.
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tees, has aroused comparatively little scholarly scrutiny. 1 60 Nonethel ess, a
few state courts have expanded the c lass o f arguably private entities that

are bound to provide the procedural safegu a rds of notice and an opportu
n ity to be heard before depriving others of their interests i n property. m As
was the case with the substantive rights a lready considered, the context
and language of the fi fth and fourteenth a mendments, w hich guarantee
that persons will not be deprived of " l i fe, l i berty, or property without due
process of law, " i n dicate that the prohibition was intended to apply only to
government activity . 1 62 While the U n i ted States Supreme Court repeat
edly held that the federal due process clauses apply to some state aided
a ttempts by private creditors to seize their debtors' assets, 163 it is equally
clear that state action remains a threshold requirement for this substantive
right as well. 1 64
I.

State Cons titutional Texts

Paralleling the United States Constitution, forty-four state constitu
tions contain explicit provisions guaranteeing that no one will be deprived
1 50. But see Berdon, supra note 3, at 53-54 (advocating a broadened definition of
state action for state due process purposes) ; and Comment, Civilian Thoughts On U.C.C.
Section 9-503 Self-Help Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 L A . L. REV.
239, 264-266 ( 1 98 1 ) (arguing that U.C.C. self-help remedies would violate the Louisiana
due process guarantee).
The parallel question of whether creditors' self-help remedies constitute sufficient
state action under the Constitution to trigger application of the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause was considered in several influential articles in the l 970's. See, e.g.,
Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors ' Rights: An Essay on
the Fourteenth Amendment (Part Ill), 47 S . CAL. L . REV. 1 ( 1 97 3 ) ; Mentschikoff,

Peaceful Repossession Under The Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and
Economic Analysis, 1 4 WM. & MARY L . REV. 767 ( 1 973).

15 l . Procedural due process has long been held to encompass two essential elements:
"notice" at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner; and an "opportunity to be
heard" by an appropriate trier of fact. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 ( 1 972) (citing
Baldwin v. Hale, 6 8 U.S. ( 1 Wall.) 223 ( 1 8 6 3 ) ) .
1 52. The due process clause of the fifth amendment i s co-joined with other provisions
gove�ing criminal procedure and condemnation for public use, both of which are
exclusively governmental activities. The provision was historically intended to restrict only
the activities of the nascent federal power. The parallel clause of the fourteenth amendment
�s �ve� �ore explicit, providing that " [n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
Junsd1ct1on the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1 53 . See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U .S. 92 2 ( 1 982); Sniadach v. Family
.
Fmance Corp. 395 U.S. 3 3 7 ( 1 969) .
1 54. See, ;.g., Flag� Bros. v. Brooks; 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 978). Flagg Bros. held that a
ware�ouseman s sale of its debtor 1s property pursuant to statutory authorization did not
�n �tltu�e "state ac:ion" su fficient to trigger federal due process rights. The court
_
�f cases on the ground that "[i]n each of those cases a
d1stmgu1shed the Smad�c� hne
_
government official part1c1pated m the physical deprivation." Id. at 1 60 n. 1 0.
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of life, liberty o r propert y without due process of law or, i n a n older,
equivalent phrasin g, that such depriva tions will not occur except in a ccord
G
with the "law of the land . " 11 1 The const itutio ns of twent y-five of those
states indicate that some kind of govern ment action is required for their
due process provisio ns. 1G6 I n contrast , the due p rocess clause of the South
Dakota Constitut ion appears in a single section along with a " right to

work" clause that i s clearly directed at private entities, and may indicate
that the due process provision should be construed similarly. 1G7 I n the
constitutions of the remaining eighteen states the text of the d u e process

guarantee does not explicitly indicate the nature of the entities to which it
applies. This ambiguity exists because the due process provision appears in

a separate section by itself, us or because it appears in a single section with a
guarantee of equality that similarly fails to refer to potential private
infringers or to exclusively governmental action.1119

155. Six states use the older "Jaw of the land" phrasing in their guarantees of
procedural protection for life, liberty and property. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2 1 ; KY. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 1 1 ; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 9; TENN . CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, §
19; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1 0. The constitutions of New York and Minnesota each contain
two applicable provisions: one that speaks of "the law of the land" and a second that
parallels the federal language. N .Y. CONST. art. I, § § 1 & 6 ; MINN. CONST. art. 1 , § § 2 & 7.
It is well established, by both federal and state decisions, that "due process of law" and "the
law of the land" are interchangeable terms embodying equivalent legal rights . Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 ( 1 8 7 7 ) ; Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Brand Distribs. of North
Wilkesboro, Inc., 28 5 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 1 4 1 , 1 46 ( 1 974).
156. In these constitutions, the due process or "law of the land" provision appears in a
single section together with provisions regarding criminal procedure or other constitutional
rights that only governments are in a position to infringe. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 7; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 1 ; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, §
8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1 3; IOWA CONST.
art. l, § 9; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1 1 ; Mo. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 24; MASS.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XII; MICH. C O NST. art. I, § 17; MI NN . CONST. art. I, § 7;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N. H . CONST. pt. l, art. 1 5; N .Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N . C . CONST. art.
I, § 19; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 2; PA. CONST. art. I , § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10th; v A. CONST. art. I, § 1 1.
157. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
1 58. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. I I , § 25; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para.
l ; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 1 4; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 1 0; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; w. VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 0; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6. But see
Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 2 1 Cal. 3d 268, 282 n. 1 9 , 578 P.2d
925, 934 n. 19, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 2 1 7 n . 1 9 ( 1 978), cert. denied, 43 ? U .S. 1 1 04 ( 1 9'. 9)
(rejecting an argument that the existence of a state due process clause m a separate section
might indicate that it applies to private parties) .
159. HAW. CONST . art. I , § 5; ILL. CONST . art. 1 ; § 2 ; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; N.M.
rm ge�
CONST. art. II, § 1 8; S . C . CONST . art. I, § 3 . But see, e.g., USA I Lehndorff
.
) ( mms
9
1
(
5
3
8
,
sverwaltung v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 , 20, . 348 N .E.2d 8 3 1
due process guarantee limits only government action) .
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The six states without an explicit due p rocess clause have all construed
other provisions of their respective state constitutions to provide equivalent
protections. Provisions used for this p urpose include guarantees that courts
and legal processes shall be available fo r the redress o f grievances , 180
provisions guaranteeing "natural" or "inherent" rights to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness, 161 or a combina tion of several different state
constitutional rights. 1 62 These texts a lso provide little guidance as to the
requirement o f state action.
2.

Caselaw: I s State Act ion Required ?

Courts construing these various due process provisions have disagreed
to some extent with each other and with the United States Supreme Court
regarding whether state action is present in particular circumstances.163
They have been virtually unanimous, however, in concluding that the
requirement must be met in some fas h ion before private creditors will be
required to afford their debtors any of the rights guaranteed by state due
process clauses. This principle has extended to possessory liens by
garagemen, mechanics and others; 164 non-j udicial sales by such lienors; 186
non-judicial foreclosures of mortgages or deeds of trust; 166 self-help

·

1 60. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1 8 ; OR. CONST. art. I. § IO
("procedural" due process only). See. e.g. , State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court of
Knox County, 229 Ind. 1 1 8, 95 N.E.2d 829 ( 1 95 1 ) ; Harrison v. Long, 241 Kan. 1 74, 734
P.2d 1 1 55 ( 1 987) ; Carr v. Saif Corp., 65 Or. App. 1 1 0, 670 P.2d 1 03 7 ( 1 983). But see
Roberts v. Gray's Crane & Rigging, Inc., 7 3 Or. App. 29, 34-35, 697 P.2d 985, 988-89
( I 985) (noting that older cases found an equivalent of substantive due process in the
"equality of privileges" language of OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. See generally Linde, Without
"Due Process:" Unconstitutional l.Aw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 1 25 , 1 3 5-46 ( 1 970)
(arguing that Oregon has no state "due process" clause).
1 6 1 . These provisions go beyond the concerns of standard due process language. N.J.
CONST. of 1 947 art. I, § l ; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 . See, e.g., King v. South Jersey Nat'! Bank,
66 N.J. 1 6 1 , 330 A . 2d 1 ( I 974); Robinson v. Cahill, 6 2 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied,
4 1 4 U.S. 976 ( 1 973); Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines v. Board of Public Utility
Comm'rs, 5 N.J. 1 1 4, 74 A . 2d 265, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 ( 1 950).
1 62. See generally Peebles v. Clement, 6 3 Ohio St. 2d 3 1 4, 3 1 7, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691
( 1 980); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 6 1 Ohio St. 2d 6, 3 99 N.E.2d 66 ( I 980) (construing a
due process guarantee into Omo CONST. art. I, § § l , 2, 1 6 & 1 9) .
1 63. See infra notes 1 78-92.
1 64. See, e.g. , Reinertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624, 627, 250 S.E.2d 475, 477 ( 1 978);
Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 1 5, 22, 3 5 3 A.2d 222, 227 ( 1 976).
1 65. See, e.g., Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, l l Cal. 3d 1 46, 1 52, 520 P. 2d
96 1 , 964, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 1 45, 1 48-49 ( 1 974); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45
N.Y.2d 1 52, 1 59-60, 379 N.E.2d 1 1 69, 1 1 73-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 ( 1 978).
1 66. See, e.g., Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 282, 5 7 8 P.2d 925, 934,
1 46 Cal. Rptr. 208, � 1 7 ( 1 978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1 1 04 ( 1 979)
;
Cramer � . Metropolitan Savings & Loan, 40 1 Mich. 2 52, 259, 258 N.W.2d 20,
23 ( 1 977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958 ( 1 978); Federal Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett,
5 2 1 S.W.2d
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repossessio ns ;167 bank s et off s ;168 and var i o u s othe r methods of n o n-judicial
debt collection.
169
The sole po s s ibl e e xception to this othe r wi s e cons i stent r e quir e m ent
may be found in King v. So u.th Jersey Na tional Bank,110 in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the s tatute authorizing s e lf-h e lp r epo s s es 
sion of plaintiff's autom obile did not c o ns titute state action s uffici e nt to
trigger federal due proc e s s protectio n s , a n d that the practic e "would not
. .. involve a que stion of fundame ntal right s , nor . .. be offe n sive to" the
state constitution's guarant e e of inalie nable rights . 171 It was unclear from
thi s language whether the failure to find a viola ti on of the state cons titution
was bas ed on the a bs e nce of state actio n or on the m erits of the claim.
However, the sub s e qu e nt u s e of King in opi n i o n s on private infringem ent of
other state constitutional rights may indicate that due proce s s rights under
the New Jersey C o n s titution can be invoked without a thr e shold s howing of
anything approachi ng a federal standard of s tate action.
112
Notwith s tanding this e xception, howev e r , the diffe r e nc e s in the texts
of various state constitutional due proce s s provisions hav e little b e aring on
whether state action i s r e quired.
173 Courts hav e r e quir ed the s am e showing
of state action for c o n stitutional pr ovi s i o n s phr a s ed in terms of "the law of
428, 439 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 909 ( 1 975); Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the
West, 88 Wash. 2d 7 1 8 , 725-26, 565 P.2d 8 1 2, 8 1 6 ( 1 977); Dennison v. Jack, 304 S.E.2d
300, 306 (W. Va. 1 9 8 3 ) .
167. See, e.g., Crouse v . First Trust Union Bank, 8 6 A.D.2d 978, 9 7 8 , 448 N_.Y.S.2d
329, 330 (1982); Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 9 5 1 , 958 (Okla. 1 97 7 ) .
168. See, e.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 1 Cal. 3 d 352, 3 5 7 , 5 3 1 P.2d 44 1 , 442,
1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 449, 450 ( 1 974); Meyer v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 96 Idaho 208, 209, 525
P.2d 990, 99 1 ( 1 974); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples N a t'! Bank of
Washington, 10 Wash. App. 5 30, 541, 5 1 8 P.2d 7 34, 7 4 1 , cert. denied, 4 1 9 U.S. 967 ( 1 974).
169. See, e.g., Donahoo v. Household Finance Corp., 472 F. Supp. 3 5 3 , 3 54-55 (E .
Mich. 1979) (wage assignments); USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins
Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 , 20, 348 N .E.2d 8 3 1 , 8 3 5 ( 1 976) (lessor's distraint); Monta.l�o �·
Consolidated Edison Co., 92 A .D .2d 389, 3 9 3 , 460 N . Y .S.2d 784, 787 ( 1 9 8 3) (utility s
refusal to provide service until disputed bill is first paid); North Carolina Nat'! Bank v.
Burnette, 297 N .C. 5 24, 5 34-35, 256 S.E.2d 3 8 8 , 3 9 4 ( 1 979) (sale of collateral by secured
party).
170. 66 N.J. 1 6 1 , 1 77-78, 330 A.2d 1 , 9 - 1 0 ( 1 974).
171. Id. at 178, 3 3 0 A.2d at 10.
.
·
172. Justice Pashma n, dissenting in King, explicitly rejected any state action rimit on
N.J. CONST. of 1 947 art. I, para. 1 , arguing th� t, "New Jers�y courts have Ion� �und
_
support for intervent ion to prevent purely private interference with property nghts m that
provision. 66 N.J. at 1 94, 330 A.2d at 1 8 .
.
. .
n
Subsequent New Jersey cases dealing with alleged p�ivate mfn�gement o f f�nd� me
n
disse
s
n
Pashma
Justice
ta! state constitutional rights have paid respectful attention to
See, e.g., State v. Schmi d, 84 N.J. 535, 5 59-60, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 628 ( 1 9 8 0) ; Peper v.
( 1 978) . . .
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 5 5 , 76-77, 3 8 9 A.2d 465, 4
how willing
mmg
determ
173. Differences in wordi ng may, however, be important for

._D

r

;
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the land, " 174 o r in even more general language, 17 11 as for the more common
"due process o f law" language, and h ave done so regardless of whether the
provision appears alone, 176 or in t h e context of criminal rights guarantees
or other language implying that t h e dra fters were concerned with only
governmental infringements. 1 77
While courts have not extens ively explained the reasons for their
insistence upon state action, two s e e m at least implicit in most due process
decisions. First, the concept of d u e process "of law" is presumed to
inherently refer to legal, and thus governmental, activity. Secondly,
concerns parallelling those raised i n speech and equa lity cases exist: the
need to avoid judicial interference with the competing rights of other
private parties; a general view o f consti t utions as inherently limited to
governments; and concerns about i n fringing on an area more appropriate
for legislative regulation.
3.

Caselaw: How S hould S t a t e Action B e Defined ?

Despite their near unanimity i n req u iring state action, state courts
have differed over how to define this requi rement. W hile m any courts have
adhered to federal precedents, a few have expressly rejected t h e narrow
federal definition of state action when interpreting state constitutional due
process guarantees. A leading exa m p l e of this expansive approach is

Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 178 i n which the New York Court of
Appeals held unconstitutional the portion of the state's lien law that
permitted a private garageman to e n force its lien by an

ex parte auction of

plaintiff's property without granting pla intiff a prior opportunity to be
heard. Recogn izing that the facts o f the case might not constitute state
a court will be to find sufficient state action in ambiguous circumstances. See discussion
infra notes 1 78-95.
174. See, e.g., Brandt v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 287 Ark. 43 1 , 434, 701 S.W.2d 103,
1 05 (1 985); North Carolina Nat'l Bankv. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 534- 3 5 , 256 S.E.2d 388,
3 94-95 ( 1 979); Kitt,rell v. Kittrell, 409 S.W .2d 1 79, 1 8 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 966);
175. See, e.g., Peebles v. Clement, 6 3 Ohio St. 2d 3 14, 3 1 7, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691
( 1 980); Carr v. Saif Corp., 65 Or. App. 1 1 0, 670 P.2d 1037, 1 040 ( 1 983) .
1 76. See, e.g., Niedner v. Salt River Proj . Agric. Improvement & Power D istrict, 121
.
Anz. 3 3 1 , 332, 5 90 P.2d 447, 448 ( 1 97 9 ) ; Reinertsen, 242 Ga. 624, 250 S.E.2d 475.
1 77. See, e.g., Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 2 7 7 Md. 1 5, 353 A.2d
222 (1976); Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan, 401 Mich. 2 5 2, 258 N .W.2d 20
( 1 977); Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 3 1 2 Minn. 3 79, 384-85, 252 N.W.2d 58 1 , 585
( 1 977); Duffiey v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n' 1 22 N . H . 484 490-91
446 A.2d 462, 466 ( 1 982).
178. 45 N.Y.2d 1 52 , 379 N.E.2d 1 1 6 9 , 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 ( 1 97 8 ) .
'

'
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action for federal purposes, 179 the court stated that differences in the
language, history and purposes of the federal and state constitutions
permitted state courts to apply a more "flexible" definition of the state
action requirement than would be possible under the fourteenth amend
ment. 110 As the court phrased it, the question for state purposes is whether
the state " has so entwined itself into the debtor-creditor relationship as to
constitute sufficient and meaningful State participation which triggers the
protections afforded by our Constitution. " 181 The court found sufficient
state action on the facts before it because the statute expanded upon the
creditor's common law rights by allowi n g it to sell as well as seize the
debtor's property, because the very existence of t h e statute permitting such
self-help remedies served to "encourage" the creditor to use this remedy
and thereby violate the debtor's rights, and because the statute effectively
transferred to the private creditor what h a d been the traditional, sovereign
and exclusive power of the state to resolve legal disputes other than by
consent.m
These facts would not have been sufficient to find state action under
federal standards. Only a few months prior to Sharrock, the United States
Supreme Court had held that New York's version of section 7-2 1 0 of the
Uniform Commercial Code -which similarly permitted a warehouseman
to unilaterally foreclose a lien by ex parte sale without affording the debtor
any opportunity to be heard as to the validity of the debt ·- did not involve
sufficient "state action" to implicate the fourteenth amendment.183 In so
concluding, the Court specifically rej ected each of the arguments that
prevailed in Sharrock.18" The New York court distinguished its facts from
179. Id. at 1 57-59, 379 N . E.2d at 1 1 72-73, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43. See also Note,

"Flexible" State Action. supra note 3.

180. 45 N.Y.2d at 1 59-6 1 , 379 N.E.2d at 1 1 7 3-74, 408 N.Y.S . 2d at 44 . The court in
Sharrock noted the word "state" does not appear in the New York due process guarantee,
which provides only that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property wit�out due
process of law." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. See supra note 1 56 and accompanying text.
The New York court also relied on the difference between the central purpose of the
fourteenth amendment and the broader purposes of the state constitution. The federal
provision was intended to provide minimum standards of protection for individuals "a�ainst
the potential abuses of a monolithic government, whether that gover�m�nt be natlo� al,
State or local." Conversely, the Sharrock court saw the state const�tut�on a� granting
fundamental rights good against the world: "In contrast, State Constitutions m general,
and the New York Constitution in particular, have long saf�guarde any threat to
,
individual liberties, irrespective of from what quarter that penl arose. Sharrock, 45
N.Y.2d at 160-61, 379 N . E.2d at 1 1 74, 408 N . Y .S.2d at 44.
1 8 1 . 45 N.Y.2d at 1 6 1 , 379 N.E.2d at 1 1 74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
182. Id. at 1 6 1 -63, 379 N.E.2d at 1 1 74-76, 408 N.Y. S.2d at 45-46.
183. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 978).
184. Id. at 1 6 1 -66 .
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by pointing t o t h e need fo r state cooperation in
recording the transfer of title to a u tomobiles.1 811 However, as many courts
have noted, this distinction is too fra i l a reed on which to rest the existence

Flagg Bros.

of a right to due process. 186
Subsequent New York decisions have partially extended the '"flexi
ble" state action rationale of

Sharrock

to find sufficient state action to

trigger state, though not federal, due process protections in a case involving
a private

ex parte

sale of bailed goods pursuant to section 7-2 1 0. 187

Nonetheless, where a statute authorizing the private creditor's actions did
not change pre-existing common l a w rights, 188 or where the state 's
regulatory bodies merely failed to a ffirmatively require a private utility to
afford a customer notice and a hearing o n a disputed bill before refusing
new service, 1 89 courts have found i nsufficient state action to trigger the due
process protections of the New York Constitution.
California courts also have been willing to expand the concept of state
action in limited situations. I n a series of cases predating

Flagg Bros., the

California courts held that private creditors exercising statutory self-help
remedies greater than common law remedi es were engaged in state action
sufficient to trigger both federal a n d state due process protections. 190
185. Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 1 59 n.2, 3 7 9 N. E.2d at 1 1 73 n.2, 408 N.Y.S.2d at43 n.2.
Some courts have accepted similar arguments. See, e.g., Adams v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 1 1 Cal. 3d 1 46, 1 52, 520 P.2d 96 1 , 965, 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (1 974).
186. Most courts addressing the issue have rejected this argument essentially because
the state's action of issuing new title documents or recording the transfer of title amounts to
nothing more than noting a fact already accomplished by private action. See, e.g., Smith v.
Spradling, 532 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Mo. 1 976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 ( 1 976)
(citing inter a/ia Nichols v . Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 3 74 (E.D. Mo. 1 973), affd,
497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1 974)). See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 1 50, at 1 9-23.
187. Svendsen v. Smith's Moving and Trucking Co., 76 A.D.2d 504, 4 3 1 N.Y.S.2d94
( 1 980), affd, 54 N.Y.2d 865, 429 N.E.2d 4 I I , 444 N .Y.S .2d 904 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , cert. denied, 455
U.S. 927 ( 1 982).
I 88. See, e.g., Jefferds v. Ellis, I 3 2 A.D.2d 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d 398 ( 1 987), appeal
dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 1 002, 521 N.E.2d 445, 526 N .Y.S.2d 438 ( 1 98 8 ) (U.C.C. §§ 9-503
and 9-504 do not involve state action because self-help repossession under a chattel
mortgage permitted at common law); accord Crouse v . First Trust Union Bank, 86 A.D.2d
978, 448 N.Y.S.2d 329 ( 1 982).
1 89. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Consolidated Edison of N.Y., 92 A.D.2d 389, 460
N.Y.S.2d 784 ( 1 983), affd, 61 N.Y.2d 8 1 0, 462 N .E.2d I 49, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972 ( I 984).
I 90. See, e.g., Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court of Merced County, I 7 Cal. 3d
803 , 8 1 4- 1 5, 553 P.2d 637, 644-45, 1 32 Cal. Rptr. 477, 484-85 ( 1 97 6 ) , appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 1 056 ( I 977); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, l I Cal. 3d 352, 3 59-63, 5 2 I P.2d 44I,
444-47, I 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 449, 452-55 ( 1 974) ; Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, I I
Cal. 3d 1 46, I 52 , 520 P.2d 96 1 , 965, 1 I 3 Cal. Rptr. 1 45, 149 ( 1 974) . But see Connolly, 17
C �l: � d at 8 I 5 n . I 4, 553 P.2d at 645 n . 1 4, 1 3 2 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n . 1 4 (acknowledging
c�1tlc1sm of t�e constitutional distinction between common law and statutory creditor's
nghts). See infra notes 3 37-44.
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Although Flagg Bros. made it impossible for courts to maintain that
position with respect to the Constitution, California courts have adhered to
the broader defi nition for state due process purposes.191 In other areas of
due p rocess law, however, the California courts have found federal state

action precedent persuasive.192
D.

Sum mary and Analysis of the Case/aw
Examined as a whole, the decisions interpreting state constitutional

guarantees of speech, petition, equa lity and due process j ustify a few
general propositions about how state courts have approached the state
action issue, and the reasons for thei r conclusions.
I . Applying state constitutional guara ntees against private infringers

not already subject to federal restraint is not a n issue that is confined to
specific substantive rights or fact patterns. Ra t her, it is an issue of general
concern across the spectrum of substantive rights. The frequency of
expansive interpretations varies depending o n the substantive right in
volved, with expansive interpretations more common in cases involving
speech and petition rights than in cases involving equality or due process
guarantees. Courts' rationales and a pproaches also have varied. Some
courts reached expansive results by rej ecting state action l imits entirely,
while others merely rejected restrictive federal definitions of those limits.
All of the substantive areas studied, however, include examples of courts
that took an expansive a pproach to the questions of whether and under
what circumstances non-governmental entities must respect the state
constitutional rights of others.

2. The expansive a pproach adopted by some courts appears to rest on
two underlying perceptions: that non-governmental entities may be in a
position to curtai l the liberties of others such that an expansive approach is
necessary to prevent encroachment on state constitutional rights;193 and
that for structural reasons involving the absence of federalism concerns,
191. Martin v. Heady, 1 03 Cal. App. 3d 580, 5 8 6-88, 163 Cal. Rptr. 1 1 7, 1 2 1 -22
(1980) (creditor's ex parte sale of collateral pursuant to California's Aircraf� Lien Law
constituted state action for state due process purposes even though no state official took any
action in connection therewith, and even though Flagg Bros. made clear that. these facts
would not constitute state action under the fourteenth a mendment) . See also Kmg v South
Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N .J. 1 6 1 , 1 9 1 -95, 3 30 A.2d l , 1 7 - 1 9 ( l �74) (Pashman, J., �iss,�nting)
(arguing that the court "need not impose [as] rigorous a requirement of state action under
the New Jersey due process clause as under federal law).
192. See, e.g., Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 2 1 Cal. 3 d 268, 2 8 1 -82, 5 7 8 P .2d 925, 934,
1 46 Cal. Rptr. 208, 2 1 7, appeal dismissed, 4 3 9 U.S. 949 (1 978).
193. See, e.g., Robins v . PruneYard Shopp ing Center, 23 Cal. 3d 8 99, 906-07, 592
P.2d 341 , 345, 1 5 3 Cal. Rptr. 854, 8 5 8 ( 1 979), a.ffd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 980) .
·
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state courts and constitutions are in a better position than their federal
counterparts to restrict private p arties . 19• These points a re uncontroverted
by even the most restrictive of courts.
3. The d i fferences in outcomes among courts appea r to result not just

from differences i n particular constitutional texts or histories, but from
basic legal a n d p h ilosophical divergences as well. Courts interpreting
identical or virtually identical provisions have reached opposite conclu
sions regarding state action . 195 Some courts demonstrated a general
willingness to expand the appl ication o f their state constitution beyond
1 94. One of the traditional reasons for imposing a state action limitation on the Bill of
Rights is the potential impact on the issue of federalism. State law has traditionally
governed the rights and responsibilities of private parties inter se; im�ing federal
constitutional standards on such relationships would effectively shift power away from state
to federal law. The Civil Rights Cases, 1 09 U.S. 3, 1 1 - 1 3 ( 1 8 8 3 ) .
There are, however, no such federalism constraints on state constitutional guarantees.
Moreover, state courts construing these provisions are in a better institutional position to
expand the coverage of such rights because they are unconstrained by the need for uniform
nationwide applicability. States serve as laboratories, free to consider how to apply such
guarantees in light of local circumstances or traditions. See generally Maltz, Individual
Rights and State Autonomy, 1 2 HARV. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 1 6 1 ( 1 989) (emphasizing the
importance of the "structural" federalism issues in construing the federal and state
constitutions).
1 95. Compare Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm ., 1 59 Ariz. 37 1, 767
P.2d 7 1 9 ( 1 988) (Arizona 's affirmative free speech guarantee of ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6
does not apply to private conduct) with Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council,
96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d l 08 ( 1 98 1 ) (identical language in WASH. CONST. art. I , § 5 does
so apply). Compare State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 5 3 5 , 423 A.2d 6 1 5 (1 980), appeal dismissed,
455 U.S. 982 ( 1 982) ("dual" speech guarantee of N.J. CONST. of 1947 art. I, para. 6 applies
to private infringers) and Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 5 9 2 P.2d 34 1 , 1 5 3 Cal. Rptr. 854 ( 1979),
affd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 979) (CAL. CONST. art. I , § 2 applies to private action) with
Oklahomans For Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Oklahoma, Inc., 634 P.2d 704, 708 n. 1 5 (Okla.
1 98 1 ) ("dual" guarantee of OKLA. CONST. art. I I , § 22 applies only to state actors);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 8 8, 378 N.W.2d 3 3 7 ( 1 985) (same,
MICH. CONST. art. I , § 5 ) ; Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d
1 2 1 1 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 ( 1 985) (same, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ) and Jacobs v. Major, 139
Wis. 2d 492, 407 N. W.2d 832 ( 1 98 7 ) (same, Wis. C ONST. art. I, § 3 ) . Compare Welsch v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 1 69, 494 A.2d 409 ( 1 98 5 ) (guarantee of " [e] qualityof rights
under the law" does not require state action) and Bartholomew ex rel. Bartholomew v.
Foster, 1 1 5 Pa. Com,mw. 430, 541 A.2d 3 9 3 ( 1 98 8 ) , affd, 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1 390
( 1 989) (same) with Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1 982), affd, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1 98 3 ) (Florida's guarantee that "persons are equal
before the law," requires state action); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576
S.""!.2d 922 (T�x. Civ. App. 1 979) (guarantee of " [e]quality under the law" requires state
action) and Junior Football Ass'n of Orange County v. Gaudet, 546 S. W .2d 70, 7 1 (Ct. Civ.
App. 1 976) (sa !Ile) . Comp01:e Schreiner, 432 So. 2d at 567 (Florida's "inalienable rights"
guarantee requires state a�ti?n) with ��per v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55,
389 A.2d 465 ( 1 978) (s1mtlar provlSlon in the New Jersey constitution had no such
.
reqmrement).

1990)

ALTERNA TIVE LIMITS ON STA TE RIGHTS

859

federal models,1 96 while others flatly refused to do so,1 97 regardless of the
substantive right or particular provision a t issue.

4. All courts, even those most expansive in their interpretations, have
been cautious in extending the reach of their state constitutions. Expansion
has been accomplished more often by the less radical method of redefining
the scope of the state action requirement than by abandoning the

requirement entirely. 1 98 Even those courts t hat rejected state action
requirements have resisted extending those results much beyond the
particular fact patterns o f the paradigm cases, or their obvious analogs.

5. The recent trend has been away from e xpanding the reach of state
constitutional rights. With some exceptions, most of the decisions taking
an expansive approach were decided between five and fifteen years ago.1 99
Most recent cases have continued to require a showing of state action,
using a definition similar to the federal courts' definition, before applying
state constitutiona l rights. 200 Even the relatively few recent decisions that
have effectively extended state constitutional rights to cover private
infringements have often done so in silence2 0 1 or by subterfuge,2 02 rather
196. California and New Jersey have widened the scope of their respective constitu
tions in several substantive areas. See, e.g., Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 1 5 3 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (speech ); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 4 ( 1 979) (equality); Martin v. Heady, 1 03 Cal. App. 3d 580, 58688, 163 Cal. Rptr. 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 - 2 2 ( 1 980) (due process); Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.3d 6 1 5
(speech); Peper, 7 7 N.J. 5 5 , 3 8 9 A.2d 465 (equality ) ; King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66
N.J. 161, 1 9 1-95, 330 A.2d I , 1 7 - 1 9 ( 1 974) (inalienable rights).
197. Courts in Connecticut and Michigan, for example, have rejected claims that
various substantive provisions of their respective state constitutions apply to private
infringers. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A . 2d 1 20 1 ( 1984)
(speech); Lockwood v . Killian, 1 72 Conn. 496, 3 7 5 A.2d 998 ( 1 977) (equal protection);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88 , 3 7 8 N.W.2d 337 ( 1 985) (speech);
Scbroedcrv. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 9 1 0, 9 1 5 (E.D. Mich. 1 977) (quoting Fox
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 379 Mi�h. 579, 1 53 N .W.2d 644, 647 ( 1 967)) (equality);
Donahoo v. Household Fin. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 353, 354-55 (E.D. Mich. 1 979) (due
process) .
198. See supra notes 8 2-92, 13 7-49 & 1 78-9 1 .
199. The major cases expanding on federal definitions of state action for due process
were decided be�ween 1 974 and
purposes
King, Sharrock, Connolly and Martin
1980. The most important cases expanding speech and petition rights on private property 
were all decided between 1 979 and
Robins, Schmid, Tate, Alderwood and Batchelder
Gay
1983. The cases providing the most expansive applications of equality guarantees
!Aw Students, Peper and Hartford
were decided b�twee� 1 978 an� 1 984.
200. Most of the important state action cases decided smce 1 98� mvolv�d speech
rights on private property, and many of these i mposed rig�rous state action requ1.rements.
See supra notes 68-7 7 and accompanying text. See also Umted States Jaycees v. R1chard�t,
666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1 98 3 ) (imposing a state action requirement on a state equality
guarantee).
201 . E.g., Hartford Accident & lndem. Co. v . Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 5 7 1 , 482
A.2d 542 ( 1984), discussed s upra note 1 27.
-

-

-

-

-
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than by any straightforward reexamination or modification o f the state
action requirement.

6. This recent trend away from expansive interpretations does not
appear to h ave resulted from a n y lessening of courts' awareness of the
growth of private power. Rather, such fears have been overlain by contrary
concerns that abandoning or wea kening the state action requirement may
violate the traditional understanding of the purpose of constitutions, that it
represents a slippery slope likely t o lead t o the inappropriate imposition of
constitutional restraints on a broad range of private relations among
individuals, a nd that altering state action requirements could violate the
appropriate allocation of powers between courts and legislatures. If state
constitutions are to serve as a systematic protection against private
infringement of i ndividual rights, these concerns must be addressed.
III.

PARSING THE ARGUMENTS: MUST STATE ACTION

REQUIREMENTS B E READ INTO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
GUARANTEES?

The arguments against expanding the reach of state constitutional
rights beyond the confines of state action have been o f many types. The
most common elements include not only instrumental arguments that
consider the need to avoid interference with the competing rights of other
private parties, but also appeals to the "plain meaning" of the state
constitutiona l texts, the specific drafting history of particular provisions,
asserted general principles of constitutional interpretation that would

a

priori limit their application to state actors, and arguments concerning

separation of powers. Before discussing a lternate mea n s of defining the
reach of state rights guarantees, i t is necessary to consider each of these
arguments and determine whether they r equire a state action limitation.
Arguments from the Plain Meaning of Constitutional Texts

A.

Instances exist in which a particular state provision clearly indicates
that it protects rights against infringement by any party, private or
governmenta l .203 Other provisions equ ally clearly indicate by their
words20• or context206 that they apply only to governmental actors. In most
cases, however, the provisions leave open the question o f to whom they

202. E.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1 1 5 7 ( 1 988), discussed
notes 89- 9 1 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 102 & 1 57 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 39-40 & I 00 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 101 & 1 56 and accompanying text.

supra
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apply. For example, state guarantees of freedom of speech expressed in
language that citizens have a right to "freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for abuse of that liberty,"206 or presumably
absolute statements that persons have " i n al i e nable rights" to equality207 or
due process,208 can support interpretatio n s extending their application to at
least some private actors. A significant n u mber of courts have i n terpreted
them in this mann e r . 20 9
A more difficult i nterpretive problem i s posed by provisions stating, in
otherwise absolute terms, that citizens are entitled to equality "before the
Jaw" or "under the law , " 2 1 0 or by provisio n s that conclusively prohibit loss
of liberty or property absent "due process of law" or the equivalent.211
Some courts and commentators have argued that the reference to "law" in
such provisions implies that those provisions refer only to the relation
between the claiman t and the state in i t s law making or law enforcing
capacity.212 Such a reading, while plausible, i s by no means compelled by
the texts. Any gua r a n tee of freedom expressed as being "of law" or "under
law" could equally b e interpreted as con s t i tuting no more than a direction
that the right should be vindicated by legal processes, or a pledge that the
law will operate to vindicate such � right, o r that no one, public or private,
may use the forms and methods of law to violate such rights.213
206. See supra notes 4 1 -47 and accompanying text. But see Jacobs v. �ajor, 1 39 Wis.
2d 492, 503-04, 407 N . W .2d 832, 836-37 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , construing a "dual" constitutional
guarantee of speech -free speech language combined with a separate statement that the
legislature should pass "no law" abridging speech. Interpreting these clauses in light of the
"presumption" that the state bill of rights applies only to state action, the court found the
"plain meaning" of these clauses to preclude application to private actors. It is noteworthy
that this "plain meaning" was derived not from the provision's text, but from an a priori

presumption.
207. See supra notes 1 0 5 & 1 30-36 and accompanying text (inalienable rights).
208. See supra notes 1 6 1 & 1 70-72 and accompanying text (absolute rights to
equality).
209. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 5 9 2 P.2d 3 4 1 , 53
Cal. Rptr. 854 ( 1 97 9 ) , affd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 980), d iscussed supra notes 50-67 (regardmg
speech and assembly guarantees ); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of'�rus�ees, 7 N.J. 5 , 389
_
A.2d 465 ( 1 978), discusse d supra notes 1 3 5- 36 (regardm g equality �tghts mferred into a
.
state guarantee of inalienab le rights); and Kmg v. South Jersey Nat l Bank, 66 N.J. 1 6 1 ,
1 9 1 -93, 330 A.2d 1 , 1 8 ( 1 974) (Pashman, J., dissentin g), discusse supra note� 1 70-72
(regarding due process rights inferred from a state guarantee of mahenable rights).
.
210. See supra notes 1 04 & 1 1 9-29 and accomp anymg text.
21 l . See supra notes 1 5 8-59 and accompa nying text.
.
McKenzie Tank
2 1 2. See, e.g., Note, Pathways, supra note 3 , at 1 25-26; Schreiner v.
Lines, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 , 7 1 5 (Fla. App. 1 98 2 ) .
concluded that
2 1 3 . Most courts that have considered provis ions such as these have
1 74-76 a�d
9-26
1
1
notes
they apply only to state actors of some kind. See supra
. 1am meam ng" analysis
"
P
a
on
1e
d
I.
re
not
accompanying text. Howe ver, these courts hav�
. .
at least imphc1tly
The possibility of expan sive interpretation ofthts or similar language was
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Notwithstanding the debate over alternative readings, the basic
problem with a reliance on textual argu ments or an asserted plain meaning
of state constitutional guarantees is the inability of a n y such approach to
predict results . Relying on the plain meaning of t h eir constitutional
provisions, states with virtually identically phrased guarantees have
interpreted them in divergent ways. 2 1 4 Courts that wish to i mpose a state
action requirement will do so even in t h e face of constitutional language
clearly indicating that no such limitation is required.216 States that wish to
vindicate righ ts against private infringeme.nt can fi nd a way to do so, even if
the constitutional provision at issue seems to apply only to state actors.11•

Perhaps as a result of such problems, few courts to date have been willing to
base their conclusions regarding the application of such guara ntees to non
governmental actors on any subtle parsing of text or appeal to the asserted
"plain meaning." Instead, the operative d ecisions appear to depend more
on the courts' views as to the role o f constitutional guaran tees in general or
on one or more of the arguments considered below.217

B.

Arguments from Constitutional History and Framers ' Intent
In some cases, state courts have marshalled persuasive evidence that

their respective framers and ratifiers cons idered the iss u e and knowingly
chose to limit the reach of particul a r constitutional guarantees to govern
menta l action only. 218 In such circumstances, the argument for retai ning a
recognized in Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 5 7 1 , 586,
482 A.2d 542, 549 ( I 984). See supra notes 1 27-29. See Skover, supra note 3, at 245 n.58,
arguing that such language should be interpreted to refer to an extension of protection
under the "law of the land" clause rather than as an identification of the targets of the
constitutional prohibition.
.
214. See supra note 1 95 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Richardet,
' 666 P.2d 1 008 (Alaska 1 983). See
also supra notes 1 1 1 - 1 2 and accompanying text.
216. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 7 50 P.2d 1 1 57 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . See also supra
notes 89-9 1 and accompanying text.
. 2 1 7. A few courts have reached conservative results by explicitly rejecting arguments
based on language alone. See, e.g., Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol 'y
Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3 , 424, 780 P.2d 1 282, 1 28 7-88 ( 1 989) (while an early draft of the
state's spec:ch guarantee contained explicit state action language, the court refused to
attach significance to the change in language); Richardet 666 P.2d at 1 0 1 2- 1 3 & n.14
(rejecting petitioner's attempt to distinguish between st�te constitutions guaranteeing
"equal protection of the laws" and those, like Alaska's, which are phrased more broadly).
2 1 8 . See, e.g., Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 88 , 208-09, 378
N.W :2d 337, � 45-46 ( 1 985), in which the court quoted the chairman of the· relevant
?raftmg committee fo� the state's �ece�tly revised constitution as stating the committee's
intent to generall � r�tam a stat� action hmit for the state bill of rights. Although the debate
f�used on the Michigan equalit y rather th �n the speech guarantee, it still provided strong
evidence that the drafters consciously considered the issue and decided to treat the rights

1990]

ALTERNA TIVE LIMITS ON S TA TE RIGHTS

863

state action limit is certainly compelling. However, arguments that the
historical record and the intentions of the framers require courts to i nfer a
state action limit on other.w ise ambiguous state constitutional rights

guarantees do not always rest on such compelling factual bases. For
example, several courts have based arguments in favor of imposing a state
action limit on nothing more than some indication that those drafters
regarded the government as the pri mary source of potential infringement
of the rights they sought to protect.219 But while the primary impetus for
drafting state bills of rights may have been a concern to limit the powers of
governments, such an argument does not, b y i tself, show that the primary
purpose also was intended to be the sole purpose.
The same is true for arguments based on the existence of analogous
federal provisions or on evidence that state constitutional draftsmen
intended to incorporate substantive protections already protected by
cognate federal guarantees. 22 0 While such evidence may have some value
in eliciting the drafters' intentions, it is far less probative than evidence that
the draftsmen considered the issue and decided to restrict the application
of such guarantees to traditionally defined state actors. D irect federal
inspiration for state bills of rights is relatively rare; the original colonies
adopted their respective bills of rights long before the federal version was
drafted. Subsequently admitted s tates generally drew inspiration for
their charters from other states, rather than from the Constitution.221

ever

Moreover, to the extent that the Constitution may have provided the
inspiration for including certain additional substantive guarantees, there is
a significant difference between agreeing that a particular interest is
worthy of constitutional protection in general, and agreeing with all of the
specifics as to precisely how and against whom that right w i ll be protected.
Nor does the absence of affirmative evidence that the framers
considered state action issues necessarily suggest an intent to restrict the
reach of state constitutional rights. 222 In light of the difficulty of ascertainenumerated as privileges against governmental interference rather than as "rights" in the
Hohfeldian sense.
219. See, e.g. , Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. , 1 9 2 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 20 1 , 1 207-08
(1 984); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 492, 5 1 1 - 1 2 , 407 N.W.2d 832, 840 ( 1 987).
l�l
220. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Killian, 1 7 2 Conn. �9.6, 5� 1 -04, 37? �.2d 998,
hve
substa�
ilar
s1
impose
1s1ons
pro
y
�
(1977) (arguing that state and federal equalit
�
.
action)
state
require
to
eted
interpr
be
must
also
ns
restraints and, therefore, state provisio
See also supra note 1 1 8 .
.
Divers it� m a
221 . Linde, supra note 3 1 , at 380-82 ( 1 980); Utter, Freedon:' and
.

s and the Washi ngton Declaration of
Federal System: Perspectives on State Consti tution
( 1 984).
7
496,
1
.
Rights, 7 U. PuGET SouND L. REV. 49
, Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 , 7 1 6 (Fla .. D1�t.
Lmes
Tank
nzie
McKe
222. See, e.g. , Schreiner v.
of state action m
Ct. App. 1 982), a.ffd, 432 So. 2d 567, 569 ( 1 98 3 ) (absence of discussion
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ing any general sense o f the w i l l of a d i tfuse group o f constitutional
draftsmen, 2 23 and the frequently incomplete nature of the historical
record, such a lack of evidence m a y reflect no more than an inevita ble
degree of u ncertainty as to what the framers' intentions were. Or it may
mean no more than that the issue was never considered . It does not
necessarily demonstrate that the d r a ftsmen intentionally chose to retain a
state action requirement.
But the essential difficulty goes beyond any of these pa rticular
arguments. Attempts to rely upon h i storical evidence of framers' intent in
order to decide whether to retain a state action limit generally founder on
the fact that the requisite evidence is o ften contradictory, unclear or
nonexistent.2u The problem is particul a r l y acute where the state bills of
rights were drafted long ago and remain unamended or w here the relevant
language has been carried forward without substantial change. But even
where state constitu tions hav e been recently revised and extensive records
of the drafting history and debates have been kept, it is rare to find any
overt discussion of the state action issue.2211
Neverth eless, these problems of proof are not necessarily conclusive.
Though arguments such as these are generally cast in terms of framers'
intent, they can be v iewed more sympathetically as articulating a set of
presumptions that courts use to guide their interpretation of constitutional
rights. If there was a general understandin g in the legal community at the
time state constitutions were drafted that constitutional rights by their
nature applied only to restrict the activities of governments, then it would
make sense to accept indirect indications that the framers of a particular
the records indicates that the framers intended that the relevant constitutional provisions
apply only to government actors).
223. See generally Brest, supra note 26, at 209- 1 7 (exploring the difficulties of
"framers' intent" arguments in general).
224. A good example of the practical difficulty of such a historical or intent-based
analysis of the state action issue can be found in the debate between Justices Utter and
Dolliver of the Washington Supreme Court. Compare Utter, supra note 42, at 1 63-66 &
1 78-80, arguing that the h istorical record concerning the framers' overall intentions and
specific proposals clearly indicate that they intended to bind individuals as well as
governments with Dolliver, supra note 3 , at 450-54, arguing that the framers instead
!
shared a basic, though not always expressed, foundation premise that constitutions bind
only governments.
�25-. Half of the current state constitutions are a century old or more. Even those
constitutions that have been recently redrafted have in most cases carried forward
provisions in their bills of rights without significant change or discussion. While the
�mple�eness of the record � vary, it is not surprising that many do not reflect any express
d1scus �10n of sue� current issues as the definition of state action. See Note, "Malling" of
.
Constztu �zona � Rights, supra note 22, at 1 1 0, noting the absence of express discussion of
state action with respect to the speech guarantee in the Michigan Constitution of 1 963.
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constitution shared that common view or to i mpose a burden of production
and proof on those arguing for a different result.228 But this analysis
assu mes that there was a common agreement on some general principle or

understanding of the role of bills of righ t s - that they apply not merely
primarily, but solely to the actions of government. I t remains to be seen if
such an absolute principle ever existed i n so strong a form.

C.

Arguments from t h e "General Principle " that Constitutions by Their

Nature Bind Only Governments
In addition to arguments about a specific state' s drafting history,
many courts and commentators have r aised t h e related argument that it is
a traditional foundation principle of A merican constitutional interpreta
tion that guarantees of individual rights, state or federal, are properly
understood as d irected to limiting only government action, at least in the
absence of explicit textual or historical evidence to the contrary.227 Courts
have found authority for this principle both i n nineteenth century treatise
writers such as Thomas Cooley228 and modern commentators. 229 But while
the argument contains some element of truth - fear of governmental
power was a major motivating force for creating bills of rights - it remains
considerably overstated.
If the argument is taken as a claim that constitutional rights by their
inherent nature can never apply to private action, it is demonstrably
incorrect. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was established
that a state's plenary power over citizens could in principle be exercised by
imposing constitutional restraints on individuals in their dealings with
each other.230 Today it is clear that state constitutional provisions can be
226. See, e.g., Dolliver, supra note 3, at 453-54.
227. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Boys, 98 Ill. App. 3d 803, 807-09, 424 N.E.2d 886, 889
(1981) (noting laconically that " [i]t is fundamental that constitutional restraints apply
only to governments and not to individuals") ; Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66
N.Y.2d 496, 502-03, 488 N .E.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 5, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 ( 1 985); Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 247-5 1 , 635 P.2d 108, 1 1 8-19
(198 1) (Dolliver, J., dissenting); Jacobs v. Major, 1 39 Wis. 2d 492, 506-08, 407 N.W.2d
832, 837-38 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; Dolliver, supra note 3 , at 447-54; Ragosta, supra note 3, at 23.
228. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH. RE�T
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER Of THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION ( 1 868) (c1ted m
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3 , 780
P.2d 1282 ( 1989)) .
229. Shad Alliance, 6 6 N.Y.2d a t 503, 4 8 8 N . E.2d at 1 21 6, 498. N.Y .,S.2d at 103;
Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 248, 6 3 5 P . 2d at 1 1 8 (Dolliver, J., d1ssentmg); Jacobs,
139 Wis. 2d at 508, 407 N .W.2d at 838.
. .
.
le was well
230. See Utter, supra note 42, at 1 63-66 , noting that this prmc1p
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explicitly drafted and consistently i n terpreted to protect some rights
against private as well as governmental infringement. 231
The princip l e that state constitutions bind only governments never has
been consistently followed. On the contrary, decisions from several states
show that even before the current i n terest in state constitutions as sources
of individual rights, considerable precedent already existed for the d irect
application of a wide range of state con s ti t utional guarantees against some
private parties. Labor unions were a frequent target of such decisions.
Courts in Pennsylvania,232 Californi a,233 New Jersey23" and Massachu
setts236 all held that state guarantees of i n herent and inalienable rights of
life, liberty, property and the pursuit o f happiness prohibited unions from
attempting to i n t erfere with the freedom of non-members to pursue their
livelihood, or w i t h the freedom of e m ployers to hire non-union members.

Similarly, New York courts held that a state constitutional right to
procedural due process independ e n t l y a n d directly precluded labor un
ionS, 236 as well as other private vol u n tary associations,237 from expelling
members without affording them notice a n d an opportunity to be heard.
Other state constitutional rights l i kewise received a t least occasional
protection from private infringeme n t d uring the pre-incorporation era.
Courts in several states held that state guarantees of freedom of speech,
press, petition, a n d assembly prohi b i t ed private citizens from interfering
with the publication of a newspap e r , 238 precluded a l a bor union from

�stablished and popularly understood when the Washington state constitution was adopted
1 889.
231. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 1 2 and provisions cited supra note 27.
232. Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (1903).
233. Jordahl v. Hayda, 1 Cal. App. 696, 82 P. 1079 (1905).
Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving
. 234.Operators,
Pic�ure
N.J. Eq. 1 1, 1 76 A. 692 (E.& A. 1935); Collins v. International
_ 1 1 8Stage
Alliance of Theatrical
Employees & Moving Picture Machine Operators, 1 19 N.J.
�\�iO, 241, 182 A. 37, 43-44 (E.& �· 1 935);
Walsche v. Sherlock, 1 1 0 N .J. Eq. 223 , 159
& A. 1 932); Brennanv. Umted Hatters ofN. Am., 73 N.J.L. 729, 65 A. 165 (E.&
A: 190��:
���- �e ves v. Scott, 324 Mass. 594, 598, 87 N.E.2d 833, 835 ( 1 949).
�
���t�)�
v. Independent Dock Builders' Benevolent Union, 164 A.D. 267 , 149
N.Y.S. 771
h e v.
i
io , 1 54 isc. 281_, 277 N.Y .S . 8 1 (N.Y . Sup. Ct.),
aff/��l ���� 6�4 2�1:1� ��L· �� 1 ; 934)M (expulsion
a member from American
. 96• 96 N.Y.S.of 644
egion) ; Williamso� v Ra�d�l h 48 �isc.
L(member
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905 )
expelled fro� the Con�oi·d
e
�
Stock
and
Petroleum
Exchang
e of New York);
Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140 89 N �
�2 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1904) (expulsio
·
n of a member
from a social and literary diub).
. 25'. 1 1 1 �.Y.S. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
238. E.g., Ulster Squar
v Fowler, 5� Misc.
�
1908). The priva te defendanetsDeal
in
t�rs
�
ase
m combmation with public officials and,
therefore, might be held to be "state actors,,acted
under current doctrine. What is striking about
ID

·

·
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expelling a member who signed a petition opposing a union supported
law,m and prevented the American Legion from taking retaliatory action
against a member who p ublicly spoke o u t against a position favored by that

body ...0 In Ohio, the state constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion
was held to prevent a private school from requiring a Jewish student to
attend Christian services.20 The California constitutional right to the
pursuit of happiness was held to include a right of privacy, which was
violated when a private film company m a d e a film about the plaintiff's
sordid life.141 The New Jersey consti t utional g uarantee of workers' rights
to organize and bargain collectively was held to create enforceable rights
against interference by either a private employer243 or a labor union.24•
It is certainly true that most court decisions involving state rights have
involved challenges to government acts, and that some earlier state court
decisions explicitly hold that particular state bills of rights have no
application to private i n fringements. Nonetheless, the fact that a substan
tial number of pre-incorporation precedents for applying state constitu
tions to private infringers exist at least disproves any claim that applying
state constitutional guarantees to private action would be fundamentally
contrary to the nature or spirit of American constitutions. S uch precedents
also may demonstrate that such guarantees retain at least the potential for
contemporary use in dealing with violations of fundamental interests by
non-governmental entities. Even if the cases applying state guarantees to
private infringers constitute no more than relatively rare responses to
unusual problems, it could still be argued that the size and power of some
this case is that the court did not find it necessary to inquire into the question of the degree of
"state" involvement in the violation. Rather, the court quite evidently regarded state
constitutional rights as rights good against the world, which no one could violate: "The
plaintiff has the constitutional right to publish its newspaper . . . . No one can take unto
himsel f the right of suppressing in advance the publication of the printed sentiments of
another citizen on any public or private question." Id. at 327, 1 1 1 N.Y.S. at 1 7- 1 8
(emphasis added) .
239. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 1 1 3 A . 70 ( 1 92 1 ).
240. Gallaher v. American Legion, 1 54 Misc. 2 8 1 , 277 N .Y.S. 8 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1934). See also Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 1 29 N.J. Super. 379, 324
A .2d 35 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 3 1 7, 3 3 1 A.2d 1 7 ( 1 974) . .
241 . Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 1 29 Misc. 48 1 , 220 N.Y.S. 799 (City Ct. 1926).
See also Barry v. Order of Catholic Knights of Wisconsin, 1 1 9 Wis. 362, 96 N.W.. � 97
(1903) (holding that an association's rule that limited membership benefits. t? pract1cmg
Catholics did not violate the state constitutional right to freedom of rehg1on because
membership in the association was voluntary).
242. Melvin v . Reid, 1 1 2 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 9 1 ( 1 93 1 ) .
243. Cooper v . Nutley Sun Printing Co., � 6 N .J. 1 8? , 1 7 5 A.2d 6 3 9 ( 1 961).
244. Independent Dairy Workers v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Loca� No. 680,
23 N.J. 85, 99- 1 00, 1 27 A.2d 869, 876-77 ( 1 956). See also Comite Orgamzador de
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Molinelli, 1 14 N . J . 87, 5 5 2 A.2d 1 003 ( 1 989).
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equally creative
private institu tions i n the moder n world call for a n
applica tion o f fundam ental princip les o f law.
Beyond whatev er may be inferre d from these precede nts, the underly
ing reality is that the claims made i n the name of this asserted traditional
general princip le greatly oversta te the concep tual distinct ions on which it is

based. To be sure, as Cooley and h i s contemp oraries stated, the major
motivating p urpose for state bills o f rights was to put limits on the ability of
state governm ents t o legislate or otherwis e i n fringe the rights of individu
als. 2415 This a d mittedly central purpose, h owever, is not the only purpose

that such provisions might addr es s . O n the contrary, American state
constitutions were conceived by their framers as "horizonta l" compacts
among citizens rather than as "vertical" agreements between citizens and
some pre-existing governing authority. Thus, nothing prevented those

citizens from binding themselves a s well a s the government they created,
and no reason compels the conclusion t h a t they did not do so.
The standard view shared by Cooley a nd his contemporaries was that
state bills of rights generally did not confer or create rights of any kind.
Rather, they declared rights that citizens a l ready possessed by virtue of the
common law, and by virtue o f the n atura l law on which the common law
was based.2 46 In the natural law tradition, the distinction that modern
245. T. COOLEY, supra note 228. See also H . BLACK, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 9- 1 0 ( 1 895); J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1 45 ( 1 870). Note that in Cooley and Pomeroy, quoted above, the
commentators were speaking of issues other than whether state constitutional rights can be
protected against private infringement.
246. T. COOLEY, supra note 228.
Jn considering state constitutions we must not commit the mistake of
supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and protected by them, they
must also be considered as owing their origin to them. The instruments measure the
powers of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed . . . . {A
constitution] grants no rights to the people but is the creature of their power, the
instrument of their convenience. [It is d]esigned for their protection in the
enjoyment of the rights and powers they possessed before the constitution was
made. . . .
Id. at 36-37 (quoting Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 1 5 Mo. 1 , 1 4 (Bates, arguendo)).
_
I t IS to be observed of {state constitutional provisions regarding freedom of
speech and the press], that they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek to
protect and per�et�at� them, by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that
they shall remam mv1ol�t�. T�ey do not assume to create new rights, but their
.
purpose is to protect the citizen m the enjoyment of those already possessed. We arc
at on�, therefore, turned back fro!Il these provisions to the pre-exist ing [common]
law, m ord�r that we may ascertam what the rights are which are thus protected
'
and what is the extent of the privileges they undertake to secure.
.
Id. at 4 1 5- 1 7.
See also, to similar effect, H. BLACK, supra note 245, at 7-9; J. STORY, COMME
NTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1 858, 1 860
(tracing bills of rights to
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lawyers draw between the body of law governing relations between
individuals and the state and the body of law governing relations among
individuals was far less rigid or defined. On the contrary, natural law
provided the revolutionary generation with a unified foundation both for
the common law governing relations between individuals247 and for the
fundamental public .. liberties" that the colonists asserted against the
perceived encroachments of the British a uthorities.248 Although the
precise content of and remedies available u n der the law of the land as
private law were certainly different than under the law as a restraint on
King and Parliament, both aspects fun ctioned a s complementary parts of a
single legal trad ition that protected i ndividual rights from unjust en
croachments at the h a nds of fellow c i tizens and from violations by the
"state." 248 Thus, it would not be incongruous for those who drafted the
initial state bills of righ t s to regard the i nterests listed i n state bills of rights
as "rights" good against the world, which individuals could vindicate even
if the source of infringement were not the state.260
Such arguments may not, however, suffice for state guarantees
drafted, amended or reincorporated a t a later period, after the orthodox
view became established that such guarantees apply only to state actors.
Regardless of the views of the revolutionary era drafters of the initial state
bills of rights, it could be argued that those who subsequently amended
those early constitutions or who drafted and ratified the constitutions of
later admitted states assumed that constitutions generally bind only
governments, and that i t is the beliefs and understandings of these
subsequent framers that must guide i nterpretation of state constitutional
guarantees. Despite this argument 's force, it does not offer an independent
reason why state rights must be construed to require state action. If the
common law sources and noting their use for curbing infringements by government organs
and people mobilized as popular majorities).
247. On the natural law basis of private law in the revolutionary period, see generally
M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LA w 1 780 - 1 860 ( 1 977), distinguish
ing between the colonists' acceptance of British common law as "the law of nature and its
author," and their suspicion of British statutory law.
"
248. See generally E. CORWIN , THE "HIGHER LAw BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
Constitution: Fundamental
Unwritten
CONSTITUTIONA L LA w ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; Grey, Origins oft he
843 ( 1 978).
REV
L.
STAN.
0
3
Thought,
Law in American Revolutionary
.
:
that the Constitution
rights
the
of
"Many
24.
at
248,
note
upra
s
,
249. See E. CORWIN
of the United States protects at this moment against legislative power were first protected
by the common law against one's neighbors." Id.
L.
250. See generally Sherry , The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 5 4 U. CHI.
ent
docum
th
hat
t
intend
not
did
tion
t
�
Consti
l
REV. 1 127 ( 1 987) (the framer s of the federa
�
.
they drafted was to be considered the sole source of higher law to be apph� by J�dg.e�, but
was to function only as a part of the broader traditi on of natural law protection of md1v1dual
rights).
.
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historical record demonstrates that subsequent re-dra fters or amenders
consciously considered state action issues, their choice to limit the
application o f rights may well be entitled to deference. H owever, if the view
that constitutions "inherently" l i m it only governments reflected an unex
amined assumption by those later constit u tional fra mers - an assumption
that apparently diverged from the understandings of the very predecessors
who these later drafters intended to follow - then any claim to deference
seems much weaker. 2111 I f the latter day framers did err in their assump
tions regarding the original fra mers' intent, the purposes behind originalist
interpretation would suggest that modern courts shou l d give effect to the
views of the original framers rather than the errors o f their successors.
Finally, it could be objected that even i f the individ ual rights protected
by state constitutions were interpreted a s part of a natu ral law tradition
that also protected those interests from private infringement, this would
not necessarily require the state constitu tions themselves to be interpreted
in such a fashion. On the contrary, courts have traditionally had authority
to protect fundamental interests from some forms of private infringement.
Such authority, however, did not derive from any written constitution and
is irrelevant to interpretation of such a document .2112 The purpose of a
written constitution was to provide the aut hority for courts to protect those
rights from i n fringement by coordinate branches of government, an
authority that was unclear at best u nder common law. T herefore, to speak
of a right not only as "fundamen t a l " but also as "constitutional" might
imply that the specific right s ho u l d be u nderstood a s a restriction on

251. Original ist approaches to const itutional interpretation emphasize that courts
may not alter the framer's i nitial intent; otherwise the document 's original, rati fied political
and philosophical legit i macy would be underm ined. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra note 228,
at 68 -70; J . ELY, DEMOCRA CY AND DISTRUST: A THE ORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-9 (198Q ).
Although relevant to reconstruct the intent of later re-drafters or amenders, a background
assumption is not a conscious choice and does not constitute a fundamental political act to
which subsequent generations must defer.
�52 . .Fo� example, the fundamental r ight of equal treatment b y private individuals
.
w1eldmg s1gmficant de facto power was vindi cated by the nonconstitutional common law
rule tha � requires common carriers or other providers of necessary services to treat all
Pro�pective customers equally. The fundamental rights of li berty and privacy were
.
s1mil�rly protected !rom some forms of non-governmental i nfringement through the tort
doctrme of defamat10:°. See -?ener�lly Lombard v. Louisi ana, 373 U.S. 267, 275-8 1 (1963)
(Do�gl�s, J., concurnng) (dJS<;ussmg the common law duties of businesses affected with a
pubhc mterest).
The existence of thi s early body of non-consti tutional doctrine was not lost on the
.
nmete.ent� century commentators. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra note 228 (the federal
�o�s�1tut10�
was based on the pre-exi sti ng legal order that already guaranteed a range of
md1V1dual nghts and personal freedoms).
·
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government, regardles s of whether the s a m e or a cognate right against
private infringeme nt also may exist by virtue of another body of law.
Understood in this fashion, the a rgument that as a matter of general
principle state "constitut ional" rights apply o n l y against governmen ts may
have considerable historical validity. But, s o understood, the argument

may express little more than a semantic d istinction . At the very least, state
and federal bills of rights serve as formal statements of what their drafters

and the nation a s a whole consider the most important natural and civil
rights. Assume, arguendo, that state consti tutional rights are i ndepen
dently protected against private infringement by other bodies of law and

that when courts speak of "private i n fringement of constitutional rights"
that they would be more correct if they referred to a private i n fringement of
rights that are so fundamental that we have also given courts explicit
constitutional authority to protect them against governmental i nfringe
ment. ls this a distinction that makes a d i fference ? In either case, the
statement of the right in a constitution is m erely declarative and does not
create rights. I n common parlance of lawyers and laymen alike, such rights
are generally considered of "constitutional" magnitude regardless of who
is infringing upon them .
Nevertheless, there is one level o n w hich a distinction between rights
in their more general sense as pre-constitu t ional "natural rights" and in
their strict "constitutional" sense as restrictions on government might
make a critical difference. That is w it h r e ference to the willingness of
courts to act on their own to vindicate those rights. Written bills of rights
and the doctrine of judicial review provided a firm basis from which state
and federal courts could assert authority to overturn governmental acts
that violated the rights restated therein . I n contrast, as the reliance on
natural law gave way t o the dominance o f positivist concepts i n the early
nineteenth century, the traditional justification for courts t o independently
define and vindicate fundamental i n d ividual interests from non-govern
mental infringement declined. As a result, the role of defining the rights of
individuals inter se was largely taken over by legislatures.263
For these reasons, the tradition that "constitutional" rights, narrowly
defined, are directed a t limiting the actions of governments - a tradition
which some courts have ascribed to Cooley a nd other nineteenth century
treatise writers - may well exist. U po n a n alysis, however, that tradition

253. See generally M . HORWITZ, supra note 247, at 4-30. This .double movem�nt
i
demonstrates both the ultimate roots of the state action requirement as 1t has been appl ed
to
d
tmg
�ttemp
?
s
outside of the fourteenth amendment context, an a reason w y court.
fo
of
rm
the
m
sis
analy
vindicate fundamental rights from private infringement cast their
constitutional interpretation.
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has far less t o d o with whether the framers o f the state bills of rights
intended to restrict the scope and a pp l ication of the rights restated therein,
than it has to do with whether courts should share with legislatures the
power to define those rights as they apply to interactions between private
entities. The real issue is not an independent question of how constitutions
themselves have traditionally been interpreted, but a q uestion of the
separation of powers between court and legislature - a q uestion that will
be taken up in part E, below.
D.

Arguments from the Need to A void Interfering with the Liberties of

Other Private Parties

The main instrumental reason advanced in favor of a state action limit
on the reach of constitutionally protected rights is that in the a bsence of
such a limitation courts seeking to vindicate the rights of one private party
might infringe the equally importa nt competing liberties of other private
parties. This argument has been raised by the United States Supreme
Court construing the Bill of Righ ts , 21H by state courts construing state
constitutional rights21111 and by various commentators.2156 But while such
considerations suggest caution in expanding the reach o f state constitu
tional rights, they do not necessarily require that any limits must take the
form of a state action requirement.
On one level, the claim that state action li mitat ions are freedom
enhancing reflects the potential for conflict between spec i fic competing
rights. For example, in cases where individuals exercise their rights of
speech or petition within shopping centers or other privately owned
premises, a conflict arises between the expressive rights of one non
governmental party and the property rights of another. Simi larly, attempts
to require businesses or private associations to observe constit utional
norms of equality or due process can infringe on those entities' rights of
property, freedom of contract or freedom of association . I n such cases, the

254. Lugar �· Ednl;ondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 ( 1 982); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democrati c Nat l Comm., 4 1 2 U.S. 94 ( 1 97 3 ) ; Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244, 249-50 ( 1 963) ( Harlan, J., concurring).
255. See, e.g., Woodland v. Mi chigan C i ti zens Lobby, 423 M i ch. 1 88, 2 1 1 - 1 2, 378
N.W.2d 337, 347 ( 1 985); Shad Alliance v. Smi th Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 488
N . E.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 5, �98 N.Y.S.2d 99, 1 04 ( 1 985) ( Jasen, J., concurri ng); Southcenter
_ Venture v. National Democratic
Jomt
Pol'y Comm. , 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 780
1282
( 1 989); Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 340-41 6 1 3 P.2d 5 3 3 542 P.2d
rev
denied
·
'
'
'
'
94 Wash. 2d 1 0 1 4 { 1 980).
256. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 1 49 ( 1 978); Burke
&
Reber, supra note 1 50, at 1 0 1 6; Skover, supra note 3 , at 253-54 ; and Note
Robins supra
'
note 54, at 659.
'
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state action doctrine arguably performs a valuable service by preventing
courts from imposing constitutional obligations on either party, since any
gain in liberty enjoyed by one party would inevitably be offset by the
freedom lost by the other, a loss made even more egregious by the fact that
G
it is coercively i m posed by the court. 2 7
This argument, however, rests on the u nspoken assumptions that the
legal realm is so densely filled with "rights" of constitutional dimension
that no right can be expanded without i mmediately encountering and
diminishing another, and that all of these conflicting rights are of roughly
equivalent weight and i mportance. W hi l e this may be an accurate
description of some areas of constitutional law, it does not accurately
describe the particular countervailing righ ts at issue in most state
constitutional .. state action" cases. Neither rights of property,2H rights of
group association,2H nor rights of contract and commercial freedom260 are
so absolute as to preclude governmental regulation in furtherance of
competing constitutional values. Whether this result is explained on the
ground that the substantive content of these rights does not extend to the
boundaries impl icitly set by competing rights, or whether these rights are
deemed less important than more favored rights, the result is the same:
courts and legislatures have some freedom to impose burdens on the

257. These arguments have been frequently raised by commentators concerned with
the loss of property rights suffered by owners required to allow speech and petitioning
activities on their premises. See, e.g., Ragosta, supra note 3, at 32-35; Comment, supra note
3. Similar arguments can be made with regard to other state constitutional rights. For
example, any imposition of due process restraints on creditors necessarily diminishes their
property rights in the collateral they seek.
258. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 8 2-88 (1 980)
(property rights of shopping center owners are not so absolute as to preclude reasonable
state regulation requiring those owners to provide access for speech and petitioning) .
259. New York Club Ass' n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 ( 1 98 8 ) (local ordinance
requiring certain private clubs to refrain from discrimination did not facially violate the
associational interests of the clubs or their members). See also Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'! v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 48 1 U.S. 5 3 7 ( 1 98 7 ) ; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 ( 1 984). A fortiori, large commercial establishments possess no absolute right� of
association or managerial discretion that would immunize them from reasonable regulation
by states in furtherance of similar constitutional goals. Id. at 634- 3 8 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing rights of"commercial" association) . Only individuals engaged
in intimate human relationships enjoy pure associational rights generally exempt from state
restriction. Id. at 6 17-22.
260. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 ( 1 97 2) (holding unenforceable so muc� of a
conditional sales contract as purported to entitle the creditor to replevy the chattel without
affording the debtor a prior notice and opportunit� to .be h�ard) ; D.H. Ov�rmyer. �o. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 1 74 ( 1 9 7 2 ) (upholding the const1tut1onahty o� the cognov1t J?ro�1s1on of
the contract, but indicating that such provisions are generally subject to regulation m order
to preserve the due process rights of debtors).
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interests of one set o f private parties in order to fu rther the constitutional.
.
[
type interests o ot h er private p arties. 2 8 1
In any event, regardless of the accuracy of the assumptions underlying
these arguments, they do not justify so broad and non-discrim inating an
approach to conflict avoidance as a n across-the-board state action require
ment. While some degree of "liberty" is inevitably lost whenever private
parties are required to conform their conduct to constit utional norms,
freedoms are also infringed when priva te parties violate those norms. The
issue is to strike the correct balance. A n y existing conflict could be more
sensitively a n d appropriately resolved on the merits by weighing all
relevant factors and balancing the i n terests actually at stake, ra ther than
by any single threshold requirement, such as state action.282
In addition, state courts and state constitutions are a ppropriate organs
for resolving the conflicts that a rise in these cases. The countervailing
private interests that would most often be subordinated in such cases including the rights of property owners, employers or creditors - have
traditionally been both founded u pon a n d limited by state law. Conse
quently, there is nothing inherently i n appropriate in the prospect of a state
court finding that state constitutions a s well as state statutory or common
law principles must be considered when such private rights must be defined
or limited.283
26 1 . If the implicit assumption was correct that these potentially conflicting rights
also were protected by the federal Constitution, the argument would prove far more than its
proponents intend. If all constitutional rights "touch" at their margins, so that to expand
one would necessarily contract another, then any decision by a state court attempting to
balance conflicting private rights would deny the federal constitutional rights of the party
losing the litigation. The supremacy clause, however, prevents this result. Under these
assumptions, only the United States Supreme Court would have the power to define the
boundaries between private rights, and state courts and constitutions would effectively be
deprived of any independent role. This is not to dispute, as Professor Maltz has pointed out,
that private interests conflict and that state constitutional adjudications may not increase
the sum total of "rights" in the world. Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22. The point is that
state courts and state constitutions may have some legitimate role to play in balancing those
competing interests.
262. The utility of a direct choice among competing interests rather than a
mechanical application of the state action doctrine has been recognized even in the federal
context. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More ls Not Less: A Rejoinder To Professor Marshall, 80
�":' · U.L. REV. 5 7 1 , . 57 �-73 0.980). Professor Skover also has argued that state action
hmits on state const1tu:ional n��ts guarantees do not effectively preserve liberty, but
merely render th� operative definition of those rights systematically underinclusive. Skover,
supra note 3, at 253-54.
2�3 . A similar poin� was made by the United States Supreme Court in PruneYard
Sh?ppmg Center v. �obm �, 447 l!·S. 74 ( 1 980). In that case, a shopping center owner
.
clam�ed that the Cahforma de�1s 1ons requiring it to allow expressive activities on its
.
.
premises had the effect of depnvmg it of federally constitutionally protected property
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The claim that a threshold state action requir emen t is freedo
m
also can be unders tood o n a nother level a s a claim
erving
pres
that
individuals should enjoy some realm of a utonom y in which they a r e free to
act arbitrarily, to refuse to listen to certai n points of view for no better
reason than because they happen to disagre e, or to exercis e private
prejudices in their persona l dealing s with others. Arguab ly, these are
important element s of individu al autonom y that should never be sacrificed
to the counterva iling i n terests of others, or even questioned by any court.2s'
As applied to individua l human beings, such argument s have great force2sa
and argue in favor of limiting the reach of state constituti onal rights to

ensure that an appropriat e realm of persona l individual a u tonomy can be
maintai ned.
Nevertheless, while arguing in favor o f some limits on the reach of
state rights, these considerations do not necessarily favor defining that

limit along the lines of "state action," as that term is ordinarily understood.
Most courts relying on such arguments to j ustify reading a state action

limitation into state constitutions, h ave done so in cases where the parties
seeking to avoid constitutional restraint were not private individuals but
business organ i zations or other relatively powerful and i mpersonal enti
ties.288 By grouping all non-governmental entities into a single class of non-

rights. The Court had previously indicated that such an argument had merit in the context
of an asserted first amendment right of access to such private fora. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 ( 1 972). It sharply distinguished the situation presented, however, when the
asserted right of access was based on state rather than federal constitutional principles. In
the latter circumstance, the state merely is exercising, through its courts, an undisputed
state police power to define and limit property rights. 44 7 U.S. at 8 1 . The vindicated state
constitutional right to speak thus becomes the functional equivalent of an easement
imposed upon the property by operation ofla w, an easement states may freely impose unless
it becomes so onerous as to constitute a "taking" of property without compensation.
264. The erosion of liberty that can result from unrestricted j udicial inquiry into
private conduct has been frequently noted. See, e.g., Note, Four Alternatives, supra note
54, at 601; Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 340-4 1 , 6 1 3 P.2d 533, 5 4 1 -42, rev.
denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1 0 1 4 ( 1 980). The United States Supreme Court has frequently noted
that some personal choice and intimate Gonduct is a fundamental attribute of liberty and
generally immune from state regulation. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 6 1 7- 2 1 ( 1 984); Lombard v. Louisiana, 3 7 3 U.S. 267, 274-7 5 ( 1 962) ( Douglas, J.,
concurring).
265. Burke & Reber, supra note 1 50, at 1 0 1 6.
266. Defendants in cases raising speech and petition rights have most often been
shopping centers and universities. See supra notes 50-9 1 . In addition, they have �ncluded a
state fair, a large private hospital and an agricultural labor camp. See Umted Farm
Workers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 201 Cal. App. 3d 1 2 1 3 , 236 Cal. Rptr. ? 8,
vacated on other grounds, 237 Cal. Rptr. 576, 7 3 7 P.2d 779 ( 1 987); Oklahomans for Life,
Inc. v. State Fair of Okla., Inc., 634 P.2d 704 (Okla. 1 98 1 ); Jone.s �· Memo�ial �osp. Sys.,
746 S.W.2d 89 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 988). Defendants in cases �arsmg equahty r�ghts have
included insurance companies and other busines s entities, private clubs and high school
·

·
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state actors, n o matter how large, i nstitutionalized or powerful, the state
action doctrine has served primarily to divert attention from the need to
protect the a utonomy interests of private individua ls. I t h a� instead

�� nded

to protect the ability of relatively large a n d powerful business entities or

private associa t ions to act arbitrarily, to discriminate, to effectively muzzle
others, or to i n fringe on those values o f personal autonomy that they assert
i n their own defense.
Finally, a bandoning a state action requi rement need not sacrifice the
autonomy interests of private individuals. On the contrary, those courts
most active in abandoning or modifying state action requirements have
consistently reaffirmed that the exp a nsion they envisage is not without
limit, and that the decisions of private i ndividuals will remain free of
constitutional scrutiny.287 While t h e debate continues a s to how best to
define alternative limits, all courts consid ering the issue have excluded
from constitutional scrutiny any purely private decision by a n ind ividual in
matters truly infringing persona l autonomy.288

E. Argumentsfrom Separation of Powers: That Private Infringement of
Fundamental Rights Should Be Regulated by Legislatures, Not Courts
The most powerful argument employed in defense of reading state
action limits into state bills of rights is one of separation of powers. This
argument has been p hrased and explained by various courts in different
ways: that regulation of private rela t ions is inherently a function of the
athletic associations. See United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1 008 (Alaska
1 983); Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 1 97 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal. Rptr.
1 68, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 8 8 1 ( 1 988); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 4 ( 1 979); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank
Lines & Risk Mgmt., Inc., 408 So. 2d 7 1 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982), a.ffd, 432 So. 2d 567
(Fla. 1983); Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 5 3 , 50 1 A.2d 8 1 7 (1985);
Hartford Accident & lndem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 505 Pa. 57 1 , 586, 482 A.2d 542,
549 (1984); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Defendants in cases raising due process issues have generally been banks,
business corporations and similar institutional creditors. See supra notes 1 66-67.
2� 7. In Robins a?d Gay Law Students, the California Supreme Court did not
.
procl�1m a� ab�olute prmc1ple that state constitutional restraints apply across the board to
all private mfrmgers. Rather, it carefully weighed the particular facts of each case. See
supra notes 50-53 & 1 3 8-40 and ac�om �anying text. Where the competing rights of the
�efen�ant have been greater, Cahforma courts have found constitutional restraints
mapphcable. See, e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 1 72 Cal. App. 3d 322, 342 n.8,
2 1 8 Cal. R�tr. 228 , 24? n.8 ( 1 985). Courts in New Jersey, Washington, Alaska, Texas and
Pennsylvania have ach1ev�d the same result through explicit balancing tests. See infra notes
299-304 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 3 1 6- 18 and accompanying text.
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legislative branch; 299 that the complexity, fluctuating interests and varia
bility of private relations demand flexibility that constitutional adjudica
tion cannot provide; 2 10 or that attempts to apply guarantees to the relations

of non-governmental parties would cause jud ges to inappropriately impose
their individual beliefs and philosophies o n other branches of govern

ment.n1 The common thread is that, regardless of whether it would be
desirable to require some non-governmental entities to observe constitu
tional norms, it is properly the business of legislatures, not courts, to define
and impose those requi rements .272
At the outset, it should be noted that state constitutions and state
judges occupy a somewhat different position with respect to separation of
powers issues than do their federal counterparts. Federal law provides a
" floor" for all competing rights at stake i n individual rights cases; no state
decision can denigrate these federal rights, even in the name of the state
constitutional rights of another party. Consequently, state courts have
comparatively limited discretion to constru e their state constitutions in
ways that would impose burdens on private parties.273 Moreover, many
separation of powers arguments apply with less force to state than to
federal constitutional law. In states with j udiciaries directly elected or
subject to retention elections, institutional concerns over undemocratic
decisionmaking should be lessened .21• And even in states with purely
appointed judiciaries, the relative ease and frequency with which state
constitutions have been amended significantly lessens the possi bility that
judicial decisions out of step with popular sentiments will be unchange
able.2711 Of course, elected j udges must respect the prerogatives of
269. See, e.g. , Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 1 8 8, 2 1 1 n.28, 378
N.W.2d 337, 347 n.28 ( 1 9 85).
270. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 1 92 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1 201 ( 1 984);
Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1 982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 5 1 2 Pa.
23, 31-32, 5 1 5 A. 2d 1 3 3 1 , 1 3 35 ( 1 986); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic
Pol'y Comm., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3 , 780 P.2d 1 282 ( 1 989).
27 1 . See, e.g., Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 503-04, 488
N.E.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 6, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 1 04 ( 1 98 5 ) . See also Deukmejia n & Thompson, All
Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS

L.Q. 975, 1 001 -04 (1979).
272. This point has been raised by academic commentators as well. See, �;g., L._TR.I.BE,
supra note 256, at 1 1 49; Note, Robins, supra note 54, at 659-60; Note, Malling of
Omstitutional Rights. supra note 22, at 1 1 6- 1 8.
273. See supra note 27 and accomp anying text.
. .
l ��·
274. See generally Skover, supra note 3 , at � 57-59; Utte�, �tate Consti tutiona

CONST.

the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountab1/zty: ls There a Crocodile in
the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 1 9 ( 1 98 9 ) .
.

n 1 974, and
275. The Louisiana Constitution, for exam ple, was completely redra ftc:<1 !
ms, In The
Willia
then amended some 2 2 more times between 1 974 and 1 988. See generally
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coordinate branches, and the power t o amend the state constit utio n,
however easy, should not be taken lightly. 278 Nevertheless, separation of
powers arg uments developed in the federal context in s upport of a state
action requirement cannot be a utoma tically transferred to the state
constitution a l context.
Viewed solely in terms of state constitutional law, the separation of
powers question resolves into two related but separable aspects. The first
focuses on the appropriate allocation o f authority between courts and
legislatures a n d asks whether there are historical or practical reasons
requiring courts to systematica l l y refrain, in the a bsence of explicit
statutory direction, from requiring private entities to respect the ..constitu
tional-type" rights of others. The second focuses on the d i tferences between
constitutions and other sources o f law, such as statutes o r common law, and
asks whether constitutions have any l egitimate role in regulating the
relations between non-governmental parties.
Courts in the common law tradition do not seem restrained by any
historical or inherent reason from playing a role i n regulating the
fundamental rights of private parties in t h eir relations with each other. The
task of regulating the ordinary relations of private parties was a major
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning
and Result, 3 5 S.C.L. REV. 353, 382 ( l 984) (not i ng the ease and frequency of state

constitutional amendments to "correct" unpopular jud icial decis ions); Comment, The

Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popu lar Sovereignty, and
Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1 47 3 ( 1 987).

276. The negative consequences of pol i t ical methods that overturn unpopular state
i
jud cial decisions are well illustrated by the recent retent ion elect ion controversy that
resulted in the ouster of Cali fornia Supreme Court Chi ef Just ice Bi rd and Justices Grod in
and Reynoso. That campa ign demonstrates the dangers of polit ici zation of state const itu·
t ional deci sions. See generally Grodi n, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 6 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 969 ( 1 988). As Dean
Calabresi noted in a parallel context:
[T]he posit ion that where procedures for amending consti tuti ons are relati vely
easy courts can use constituti onal adjud ication to modify or eli mi nate anachronistic
laws, as well as to uphold consti tuti onal ri ghts, i s simpl istic and wrong.
[Consti tutional adjudicati ons are] and should be more than an invi tation to
amend the consti tuti on. Indeed, the easi er the procedure for amendment the more
must the judi ci al decrees of unconsti tutional ity put to the people the seri�usness of
what an amendmen� m.e�ns. Only i n thi s way can consti tuti onal ri ghts be protected
from temporary m�Jonti es. [Too easy a reli ance on amendment to control judicial
excess] cheapens, mdeed destroys, the cruci al moral force that underli es and
protects true consti tutional decisions.
':!· CA�A��ESI, A C�M�ON LA� FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 2 ( 1 982). See also Note,
'Mal/mg of Constllutwnal Rights, supra note 22, at 1 1 7. There i s some evi dence that
.
contr?ve�stal state consti tuti onal judicial deci sions only rarely result i n responsive state
const1tut1onal amendments. Utter, supra note 274, at 36-40.
·
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function of traditional common law courts . 277 Courts' innate capacities do
not change when funda mental rights are involved. American courts have in
the past found no impediment to t heir a pplication of fundamental
principles (whether drawn from natural law or from written state constitu
tions) to controversies between private parties.278 The courts' capacity to
deal with such questions cannot be v i ewed a s permanently lost merely
because the judicial function has become less c ommon in recent decades.279
Nor can it be said t hat courts lack all democratic legitimacy when
making decisions of this sort . To t h e extent that majoritarian choice
constitutes the ultimate authority for allocating rights a mong private
claimants, legislatures are, arguably, the single most appropriate forum
for determining such issues . Courts should, t h erefore, exercise appropriate
self-restraint. It does not fol low, however, that courts cannot legitimately
participate in the process of allocating basic rights among private parties.
The authority of courts to order private relationships is ultimately founded
on the longsta nding consent of the people and their political leaders. This
consent, while occasionally questioned in controversial cases, has never
been substantially withdrawn. M oreover, even in those states where
justices are appointed rather than elected, the j udiciary as a group
inevitably tend to reflect long term trends in majority sentiment. The
creation of law by the process of case-by-case development is by definition
incremental in nature and ultimately the result of many d i fferent judges
confronting variations on a single problem over a period of time. As such,
the ultimate results of the process c a n be expected to, and generally do,
reflect long term societal consensus, rather t h an the potential ly divergent
views of one or more well-placed individuals.280
Similarly, the practical advanta ges that legislatures enjoy over the
judiciary in the task of allocating rights among competing private
claimants are not so overwhelming a s to completely deprive courts of all
ability to participate with legislatures a s partners in fashioning the
operative rules governing the circumstances under which non-governmen
tal entities may be required to respect t h e fundamental rights of others.
Although legislative bodies are generally better suited than courts to
gather some kinds of information and to reconcile the conflicting interests
1985).
277. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (
278. See supra notes 2 32-44 and accompanying te�t.
.
,
Comm.,
279. See generally Southcenter Joint Ventu re v. National Democratic Pol �
.
ring)
concur
,
.
J
,
(Utter
989)
1
(
9
1 1 3 Wash. 2d 4 1 3, 446-49 , 7 80 P.2d 1 28 2 , 1 29
note
supra
,
BRESI
CALA
G.
;
1980)
(
280. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 67-68
276, at 93-95 .
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of different segments of society,28 1 cou rts have some compensa ting
advantages of their own. As has been recognized in other contexts, the
case-by-case process of judicial decisionmaking permits greater flexibility
of response to unforeseeable or s ubtly v arying factua l circumstances and
allows tentative solutions to difficult or closely balanced issues of fact and
principle to be worked out in practice without committing the deci
sionmaker to the same result i n future cases.282 Moreover, because case
by-case decisionmaking is constra ined by the need t o justify results by
reference to principles previously a n nounced, it is more li kely to ulti mately
result in consistent and intellectually defensible results ra ther than from ad
hoc political horse trading. Finally, to the extent that one may fear the
ability of powerful private entities to wield disproport ionate i n fluence over
political representatives, the relative political isolation of courts may
provide a practical additional safeguard.
Moreover, even if concerns over the lack of immediate democratic
sanction or the practical incapacities o f courts constitute a reason for
courts to defer to legislatures for policy choices, the dividing line between
the role of legislatures and courts need not necessarily be drawn on the
basis of whether "state action" i s involved. Certainly Americans expect
most of the rules governing the daily activities of private parties to be set by
elected representatives. But they equally e xpect most of the rules governing
the activities of government and its officials to be set by those same
representatives. Judges seem to enjoy, i f a nything, more practical insight
and a historically better sanctioned role as partners with legislators in cases
concerning private rights and duties than in cases concerning government
operations. The undoubted necessity of judicial self-restraint in all
situations does not dictate that permissible judicial activity should depend
on the presence of state action.
Such arguments address only h a l f of the problem, however, and can be
construed as fundamentally misleading insofar as they posit a real
"partnership" between courts and legislatures. The more difficult question
is the proper role of state constitutions i n allocating rights among private
claimants. As man y courts and commentators have poi nted out, judicial
decisions based on constitutional i nterpretation, unlike those based on
28 1 . See. e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 2 7 1 , at 1 000.
�82 . In �he analogo �s situation where an administrative agency can choose between
quas1-leg1slat1ve rulemakmg and quasi-judicial case-by-case adjudication as alternative
ways of developing pol�cy, the Court has noted that the latter method has significant
.
practical advantages of its own. See, e.g. ! �ational Labor Relations Bd. v . Bell Aerospace
Co., 4 1 6 U.S. 267, 292-94 ( 1 974); SecuntJes & Exchange Comm' n v . Chenery Corp 332
U.S. 1 94, 202-03 ( 1 947).
.

"
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other sources of law, cannot be changed by ordinary legislative processes.
Such decisions contemplate a complete displacement of legislative author
ity and majoritarian decisionmaking, not a cooperative effort by courts and
legislatures.283 Such objections do con stitute additional reasons for j udicial
self-restraint in interpreting the substance of constitutional rights. How
ever, these arguments do not demonstrate that constitutionally based
rights are totally different in kind from those based on other sources of law,
and are not dis positive of whether fundamental constitutional rights must
be interpreted as rights against only governmental interference.284
The claim that decisions grounded in constitutional interpretation are
permanently beyond majoritarian control significantly overstates reality.
No judicial decision can do more than establish a provisional "interim"
rule. Majoritarian processes can overturn a n y decision; the only issue is the
relative difficulty of this task. Decisions based on statutes or common law
can be overturned relatively easily b y legislative enactment. Those based
on the federal Constitution can be overturned only with great difficulty by
amendment or by the slow and uncertain process of replacing outgoing
Justices with successors holding different views. As noted above, state
constitutional decisions fall in the middle of this spectrum . They can be
overturned by the relatively easier process of state constitutional amend
ment or, in many states, by electing justices likely to reconsider controver
sial decisions. Such m ethods of state constitutional change are not "easy"
in any absolute sense, nor should they be. But the state process is
considerably easier than that required to produce equivalent changes on
the federal level. These methods are s u fficiently easy to significantly lessen
the danger that j udicial decisions based on state constitutional rights
guarantees will long or often hamstring popular will in the area of private
rights. 286 Thus, the real issue is not w hether state constitutions preempt
majoritarian decisionmaking, but w hether the somewhat increased diffi
culty of overturning decisions based o n state constitutions requires that
state action
guarantees.

requirements be systematically read · into state rights

283. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 276, at 1 1 - 1 2; Deukmejian & Thompson,
supra note 27 1 , at 986; Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22, at 1 000.
.
284. See Skover, supra note 3, at 259 (suggesting that the proper pnm�cy ?f s.t�te
legislatures in allocating private rights can be mainta�ned bes� by su.bstantive Judicial
deference, rather than by threshold tests like the.state action doctrme, which removes whole
categories of cases from effective judicial review) .
986
285. See supra note 275. Cf Deukm ejian & Thompson, supra note 27 1 ,. at .
ut1ons,
const1t
state
f
s
etation
erp
�
in
ive
?
(decrying the anti-democratic impact of expans
:
greater
but noting that the greater ease of amending state constitutions permits state courts
.
leeway than federal courts should exercise in similar cases)
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Reformula ted in this way, the q u estion becomes whether the risks of
permitting constitutionally based j udicial input outweigh the risks of
depriving courts of any independent role to determine the extent to which
fundamental rights can be vind icated against private infri ngement. This
may ultimately be a matter of judgment. But the same rationales that have
been trad i tionally used to justify j udicial actions as a second line of defense

for fundamental rights when democra tic processes fa i l to prevent govern

mental viola tions of those rights would appea r to eq ually j ustify similar
protection when legislative processes fail to protect those rights from
private-party infringement.286 W hatever the sou rce o f infri ngement, the
legislature concededly has the primary role in determining the operative
rules. But in both cases, courts applying constitutional norms may be able
to play a useful role by supplementing or tentative l y reversing political
decisions i n those relatively rare i nsta nces where the polit ical bra nches fail
to protect substantive rights. I n the context of state consti tutional law,
where judicial errors are relatively easy to correct, the risks of judicial
abdication seem greater than the risks of judicial domination.
Undeniably, the substance of what a state cons titu tion commands
may differ depending on whether state or private infr i ngement is alleged,
and the range of permissible results may be significantly broader where
private rights conflict. But this d i fference involves the s u bstantive question
of how a constitutional right to free speech, equal trea t ment or due process
is defined in particular circumstances. It does not demonstrate that
constitutions are irrelevant simply because a private rather than a
government infringer is at bar . While s u ch arguments may thus counsel
judicial self-restraint, they too do not demonstrate that the li ne between
permissible and impermissible j ud icial activity must be drawn along the
"state action" frontier.
The remaining arguments against reliance on state constitutions as
sources of l a w to protect rights from n on-government a l interference are
essentially arguments of prudence: that constitutions a re inherently too
rigid and unchangeable to provide workable rules for a n area so complex
286. So� � state co_n�titutional rights guarantees clearly express this view of the role of
courts by exphc1tly providmg that they are self-executing; courts are thereby empowered to
enforce them regardless of whethe: the legislature acts. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 3a.
.
several state courts have implicitly embraced this
�ven whe:e the texts a :e �ot explicit,
view, holdmg that certam nghts guaranteed by their constitutions are also to be construed
.
as self-e�f?rcmg grants. See, e.g., Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp. 1 9 1 ( E.D. Pa.
1 979) (citl ?g Erdman �· Mitch �ll, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A . 327 ( 1 903) (PA. CONST. art. I, § I is
self-executmg)) . Cf Bivens v' Stx Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
.
403 U.S. 388 ( 1 97 1 ) (construing a cause of action directly under the fourth amendment).
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and fast changing as private relations are alleged to be;287 a nd that
expanding the reach o f state constitutional rights will likely have the effect
of diluting their substantive content .288

As to the first poin t , while consti t u tional principles are i nappropriate

instruments for regulating the details of p rivate conduct, i t is far less
evident that placing constitutional outer bounds on such conduct would
require excessively detailed regulatio n . Nothing is so inherently "com
plex" or "changeable" about decidi n g on the merits whether privately
owned public gathering places should be closed to speech and petitioning
activity, whether large employers may invi diously discriminate against
homosexual job applicants, or whether financial institutions should notify
their debtors before engaging i n self-help seizure of the debtor' s property.
Respecting the second point, i t is surely true that the substantive
constitutional rules that bind government m a y not always be transferable
without change into t h e realm of private i nteractions. However, protec
tions against government action need not be weakened or diluted. Rather,
all that is necessary is to recognize that the substantive meaning of
constitutional norms may change depending on the nature of the violator,
and to make distinctions accordingly.289
* *

*

For the reasons discussed above, it is evident that state constitutional
rights guarantees should not be applied a cross the board to all types of
interactions a mong private parties; limiting principles are necessary.
However, except in rare cases where the state constitutional text or history
is explicit, such argum ents do not demonstrate that those limits should be
based on a requirement of state action, instead of some other criterion. The
construction o f alternative limits on the application of state bills of rights
on a basis other than a "state action" requirement, and whether such limits
are preferable to state action, are thus open to consideration on their
merits.

IV.

CONSTRUCTING LIMITS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

GUARANTEE S : ARE THERE BETTER A LTERNATIVES TO "STATE
ACTION?''

Courts that have considered the applicability of state rights guaranent is
287. Maltz, Dark Side, supra note 22, at 1003-0 5 (noting that this argum
flawed).
. State
. kzng
. .
.
h zn
288. See Marshall, Diluting Const itutio nal Rights: Rethznkzng "Ret
Action," 80 Nw . U.L. REV. 558 ( 1 98 5 ) .
289. See infra note 296.
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tees, regardless of their position o n the state action que�tion, have
.
recognized that some l imits must be placed on the application of state
constitutional rights; they disagree only as to defi n ing those limits. They
have, for example, uniformly agreed that in certain factual situations such as w here anti-abortion demonstra tors intrude on the private property
of abortion clinics - expressive activity is not protected by state constitu
tional speech a n d assembly guarantees. Courts that req uire state action
concluded that t h is activity is n o t protected on the g round that the clinics
are not sufficiently connected w i t h the govern ment. 28° Courts not requiring
state action reached identical results by balancing the competing private
interests a t stake.291
Despite such convergences, the di stinction between states that inter·
pret their constitutions to conta i n a n implied state act ion limit on the reach
of rights guarantees and those that do not remains i m portant. If a showing
of state action is required before state rights guarantees become operative,
then those guarantees will be i neffective as a basis for systematic protection
of individual rights from powerfu l non-govern mental infringers. Con·
structing a n alternative set of l i mits o n those provi sions may extend their
operative reach, and thus provide a means to control nominally private
institutions that wield significa n t de facto power over individuals. What
must be determined is whether a n alternative set of li mits can be
constructed and whether such limits would be preferable to the state action
requirement as a means of limiting the application of state rights.
A.

Constructing Alternative Limits: What Factors Are Relevant?
As was discussed above, some l imits on the reach of state constitu·

tional rights guarantees must b e imposed to preserve the autonomy of
individual s,292 to maintain a n a ppropriate scope for legislative choice in
290. See, e.g., Ingram v. Problem Pregnanc y of Worcester, [nc., 396 Mass. 720, 488
N.E.2 408 ( 1 986); Kugler v. Ryan, 6 8 2 S . W.2d 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 984);
State v. Horn,
1 39 Wis. 2d 473, 407 N . W.2d 854 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . But see Parkmed Co. v. Pro- Life Counselling,
Inc., 9 1 A. .2d 5 5 1 , 457 N. .S.2d 27 ( 1 9 8 2) (inj unction that prohibite
d any anti-abortion
demonstrations on the privately owned plaza fronting
a large office building was
overbroad) .
29 1 . See, e.g., State v. Brown, 2 1 2 N.J. Super. 6 1 , 5
1 3 A.2d 974 (App. Div.), certif.
.
denied, 1 07 N .J. 5 3 , 5 26 A.2d 1 40 ( 1 98 6 ) ; Planne d Parent hood of
Monmouth County, Inc.
_
v. Cannizzaro, 204 N .J . Super. 5 3 1 , 499 A . 2d 5 3 5 (Ch.
Div. 1 98 5 ) ; Crozer Chester Medical
Center v. May, 3 5 2 P . Super. 5 1 , 506 A.2d 1 3 7
7 ( 1 986); Right to Life Advoca tes, Inc. v.
�
,
_
Aaron Wo�en s Chmc
, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824
(1988 ); Benng v: Share , 1 06 Wash . 2d 2 1 2, 7
2 1 P.2d 9 1 8 ( 1 986), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S.
1050 ( 1 987); City of Sunnyside v. Lopez,
50 Wash . App. 786, 7 5 1 P.2d 3 1 3 (1988).
292. See supra notes 254-6 3 and acco
mpanying text.

�

�

y
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balancing the compet ing rights and interes ts of private parties , 2 9s and i n
'
general, to avoid sacrific ing more liberty t h a n would b e g ained b y such an
expansion of constit utional reach. 29" These considerations sugges t some of
the factors that should contribu te to any alternative set of l imits.
First, to avoid i mperm issible i n fringements on zones of personal
autonomy, state constitu tional rights guarantees should be construed to
bind, in addition to governm ent, only corporatioris, associati ons or other
similar entities, and natural persons only to the extent those individua ls are
wielding impersonal power. "Imperso nal power" used in this context
means not the authority enjoyed by all individual s to make personal choices

but the power that some individual s enjoy - by reason of wealth, position,
or some other factor - to exercise control over public or business related
matters that a ffect many people. It is, for example, one thing for a Donald
Trump to decree that political discussion i s not permitted at his dinner

table. It would be something quite d i fferent for that individual to decree
that political discussions are not allowed a m ong employees i n his hotels. 296
State constitutional rights should not be applied in a ny manner that would
restrict choices of individual persons acting in private capacities with
respect to matters that personally a ffect them.
Second, to preserve the dominant role of legislatures in the definition
and allocation of private rights, courts should be cautious in expanding the
substantive reach of state constitutional guarantees as applied to non
governmental infringers. This caution should encompass both a recogni
tion that only the most important and fundamental state constitutional
rights furnish a sufficiently important basis for judicial intervention, and a

strong resistance to intervention even in support of these core values unless
those rights are violated in some i m portant respect. Detailed prescriptions

of private conduct should be avoided and m inor or technical violations that
might not be tolerated if state action is involved should be considered de
minimis if a private infringer is at bar. 296
Finally, to maximize the liberty o f a l l private parties involved in

293. See supra notes 269-89 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
295. The distinction is similar to those drawn by other commentators who have
attempted to define a sphere of public life to which const�tutional rights should apply. See,
to
e.g., Heins , supra note 3, at 3 5 1 (Massachusetts equal rights a�endme�t .should �P�!Y
"discrimination that injures its victims in public, social, economic, �r poh�1cal affairs but
not to "discrimination causing injuries that are private, personal, insulting perhaps, but
without material impact on public life") .
.
.
.
.
.
of Judicial
296 The purpose and effect of such a restriction is similar to the goal
pson,
restraint: which also has been advocated by others. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thom
.
277-79
at
3,
note
supra
supra note 27 1 , at 98 1 . See generally Skover,
.

.
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ffs rights �annot be
dispute s of t h is type, infring ement of the plainti
,
conside red in a vacuum or on a n y a bsol ute sca l e . Instead those rights must
be bal anced against the com peting rights of the a l leged infringer. Re
straints should be imposed o n l y w h e n the impositi on on the funda mental

liberties caused by the chall enged action outweig h the imposition of
constitu tional restrain ts on t h e li berties of the d e fendant .1t7
State decisions holding t h a t sta t e constitut ion a l guarantees of funda

mental rights can apply in the a bsence of state action lend support to such
an alternative s e t of limiting principles. Contrary to the fears of some
critics, t hose decisions have n o t indica ted that state constitutional rights
guarantees should be bindi n g on a l l priva te pa rt ies regardless of the

circumstances . Rather, these courts appear to be in the process of
articulating a different set of limiting principles, not rooted in a threshold
consideration o f whether the i n fringer is connected to the government.

Though t h e arguments have not been completely expressed, these cases are
strikingly similar to the above t h ree-factor test both i n their common goal
of defining a category of arguably " private" actors w ho can j ustifiably be
required to observe state consti tutional norms and in their results.

For example, in State v. Schmid, 298 a case involving the exercise of
speech and assembly rights a t a privat e l y owned shopping center, the New
Jersey S u preme Court held t h a t its state constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech was not limit e d by a ny requireme n t of state action. The
court did not, however, hold t h a t t h e constitution binds all private parties.
Instead, t h e court held that t hree factors must be considered to determine
when priva t e property owners would be required to permit s u ch activity on
their premises:

1)

the nature and ordi nary use of the property at issue; 2)

the extent of the owner's invitation to the public to e nter those premises;
and

3)

t h e purpose and nature of t h e expressive activity at stake/'"

Other states have taken a similar approach to cases i nvolving free
speech and private property. For example, in A lderwood Associates v.
Washington Environmental Cou ncil,300 another shopping center case, the
297. Approaches to state rights that involve balancing competin interests on the
g
.
merits also have been advocated by others. See, e.g., Note, Four
Alternatives, supra note
54, at 608- 1 2 ; Note, supra note 30, at 1 5 22-3 1 . However, such balanci
ng tests are usually
proposed as part of a flexible or shifting definitio n of state action
rather than an alternative
to the state action requirement. See, e.g., Glenno n & Nowak
, s upra note 6; Comment,
supra note 49, at 9 5-99; Note, Robins, supra note 54; a t 660-62
.
298. 84 N.J. 5 3 5 , 423 A.2d 6 1 5 ( 1 980), appea l dismis
sed
4
5
5
U.S. 1 00 ( 1 982). See
.
supra note 5 9 .
299. Id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630 .
'

�

00 96 Wash . 2d 2 0, 635 P.2d 1 08 ( 1 98
1 ) . See supra note 6 1 . In its subsequent
:
.
dec1s1on m Southcenter Jomt Venture v. Natio
nal Democratic Pol'y Comm ., 1 1 3 Wash. 2d

�
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Washington Supreme Court also rej ected a state action requirement and
substituted a multi-factor balancin g test of the competing interests
involved . Like the

Schmid test,

the

A lderwood test focused

on the nature

and use of the private property and the n ature of the expressive activity.
Unlike the New Jersey version, however, the Washington test explicitly
considered the possibilities of effective time, place and manner regulation
of the activity.301 The Ca lifornia S upreme Court, in

Prune Yard,

though

less clear in rej ecting the state action concept in its entirety,302 also
proposed a multipart test for speech a n d petition access to shopping
centers. This test included the factors listed i n A lderwood, plus considera
tion of the availability of alternative fora .303 Other state courts, while not
explicitly articulating the precise n a ture of the test used, also have
explicitly balanced competing private rights to resolve claims under state
guarantees of speech and assembly.30"
Moreover, it appears that decisions a b andoning state action limits for
other state constitutional rights also may be interpreted like

Alderwood

and

Prune Yard

Schmid,

as imposing i nstead a different and more

expansive - but nonetheless real - set o f limits on the applicability of
those rights. For example, as noted a bove, a series of Pennsylvania cases
held that rate setting decisions by private insurers are subject to the
constraints of the state constitution's equa l rights amendment .3011 Al
though those decisions appear to suggest that those rights apply without
limit,308 both the unique status of the a utomobile insurance business307 and
4 1 3, 780 P.2d 1 28 2 ( 1 989), the Washington Supreme Court rejected the Alderwood
analysis for claims based on the state guarantee of free speech and other rights set forth in
the Washington Declaration of Rights. It did, however, retain that analytic approach for
claims against private actors who infringe upon rights contemplated by that state's
initiative and referendum procedures. Id. at 426, 7 8 0 P.2d at 1 289. Before Southcenter
limited its application, the Alderwood test was successfully applied by lower courts in
Washington. Id. at 454-5 7 , 780 P.2d at 1 303-04 (Utter, J., concurring).
30 1. 96 Wash. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 1 1 6 .
302. See supra notes 5 2-58 and accompanying text.
.
303. Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center, 2 3 Cal. 3d 899, 9 1 0, 592 P.2d 341 , 347,
153 Cal. Rptr. 8 54, 860 ( 1 978), affd, 447 U.S. 74 ( 1 980).
304. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 1 8 5 , 1 90 (Alaska 1 989) ; C�ozer Chester
_
Medica! Center v. May, 3 5 2 Pa. Super. 5 1 , 506 A.2d 1 37 7 (1986); Right
to Life Advocates,
Inc. v. Aaron Women 's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 98 7 ) .
305. See supra notes 1 27-29 and accompa nying text.
,
306. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm r, 505 Pa. 5 7 1 , 586, 482
A.2d5 42, 549 ( 1 984); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 343 Pa. Super. 1 69, 1 73-74, 494 A.2d 409,
412 (1985); Bartholomew v. Foster, 1 1 5 Pa. Com m w . 430, 437, 5 � 1 A . 2� � 93, 396 ( 1 988).
state
307. As several courts have noted in the context of claim� ansmg under
leg
the
m
fr
y
directl
benefit
s
?
�l
constitutional due process provisions ' automobile insurer
· "c ptive market '
is
Th
rance.
ms
h
·
sue
�
',,
requirement in all states that drivers must have
�
"no fault
combined with the special degree of regulation they are subjected to under either
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the failure of the courts to extend this rationale to other fact ual situations,
suggest an alternative explanation. These cases cou l d be reinterpreted to
hold that some limits on the a pplica tion of state equality rights may be
required but that the requirement may be met where the defendant
provides a necessary public s e rvice, derives benefits from the state, has
traditionally been subject to significant regulation, a nd is a lleged to be
infringing on important constitutional values. 308
In similar fashion, the pre

Sch m id decisions of the New Jersey
Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees3°' and
King v. South Jersey National Bank, 31 0 a lso may be in terpreted to intimate
-

Supreme Court in

that non-state action limits m a y be a p plied to state guarantees of equal
protection and due process. The holding in

that Princeton Univer
sity was bound by New Jersey's equal protection provision despite its

Peper,

private status, appears to turn on the importa nce o f the right to pursue
one's livelihood . 3 1 1 More importantly, the significa nt economic and cul
tural power wielded by Princeton University and its multiple ties to the
state and federal government, though not relied on by the court, also may
be grounds for distinguishing that defendant from others. The holding in

King,

that financial institutions engag ing in self-help repossessions must

afford their debtors some minim a l d u e process rights, a lso may be seen to
have depended, at least implicitly, on the importance of the right at issue,
the perceived power of such institu tions and the coercive impact of
summary seizures.
Thus, both the results and reasoning of the cases lend su pport to the
three-factor analysis derived a bove . Although these decisions do not
discuss whether state constitutional rights guarantees bind private individ
uals or whether the other, arguably l ess fundament a l , rights should be
interpreted to apply to non-governmental actors, the results in these cases
are consistent with such principles. In each case, the private entity required
laws or state mandated "assigned risk pools," renders them even more "entangled" with the
state thanother insurers. c_ompar� Shavers v. Kelly, 402 Mich. 5 54 , 267 N.W.2d 72 ( 1 978)
.
(rely1ng ?n such facts for its finding that such an insurer was a state actor for Michigan
.
const1tuttonal due process purp<>ses) with King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3 d
1 2 1 7, 743 P.2d 889,
240 Cal. Rptr. 829 ( 1 987) (noting the same facts but declining to find state action under the
.
.
Cahforma due process guarantee).
308. T� e decision in Gay Law Stude t is similar in structu
re. Althou gh that decision
'! �
was phrased m terms of an expanded defini tion of state action
rather than an abandonment
of such a concel?t, t�e court a �so �ound that the state constitution
al right of equality applied
only after cons1dermg the s1gmficant powe r w 1"elded by
th e d e1en
.
r d ant and its
.
· muI tipIe
connections with the state. See supra notes 1 3 8-48
and accom panyin g text.
309. 77 N.J. 5 5 , 389 A.2d 465 ( 1 97 8 ) .
3 10. 66 N.J. 1 6 1 , 1 77-78 , 3 3 0 A.2d 1 , 9- 1 0
( 1 974)
3 1 1 . 77 N.J. at 77-80 , 389 A.2d a t 476- 77.
·

·

·
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to observe state constitutional norms was not an individual, but a l arge and
relatively impersonal entity that wielded significant de facto power over
individual lives. The individual rights a t stake i n these cases - the right to
engage in political speech and activity i n a forum that would assure that
such speech would reach its intended a udience, the right to equal treatment
by large entities that control access to necessary public services or to a
signi ficant number of jobs, and the right to notice before private property is
seized by a creditor - all involved important liberties that were signifi
cantly infringed . The multifactor tests i n Schmid and Alderwood are
attempts to balance, i n a particular factual setting, the competing private
rights at stake. I t requires little imagination to see them a s instances of a
broader requirement of balancing competing rights in all cases where
private parties allegedly infringe state constitutional rights.
Though additiona l factors may requi r e consideration, these three
factors may provide t h e outline of a n alternative to the state action doctrine
as a limit on the applicability of state constitutional rights guarantees.
B.

Constructing A lternative Limits: How Should They Be Applied?
If the factors outlined above do provide a workable alternative to state

action, the next issue that must be determined is how those factors should
be applied.
A requirement t h a t state constitutional rights should not be a pplied to
limit the autonomy of individuals acting in a purely personal capacity
must, if that limit is to be effective, operate as a threshold requirement.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of litigation, the mere fact that one's
actions can be questioned in court i s i n itself a significant burden on that
individual's privacy and autonomy. Maximum freedom within this per
sonal zone can be achieved only i f t h e indiv idual is guaranteed freedom
from constitutional restraint and j u d icial inquiry .312
In contrast, the other factors outlined a bove - the i mportance of the
right allegedly i n fringed, the degree of infringement and the balancing of
the competing rights a t stake - c a n be considered only on the merits. All
facts must be known to accurately a ssess the competing i nterests. Such a
balancing involves i nquiry into the relative importance o f the competing
rights and the degree to which alternative outcomes will infringe those
rights.313 However, t h i s approach does not suggest that every case must be
decided on a n a d hoc basis after a full trial. The experience with the
abortion clinic protest cases, for example, already suggests that courts are
3 1 2.
3 1 3.

See
See

supra

notes 1 94 & 264-65 and accompanying text.
.
and accompanying text.

supra notes 257-63 & 297-303
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capable o f deriving gen � ral cat egories o f simil � r c� s �s in w ich t e
.
.
.
balancin g o f competing rights will usually result in s1m1lar dec1S1ons. •
The final question addresses the order and manner in which such
limits should be applied. The require ment that the a l leged infringer not be
a private individual acting in a personal capacity is a threshold require·
ment. The requirements that the right infringed be .. fundamental" and
that the i n fringement be signi fica nt also should fu nction as required
elements of the plaintiff's

prima facie

case. Since these facts should be

within the plaintiff's knowledge a n d un necessary j u dicial inq uiry into the
conduct of private parties should be avoi ded, the plaintiff should be
required to make an initial showing a long these lines . The last requirement
that the rights ga ined by imposing j u d icial restraint m ust not outweigh the
rights thereby lost, can of cou rse be d ecided only on a review of the merits
as a whole.31�
Looked a t superficially, the cases appear to split on the issue of how
alternative limits should be applied .

Schmid and Alderwood considered all

of the factors identified in their m u l t i-factor tests before reaching their
conclusions, and they treated t hose factors as part o f the a nalysis of the
merits o f the plaintiff's cl a i m s . 316 However, subsequent lower court
decisions i n New Jersey may indicat e a significant modi fica tion of those
tests. These decisions apply t h e fi rst element of t h e

Schmid

test as a

threshold requirement rather than a single requirement among several
parts of a n inquiry on the meri t s . Only i f it is shown a t the outset that "the
owner has devoted his property to some public use" will it be necessary to
balance the competing interests b y taking the other elements of the Schmid
test into account. 317
Similar results were reached i n Washington u nd e r the Alderwood
test . Unless the property at issue is "open to the public, " its owners need not

accord state constitutional speech rights to others, apparently regardless of
3 1 4. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
3 1 5 . See Note, Four Alte:natives, supra note 54, at 608- 1 2 ( a dvocating such a direct
_ approach to the merits of cases mvolving private infringement of constitutional
b alancmg
.
nghts).
3 1 6. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 5 3 5 , 563-69, 423 A.2d 6 1 5, 630-33, appeal dismissed,
455 U.S. 1 00 ( 1 982); Alderwood Assocs. v . Washington Envtl. Council ' 96 Wash. 2d 230
243, 635 P.2d 1 08, 1 1 6 { 1 98 1 ) .
3 1 7 Bellemead ?ev. Corp. v. schneider, 1 96 N.J. Super. 5 7 1 , 5 74, 483 A.2d 830, 832
.
(":PP· D �:v. 1 984) (umon memb�rs did
not have a state constitutional right to leaflet on the
private s1d�-:Valks of a .commercial building not generally open for public use). Other New
Jersey dec1S1ons applying the Bellemead version of the Schmid test include State v. Brown,
212 N.J. Super. 6 1 , 5 1 3 A.2d 974 (App. Div.) , certif. denied, 1 07 N.J. 5 3 , 526 A.2d 140
( 1 986); and Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. 5 3 1 , 499 A.2d 535
.
(Ch. Div. 1 985), ajfd, 2 1 7 N.J. Super. 623, 526 A.2d 74 1 (App. Div. 1 987).
'
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the other factors .31• Applied i n t h i s way, threshold requirements of
"devotion to public use" or "open to the public" appear to be somewhat
similar in function and content to an expansive version of the "public
function" line of traditional federal state action analysis.319 Like some of
the early applications of the feder a l public function test, these new
articulations of the

Schmid and Alderwood standards

seem to attempt to

define at the threshold a category of priva te entities that are in some
respects as important as a public entity i s to the community, and are
therefore subj ect to constitutional restraint.
The split among these courts may be more apparent than real,
however. In

Schmid and Alderwood,

the i mpersonal nature of the alleged

infringer and the importance of the right at issue were both clear. Once the
court passed the state action issue, the only remaining issue was the need to
balance the competing rights of the priva te litigants. Thus, it is not
surprising that those courts constructed tests that only balanced those
interests on the merits. In contrast, the a ppellate courts' reading of a
threshold requirement of "public-ness" into the

Schmid and Alderwood

tests reflects the same perceptions - that state rights should not be
interpreted to bind a l l private parties and that the mere fact of judicial
inquiry can in itself become an imposition on liberty - as underlay the
conclusions regarding a threshold requirement barring most claims
against individuals. In the appellate cases, the question of w hether the
defendants were the kind of entities that should be required to observe
constitutional norms was much more problematic than it had been in

PruneYard, Schmid

or

Alderwood.

Those courts were more concerned

with constructing a version of the test that would shield purely private
relations from cons titutional scrutiny . The method of analysis currently
followed by the N ew Jersey and W ashington courts does not exactly
coincide with the analysis advocated here, but the results a nd concerns that
motivated those decisions are nonetheless consistent with that analysis.

C.

Would Such A lternative Limits Be Preferable to State Action?

One arguable v irtue of analyses based on factors other than state
actio n is that they permit individu a l rights to be vindicated in circum
stances where such protection seems i ntuitively required, but where the
3 1 3, 31_7 - 1 9
318. City of Sunny side v. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. 786, 792-95 , 7 5 1 P.2d
a �nvate
that
hold
o
t
J!rown
n
i
on
�
decis
lat
(1988) (relying i n part o n the New Jersey appel �
right to
a
rs
strato
demon
ortion
antiab
give
to
as
public
medical center was not so open to the
demonstrate on the privately owned premises ) . .
319. See infra notes 328-2 9 and accompany ing text.
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infringing party is not part of o r connected t o t h e government. Not
everyone agrees that such an expansion o f j udicial activity is good.
Nevertheless, it appears that the recurring efforts by some courts to expand
the scope of constitutional rights, whether by redefi ning or by abandoning
state action limits, reflects a belief that individ uals someti mes suffer de

facto

infringement of important individual liberties at the hands of
powerful private entities and exis t i n g legal controls on the arbitrary

exercise of non-governmental power are inadequa te. To the extent one
shares that perception, a theory of limits based on other elements provides
what no state action based theory can : the possibility of systematic judicial
protection of basic rights from some forms of private infringement.110
A rela ted, but less controversial, virtue inheres in the a bility of such an
analysis to focus the attention of courts on the real interests at stake in
particular circumstances and avoid anomalous distinctions between func
tionally identical cases. State action doctrines, no matter how defined,
create distinctions between cases that do not track a ny practical differ
ences but depend solely on the incidental factor of whether the infringer is a
state actor. For example, it is not obvious why speech and petition rights in
a municipal stadium, public park or other gathering place s hould depend
on who holds the deed to the forum, or why the right of a truckdriver to
refuse to provide urine samples to his employer should depend on whether
he is employed by a private firm or by a state department of transportation.
In such cases, the public or private nature of the infringer makes no
difference i n terms of the effects o f that deprivation. There is little
difference to the alleged victim. I d o not argue that the claimed constitu
tional right should prevail i n a l l such cases. But t h e decision whether
individual rights should be vindicated should depend o n the a ctual interests
at stake i n the particular case, not o n the functional irrelevancy of the
identity of the infringer. Analyses of the limits o f constitutional rights
similar to that proposed here h ave the virtue of forcing courts to decide
cases on the basis of the competing i n terests, a process that a t least holds
out the possibility that like cases can be treated alike regardless of who
owns or controls the alleged infringer.s21
Analysis along these lines also may rescue courts providing broader
protection of individual rights from the charge that t heir d ecisions have
been purely ad hoc, result-oriented and without theoretic justification.322
On the contrary, it provides principled bases both for vindicating rights

320. See infra notes 334-42 and accompanyin text.
321. See, e.g., G�ennon & Nowack, supra note 6;gMarg
ulies, supra note 22, at 732-38;
Note, Four Alternatives, supra note 54, at 608-1 2.
322. See, e.g., Hudnut, supra note 22, at 95; Simon, supra note 22, at 306-07, 313-14.
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and, equally important, for limiting the reach of state constitutions short of
some potential applications. By iden t i fying the autonomy interests of
individu als as a central limit on the applicability of constitutional rights, it
provides a principled reason why those g u a rantees shoul d control the
activities of some private entities but not others.323 By focusing the
decisionmaker's attention on such factors a s the nature of the rights
allegedly infringed, the d egree of infrin gemen t and the competing i nterests
of the private defendant, such an analysis at l east provides a rational basis

for litigants to argue, and courts to j ustify, conclusions as to whether and
why one case should d i ffer from another in its results.
Any system depending in part on a balancing of competing interests
will never yield wholly predictable or determi nate results. Courts applying
such tests may find it difficult to articulate reasons why the balance is
struck differently in different cases, or they may be tempted to disguise
personal value choices in the weight t h ey give various elements . Nonethe
less, such problems are not different in kind than those afflicting balancing
tests in other areas, and presumably c a n be h andled through the good faith
of judges and litigants. As experience is gai n ed, general l y agreed results
will likely emerge for certain classes of cases.324
In comparison, the state action doctrine, as defined by the Burger
Court and followed by some state courts, is a less satisfactory m ethod of
limiting the reach of state constitutio n a l rights guarantees. As many critics
have pointed out, that approach has proven d i fficult to justify conceptually
and impossible to apply consistently, 325 and does not adequately r esolve the
tensions between liberty and security of right that are i n h erent in our
traditional theory of rights.326 Moreover, under current federal formula
tions, application of the state action doctrine has resulted in obvious

l
323. The need for such a stopping place on the s lippery slope is evident. During the ora
[
]
a
f
I
"
at:
�
t
argument in Alderwood, counsel for the petitioners was driven to concede
l l l
'
private person s home was on the busiest corner of the city and hence the best avai ab e p ace
from which to gather signatures, the collector's a lleged constitutional right would compel
the homeowner to allow a card table to be set up on the front lawn." Comment, supra note
49, at 98. Such an absolute approach to state constitutional rights would seriously infringe
the rights of individuals. Id.
324. See supra notes 290-9 1 and accompa nying text.
. ,
..
l
325. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1 688-98 ; B ack, Foreword: State Action,
69, 84-91 ( 1 967);
Equal Protection and California 's Proposition 14, 8 1 HARV. L. REV.
Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 1 30 .u.
PA. L. REv. 1 296 ( 1 982); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action
Doctrine, 28 Sr. Louis U .L.J. 683, 7 3 3-37 ( 1984) ; Thompson, Piercing the Veil ofS�ate

,

sion,
Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythic al Application to Self-Help R eposses
1977 Wis. L. REv. 1 , 1 9-21.

326. Skover,

supra

note 3, at 260-75 .
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fu nctional anomalies, where the decision whether constitu tional rights will
be vindicated has li ttle relation to any rational valuat ion of the competing
interests a t stake or the real world impact of the condu c t under scrutiny .327
It is certainly no novel insight to point out that the United States
Supreme Court has not interpreted the state action doctrine with much
consistency over the years, or that the d octrine as presently interpreted has
substantially narrowed the n u m ber a nd kind of entities that will be
considered state actors. While the Court at one time took an expansive
view, developing a number of rationales by which private entities could be
sufficiently related to or dependent o n the government to be required to
respect the constitutional rights of others, 328 the trend s ince 1 9 7 2 has been
to restrict the reach of federal constitutional rights by more strictly
interpreting the requirements for a fi n ding of state a ction. 329 To be sure,
327. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. RE v . 503, 5 1 935, 550-56 ( 1 985); Horowitz, The Misleading Search For "State Action " Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV . 208 ( l 957); Van Alstyne & Karst, State
Action, 1 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 6-7 ( 1 96 1 ) .
328. One such rationale, the "public function" doctrine, posited that when a private
entity effectively supplants the state as a provider of services and opportunities, that private
entity must respect individual rights that relate to that service or opportunity. Amalga
mated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U . S. 308 ( 1 968) (privately
owned shopping center that had effectively replaced the traditional "downtown" as a public
gathering place required to permit first amendment activities on its premises); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 -02 ( 1 966) (municipal park could not be run on a segregated
basis even if it were privately owned) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 ( 1 953) (private
political "club" that effectively controlled the local political process could not discriminate
on the basis of race); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 50 1 ( 1946) (private owners of a company
town required to respect the first amendment interests of residents and visitors).
Alternatively, where the private entity was not performing any public function, a
federal constitutional violation could be found if there was a sufficiently close connection
between the private actor and some government body or official. This connection could take
the form of official enforcement, authorization or encouragement of the private party's
unconstitutional action. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 ( 1 967) (state
constitutional amendment purporting to permit private racial discrimination held to
officially "encourage" otherwise private discrimination and thereby create state action);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l ( 1 94 8 ) (court injunction enforcing private racially
restrictive covenant constitutes "state action" in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
The connection also coul� form a sufficiently close "nexus" or degree of "entanglement"
_ and some government rule or official. Gilmore v. City
between the challenged pnva te action
of Montgomery, 4 1 7 U.S. 556 ( 1 974) (sufficient government entanglement where segre
gated school was granted temporary, exclusive use of public recreational facilities);
.
Norwood v. Hamson, 4 1 3 U.�. 455 ( 1 9 7 �) (sufficient government entanglement where
_
se�re�ated school was effectively subs1d1zed
by provision of free books ); Burton v.
.
W!lmmgto � Parking Auth., 365 U.S . . 7 1 � ( 1 96 1 ) (government "entanglement" with
_ held adequate for apphcat1on of federal constitutional restrictions to a
private act1V1ty
priva �e �esta_uranteur �hose �tablishment existed on the property o f and was in economic
symb1os1s with a pubhc parking garage).
329. Since 1 972, the Court has redefined the "public function" doctrine to include
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where the federal constitutional violation occurred at the h a nds of a
government employee acting in an official capacity,330 or where a state
official acts in concert with or provides "overt significant assistance" to the
private defendant, 331 government action will still be found and federal
constitutional rights vi ndicated. However, in two recent cases the Court
has again held large and powerful quasi- private entities generally free
from federal constitutional restraints, despite what was i n both cases a
significant degree of govern ment support of and involvement in their
activities . 33 1
Such vaci llation i n the definition of t h e state action doctrine is rooted
only those few entities that provide services or wield powers "traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State" or "traditionally associated with sovereignty." Jackson v. Metropoli
tan Edison Co., 4 1 9 U.S. 345, 352-53 ( 1 974). See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U .S. 5 22, 544 ( 1 9 87) (quoting Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 8 30, 840 ( 1 982)) (government action will be found only if "the challenged
entity performs functions that have been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' " of the
government) (emphasis in original) .
The Court has similarly redefined the degree of state "encouragement" of or
"entanglement" with private conduct necessary to engender constitutional scrutiny. To
state a federal constitutional claim on this basis the plaintiff must show that the state is
"responsible," because of its exercise of coercive power or other significant encouragement,
for the "specific conduct" constituting the complaint. See, e.g. , Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 1 63 ( 1 972). Mere approval or
acquiescence by the state in decisions independently reached by private parties is
insufficient.
33 0. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 ( l 988). But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 3 1 2
(1981) (public defender under contract with local government to provide indigent legal
services is not a government actor because, inter alia, the attorney acts as an adversary to,
not an agent of, the state during the performance of his professional services).
33 1 . Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v . Pope, 485 U.S. 478 ( 1 98 8 ) (intimate
involvement of state probate court in triggering a statutory time bar for claims against an
estate constituted sufficient "government action" to require affording due process protec
tions to creditors of the estate). See also Lugar v . Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U .S . 922 (1982)
(to sameeffect). Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 5 1 6 ( 1 982) (mere existence and private
use of a state statute barring claims in certain circumstances did not constitute sufficient
government involvement to require due process protections for cre?itors); Fl.agg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 1 49 ( 1 9 7 8 ) (private creditor using self help remedies authorized by state
law was not required to comport with any constitutional standards of due process) . .
332. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v . Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 1 79 ( 1 98 8 ) (NC�A is
not a government actor despite its compositi on as an organization of state as well as pnv� te
universities, the Association ' s coercive power over member schoo!s, � nd t�e �ffective
cooperation between the NCAA and the University of Neva�a m mvesll�atmg and
imposing sanctions on the plaintiff) ; San Francisco Arts & Athlell�s, Inc. v. ymte? States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987) (United States Olymp�c Committee is n�t a
government actor despite its creation by federal law, ext�ns1ve �e eral regul�t1on,
.
statutorily granted exclusive control of the use of the word Olympic and associated
symbols, standby public financing, and role representing the nation in international athletic
organizations) .
·

�
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in the inescapable reality that governments and laws pervasively regulate
private as well as public relationships in soci ety. G overnments always
decide, th rough law, which actions will be requ i red, permitted or forbid
den. A private party can infringe t h e rights of a nother only if the
government, in its capacity as the author and enforcer of laws regulating
private interactions, constructs the leg a l system to pe rmit such action by
that priva te party. The government is i n this sense a s responsible for the
private infringements permitted a s it is for the infr i ngements directly
commanded. 333 Thus, any court seeking to base a conceptually consistent
set of constitutional limits on the state action concept is presented with a
Hobson's choice. A court can admit that state action is u biqui tous and that
constitutional rights potentially apply u n iversally, or it can reformulate the
doctrine to impose essentially arbitrary restrictions on the part icular types
of relations between the government and the infringement that are
sufficient to trigger application of constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court a nd some state courts are commit
ted to using the state action doctrine to create a conceptual distinction
between cases where constitutional rights are opera tive and cases where
they are not . As a result, they have had to redefine the state action doctrine
to impose l imits on the kinds of state involvement with private activity that
will satisfy the requirement. As defined by the Suprem e Court, the state
action concept no longer involves a n inquiry into the relations hip between
the questioned private activity and the matrix o f state power that

333. This point has been raised repeatedly in academic literature. See Brest, supra
note 325, at 1 3 1 5-22; Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and
"Power Theory" Approaches, 1 979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 760; Glennon & Nowack, s upra
note 6, at 229-30; Horowitz, supra note 327, a t 209.
On the federal level, the argument that governments have a constitutional obligation to
act to insure the re�lization of rights has never prevailed. On the contrary, the Supreme
Co��t recently remmded us that the Constitution imposes no affirmative obligation on the
pol1ti�a� branches of government to take positive action to support the constitutional rights
.
of md!Vl� uals, even w h�re such aid or action "may be necessary to secure life, liberty or
property mte�ests of which the governmen t itself may not deprive the individual. " Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 1 09 S . Ct. 3040, 305 1 { 1 989) (quoting DeShaney v.
.
,
Wm�ebago County �ep t of Social Servs., 1 09 S. Ct. 998, 1 00 3 ( 1 989)) . On the state
.
constitutional level, m contrast, the issue is less clear.
Regardless of t�e merits of such argume nts, however, the thesis presente here not
is
d
.
�ased on any obhg
� tion �n the part ?f non-judicia l governmental authorities to affirmatively
mtervene when private rights confhct. Rather , the argument is tha t
the government always
sets the rules of �he game, and so i responsible for the results tha
t those rules foreseeably
�
engender. Thus, �nsofa r as state action theory posits a class of infring
ements of rights where
.
the �overnment is not mvo�ved and bears no responsibility, it is
a n incorrect description of
reahty. See Southcenter Jomt Venture v. Natio nal Democ
raticP ol'y Comm 1 1 3 Wash . 2d
"
4 1 3, 459-60, 780 P.2d 1 282, 1 3 05-06 ( 1 989) ( Utter, J.,
concu rring ).
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authorizes that private activity.3 34 Rather, it involves separate and
narrower question s: w hether some governm ent rule mandated the alleged
viol ation; whether a government officia l actively willed or carried out the
alleged violation ; or, alternati vely, whether the power wielded by the

allegedly private infringer is "exclusiv ely" committed to the govern
ment.836 Certainly some distinctio n may exist between governm ent action
or inaction that directly violates rights and that merely permits violations
of rights by others. H owever, the difference i nheres in only the manner and

degree to which state officials directly participate in the violation, not in
any clear distinction between whether state power is involved as a
background element of that violation. Similarly, while a conceptual
distinction may exist in principle between those activities conceded to be
"traditionally" or "exclusively" governmental and other activities that are

not, the line between the two is hazy a t best and has further blurred over
time.899
·

This shift of analytic focus from broadly defined state action to narrow
concepts involving state officials a n d "exclusive" state fonctions has
exacerbated two fundamental problems for the position that the state
action doctrine is an appropriate mechanism to limit application of
constitutional rights . First, to the extent that the existence of state action
turns on the existence and actions of state officials, the determination of
whether constitutional protections a pply will necessaril y depend on inci
dental facts in what are otherwise functionally identical cases. For
example, assume a statutory scheme regulating self-help by commercial
creditors or providing for the extinguishment of claims among private
parties. If this scheme happens to require a state official to perform even a
purely ministerial act, state action w i l l be found and constitutional rights
will apply.337 I f the same result is achieved through a statutory scheme
334. See Phillips, supra note 3 25, at 7 1 9 (noting that the Supreme Court's r�cent
cases did not consider the relations between the government and the allegedly private
infringer cumulatively; rather, each contact was examined separately and sequentially).
See also Brest, supra note 325, at 1 3 1 5-23 (arguing that the matrix of st�te power that
supports the creditor's actions is no different in Sniadach, where state action was found,
than in Flagg Bros., where it was not).
335. See supra note 329.
.
336. For example, mail delivery and pris�n . oper�tions were once ��elusive and
traditional functions of governme nt. Today, mall is d�hvered by th� sem1-mdependent
United States Postal Service and by a host of purely private corporations. Movements to
"privatize" prisons and other once governm e�tal fun�t�ons are widely afo.ot_. C�,nvers_el�:
other functions once performed entirely by pnvate entities - such �s prov1dmg chanty
for the poor or operating bridges - now are performed almost entuely by governments:
( 1988),
337. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. , Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487
.
2)
8
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 ( 1 9
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omitting the ministerial act or otherwise ma king the deprivation self
operative, state action will not be presen t and constitutional rights will not
apply.338 As even so staunch an opponent of the expansio n of constitutional
rights as Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, such a d i st inction makes no
sense.339
Second, adherence to a state action req uirement, na rrowly defined,
significantly limits the effective const i tutional protection of individual
rights. The category of government fun ctions sufficiently .. traditional" and
"exclusive" for finding state action u nder current federal defin itions is
small. 340 Under both lines of a nalysis, the state act ion doctrine has
rendered courts unable to vindicate basic rights in some ci rcumstances
where intuition and equity dictate otherwise.30
These difficulties cannot be resolved simply by broadening the
definition of state action for state constitutional purposes . 342 First, there is
little theoretic reason to suppose that t h e content of the state action concept
- assuming that such a req u i remen t were to be i m ported into state
constitutions at all - should systematically differ depending on whether a
state or the federal constitution is at i ssue. Such differences do not, for
example, appear to be supported by considerations o f federa lism or other
criteria of the sort usually relied upon to justify state divergence from
federal precedent. 343
338. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 5 1 6 ( 1 982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S . 149
(1 978).
339. 485 U.S. at 492-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) .

340. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 3 3 3 , at 778-80 (noting that schools, recreational
parks, and public services would not fit within the current federal definition of "public
function").
34 1 . The results reached under the current federal definition of state action have, at
one time or another, offended the perceptions of most of the Justices themselves. See, e.g.,
�ation�I �o�legiate Athl.etic Ass'n v . Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 1 7 9 ( 1 98 8 ) (White, J.,
d1ssen�mg, JOmed b;Y Justices Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor); San Francisco Arts &
�thletI_cs, I�c: v. United St�tes Olympic Comm., 4 8 3 U.S. 522, 548- 7 3 ( 1 98 7 ) (Brennan, J.,
JOtned by Justice Marshall and, in relevant part, by Justices O'Connor and
d1ssentmg,
��ackmun); F�agg Bros . v . Brooks 436 U.S. 1 49, 1 66-79 ( 1 9 7 8 ) (Marshal l, J., dissenting,
JO�ne<! by Justices Stevens and White) . They also have engendered considerable academic
.
cnt1c1sm. See supra notes 325 & 327. Most disturbing are the results in San Francisc Arts
o
& Ath/etics and Nati m I Coflegiate Athletic Association,
where entities capable of
r; '!
.
.
w1eldmg great power w1thm their respec�ive spheres - power that was delegat
ed in part by
.
govern�ents -:- ��re held to have const1tutional
obligations no differe nt than those of the
most pnvate md1v1dual.
3� 2 . seecas�s cited supra notes 82-92, 1 3 8-49 & 1 1 8-92
. See also Note, "Malling" of
.
Constztutwnal
Rights, supra note 22 at 1 20-25 (proposing
a loo sened version of the
. '
"publ'1c function strand of state action
analy
sis
that
would
inclu
de shoppmg cen ters as
.
c
"state actors" ior
state const1tut1onal purposes).
343. See generally Comment, Interpreting
the State Constitution: A
nd
•

.

·

·

"

·

.
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Second, courts that have retaine d state action requirements in
ned form have found that this a pproach also l eads to arbitrary
ade
bro
distinctions between functional ly similar cases. For example, several
courts rejected federal analyses and constructed a broad definition of state
action in state due process challenges to creditors' self- help remedies by
distinguishing statutes that expand common law remedies from those that
merely codify pre-existing common law. The rationale for this distinction is
that the former class of remedies involve " state action" because the remedy

was created by the legislature's affirmative act. 30 In contrast, remedies
that do not alter common law, although codified, are not viewed as created

by the legislature, and therefore do not involve state action.346 The
distinction proved useful to courts that wanted to expand the application of
state due process protections without abandoning the state action doctrine
entirely,14' and was one of the grounds.relied upon by the New York Court

of Appeals to derive the "flexible" a pproach to state action a nnounced in

Sharrock.a."
Such distinctions between remedies rooted in a state' s common law
tradition and those created or modified by statute are, however, no less
arbitrary than the d istinctions drawn in federal state action cases. The
precise contours of common law creditors' rights varies from state to state.
Thus, such a distinction may lead to anomalous results because identical
remedies used i n identical circumstances could be subject to constitutional
restraint in one state, but not in another, depending upon how and when the
remedy entered each state's j urisprudence. 348 Furthermore, such a distinc-

Assessment of Current Methodology, 3 5 U . KAN. L . REV. 593, 604- 1 1 ( 1 987) (discuss_ing
various factors state courts have relied on to justify divergence from federal precedent) . But
see Williams, supra note 275, at 3 8 9-402 (arguing that state constitutional interpretation
can be wholly independent of federal precedent and that divergence needs no j ustification) .
344. See, e.g., Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 7 Cal. 3d 8 0 3 , 8 1 4- 1 6, 553 P.2d
637, 644-46, 1 3 2 Cal. Rptr 477, 484-86 ( 1 976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 ( 1 977)
(mechanic's lien and stop notice); Adams v . Department of Motor V chicles, 1 1 Cal. 3d 1 46,
153 n.1 3, 520 P.2d 96 1 , 965 n. 1 3 , 1 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 1 45 , 1 49 n. 1 3 ( 1 974) (garageman's lien

and sale).
345. See, e.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 1 Cal. 3d 3 52, 359, 5 2 1 P.2d 44 1 , 444- 5,
113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 452-53 ( 1 974); USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins
Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 1 1 , 1 5- 1 6, 348 N .E.2d 8 3 1 , 8 3 2-33 ( 1 976); National Airport Corp. v.
_
Wayne Bank, 7 3 Mich. App. 572, 5 7 5-78, 2 5 2 N .W.2d 5 1 9, 5 2 1 -22 ( l 977); Jefferds v. Elhs,
132A.D.2d 3 2 1 , 522 N . Y.S.2d 398 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , appeal dismissed, 70 N . Y .2d 1 002, 521 N.E.2d
445, 526 N . Y .S.2d 4 3 8 ( 1 988).
1 1 7, 1 2 1
346. See, e.g Martin v. Heady, 1 0 3 Cal. App. 3d 580, 587, 1 63 Cal. Rptr.
(1980). See supra note 1 9 1 .
379 N.E.2d 1 1 69,
347. Sharrock v . Dell Buick- Cadill ac, Inc., 4 5 N .Y.2d 1 52, 1 6 1 -62;

�

·

.•

1 1 74-75, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 45 ( 1 978).
� 1 97 8 ) ; Burke & Reber,
348. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v . Brooks, 4 3 6 U .S. 1 49, 1 62common
supra note 1 50, at 46-4 7 . Louisiana draws its private law from ctvlha n, rather than

��
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tion errs i n that i t regards statutes a n d case law as fun d amentally different
for state action purposes. Although there are differences between legisla
tors and judges, when they act i n t heir official capacities, it is on behalf of
the state. All law is a creature of t h e state, rega rdless of the creator's official
title. Thus, whether a private party who benefits from that law becomes
imbued with state action should not d epend upon w h ich type of official
made the law.3"9
Other cases attempting to formulate an expansive definition of state
action provide similar potential for a rbitrary distinctions. In Jones v.
Memorial Hospital System,300 Gay Law Students A ssociation

v.

Pacific

Telephone and Telegraph Co.301 a nd Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac,
/nc.,s02 the Texas, California and New York courts based their respective
conclusions that their broader sta ndards o f state action were met on a series
of inquiries into the relations between the alleged i nfringer and various
levels of government. All three purported to be close cases, such that any
change in the degree of the relationship could change the result. Thus,
minor differences i n the relations h i p between the i n fr i n ger and the state
may create arbitrary differences i n results, despite the irrelevance of the
relationship to the · nature of the rights at issue.
This is the fundamental problem. A n y "state action" requi rement, no
matter how defined, will prove unsatisfactory because b y defin ition it must
divert attention away from real issues, such as the nature of the contending
parties or conflicting rights, and focus attention instead on whether the
requisite relationship between t h e government and the private party
exists.363
V.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the scope of state constitutional righ ts guarantees must
be limit �d . Traditionally, such l i mits d eveloped through the concept of
state action . State guarantees were construed like their federal counte r
parts to prohibit only actions by state officials or by a l i m i ted class of private
law so�rces, therefore, this analys s might requ re courts
to consider virtual ly all creditors'
remedies as created by st� e a tton, a n subjec t
to the full rigor of state due process,
�
�
regardless of the countervailing interests mvolv
ed in particu lar cases. See Comment supra
note 1 5 0.
349. Cf Adi�kes v. S.H. Kress Co., 3 9 8 U.S.
1 44, 1 69-7 1 ( 1 970) (state action can be
found on the basis of mere custom havin
g the de facto force of law)
350. 746 S . W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App.
1 98 8 ) . See supra notes 8 3� 8 8 .
3 5 1 . 24 Cal. 3 d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 1 56
Cal. Rptr. 1 4 ( 1 979). See supra notes 1 38-48.
352. 45 N .Y.2d 1 52, 379 N.E.2d 1 1 69
, 408 N.Y .S.2d 3 9 ( 1 97 8 ) . See supra notes 1 7889.
353. See Skover, supra note 3, at
272.

�

�

!

•

·

1990]

ALTERNA TIVE LIMITS ON STATE RIGHTS

901

entities acting in concert with or in place of the government. But, while
there are exceptions, the language a nd drafting history of most state rights
guarantees

are

s ufficiently

indetermin ate

to

permit

alternative

interpretations.
Despite these possibilities, the recent trend of decisions and commen
tary has tended to reaffirm the need for state action limits on state
constitutional rights. Three rationales for t h is reaffirmation are prominent:
l) that the received American constitutional interpretation requires
resolving ambiguities in favor of binding only government actors; 2) that
construing constitutional rights guarantees to limit private parties imper
missibly infringes on those actors' competi n g rights; and

3)

that applying

constitutiona l norms to private d isputes usurps the primary role of
legislatures to regulate private parties.
These arguments constitute powerful reasons for developing princi
pled means to limit t h e application of state constitutional rights. However,
they do not demonstrate that such l i mits should be cast i n terms of state
action. On the contrary, the asserted principle that state constitutions do
not bind private parties rests upon s ha rp d istinctions between private and
public law, which would have been foreign to the original constitutional
drafters, and have never been rigidly a pplied. Moreover, the goals of
preserving individual autonomy, avoiding undue sacrifices between com
peting rights and securing the legitimate role of state legislatures can be
better achieved by a nalyzing these factors directly, rather than focusing on
a single inquiry into whether the i n fringing party is somehow connected to
the government.
Alternative limi ts on the rea c h of state constitutional rights can be
constructed and would more closely track the historical, individual and
structural interests a t stake. This artic l e proposes a t hree-step process
involving: first, a threshold determi n a tion o f whether the alleged infringer
was an individual acting within a s phere o f personal autonomy; second, a

prima facie

showing by the complainant that an important right was

significantly infringed by the defendant; and third, a balancing of the

parties' competin g i nterests on t h e merits. Such alternative limiting
principles would provide workable boundaries that are preferable to limits
based solely on state action concepts. U nlike state action t heories, this
analysis would not require state courts to accept or reject the federal
definition of "state action;" nor would it require courts to draw arbitrary
lines among the myriad ways in w h i c h t h e matrix of law and government
regulates private activity. By focusing a ttention on the parties and the
rights at stake, t h e proposed process would enable courts to protect
individual rights from a broader range of i n fringements as well as promote
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the development o f a consistent a nd convincing theory regarding why and
under what circumstances i ndividual rights should be vindicated.

